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Abstract
Food insecurity and chronic hunger are devastating global problems
currently facing more than a billion people. There are many actors involved in
the response to stomp out world hunger, including International NonGovernmental Organizations (INGOS). These INGOs, however, work in
tumultuous environments with limited resources. This dissertation examines the
INGOs involved in the food security dilemma (N=51) to investigate how they
use resources to reach hungry populations.
It is hypothesized INGOs use a mix of material resources and social
capital to enhance their organizational performance. However, little is known
about the impact these resources have on reaching communities in need. Social
network analysis is used to examine the connections between and among INGOs
to create a measure of organizational social capital. In addition, material
resources, such as human resources, revenue and volunteers are used to examine
an organization’s material capacity. Material and social resources are examined
through a moderated regression analysis to evaluate how they interact, and if the
promotion of both types of resources is beneficial to the INGOs and the
communities they serve. With data from over 1186 projects globally, results are
presented regarding the effectiveness of social capital and material resources in
reaching the world’s “bottom billion.”
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Preface
In this dissertation, I examine the concept of organizational social capital
and the interactive effects of social capital and material resources on achieving an
outcome. Analyses were conducted using a network of International NonGovernmental Organizations working in the food security sector (n=51). Taking
a sample of 1186 projects, I examined the social connectivity of these
organizations. The social capital measure is then examined taking into account
the interactive effects of material capabilities, such as revenue, human resources
and volunteers. It was found that both material and social resources have a
significant main effect and interactive effect when it comes to achieving
organizational outcomes.
Chapter 1 opens with an example of two INGOs, illustrating upfront the
role social resources can play in meeting organizational agendas. This chapter is
intended to give the reader a background in the subject areas this research
utilizes, including international politics, INGOs, food security and the current
crisis organizations working in relief and developing are currently facing. This
chapter introduced the research question and defined the problem, arguing the
necessity of studying the topic of INGO connectivity and effectiveness in more
detail.
After an introduction to the topics is presented, Chapter 2 hones the
theoretical motivation and new conceptual model. The concepts of food security,
material and social capital and organizational outcomes are examined. A large
x!

contribution of this work is evident in the development of a new concept never
before applied to a global sample.
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical work in the area of social capital. This
chapter focuses exclusively on empirical studies (qualitative and quantitative)
that provide insight into the current state of research regarding social capital in
organizations. I explore the definitions, conceptualization and measurement of
an abstract concept, providing evidence of the need for this research project.
Networks and Social Network Analysis (SNA) are introduced in Chapter
4. Using the 1186 global projects, I create a network, connecting INGOs (nodes).
The 51 INGOs in this network are connected using a local level proxy, enabling
examination of their social capital to be explored empirically. The design, data,
concepts, methods and results are presented in Chapter 4. It is found that not all
the organizations forming the core of the network are those organizations with
high levels of material resources, warranting further examination into the
interaction of material and social capabilities.
Chapter 5 uses the information gleaned from Chapter 4 to take the
analysis a step further. Given the social mechanisms explored in Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 introduces three inferential models, including a moderated regression
analysis that examines the empirical relationship between material and social
capital. The results indicate there is a significant predictive relationship between
the variables of interest, and a non-linear relationship exists when material

xi!

resources are introduced as a moderator variable between social capital (x) and
organizational reach (y).
In an attempt to bring the theory and empirical results to life, I use a case
specific example in Chapter 6. I provide a narrative, illustrating what these
mechanisms and relationships actually look like in real life. Mercy Corps was
chosen as the organization of focus based on my personal knowledge and social
connections. The information was gathered from published work, interviews
with employees and a site visit to the organization.
Finally, I review my findings and offer a future research agenda in
Chapter 7. My efforts to collect an original data set and develop a new theory
were able to answer some of the important questions regarding INGOs and
social capital. In Chapter 7, I explain how future research should proceed to
answer these questions.
As a full disclosure, I would like to mention that I previously worked at
Mercy Corps as a manager in the Learning and Organizational Effectiveness
division. During that time, I conducted fieldwork, and liaised with field teams in
49 countries. This knowledge fuels my research interests and assists in providing
illustrative examples of this work.
All of the work presented here was conducted while at Portland State
University and is approved by the Human Subjects Review Committee
(#122372). The data collection procedure, analysis and methods are utilized in

xii!

this dissertation in their original form and have not been used for previous
publications.
As with any large academic product, this project would have not been
possible without the assistance of my committee, family, colleagues and friends.
I would like to reiterate my appreciation for my committee members and family
for their time and energy in assisting me accomplish this goal.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement
Hence, international co-operation and solidarity and the relentless search for consensus
become an absolute imperative. They are the only possible alternative for all nations,
whose interdependence is being made increasingly manifest by the rapid development of
production technology, of transport and communications, as well as by the overhanging
threat of deterioration of the environment and exhaustion of natural resources. And what
is one to say of the frightful accumulation of means of destruction in a world facing the
no less frightful problems of hunger, disease and ignorance?
Federico Mayor, Address to the "Symposium 80" on International Cultural Relations:
Bridges Across Frontiers, Bonn, 27 May 1980
A Tale of Two Organizations
Mirroring the quote from Federico Mayor above, International
Organizations, much like nation states, can benefit from collaboration to fight
against global problems like hunger and disease. Organizations thrive under a
myriad of organizational and social environments. However, the power of social
relationships is underestimated in organizational development (Cross and
Parker 2004; Andrews 2010). In fact, some scholarship argues that developing
social partnerships can harm an organization (Pennings 1998; Durlauf 1999). The
strength of social relationships can be examined through the story of two
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)- World Vision and
Food for the Poor. These two organizations have much in common. They have
1!

roughly the same material resources and each organization has a revenue equal
to $1.5 billion.1 They are both religious Christian organizations with a mission to
serve the poor and feed the hungry. These two organizations, when examined
based on revenue and ideology, are equal.
Reaching hungry people is one organizational outcome established for
food security programs. World Vision and Food for the Poor are, however, very
different when it comes to feeding hungry populations. While World Vision
ranks first for reaching people, Food for the Poor ranks twentieth. In more
concrete terms, this means World Vision reaches 47 million more hungry people
each year with the same material resources as Food for the Hungry. In addition,
World Vision is able to offer programs in over 100 countries, where Food for the
Poor operates in 17 countries, all in the Caribbean and Latin America2. One
might expect material resources equate to similar organizational outcomes. There
must be something to account for the inequality.
Why do two organizations, both from the same sector, with analogous
missions and values, both seeking to reduce world hunger, achieve such
drastically divergent results with exactly the same resources? I examine this
phenomenon, arguing we must pay closer attention to the direct connection
between social resources (an organization’s social capital) and its ability to serve
its beneficiaries. Here, contrasting World Vision and Food for the Poor is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Both organizations of in the top 5 of the 51 organizations examined in this study for revenue.
In Figure 1.1, on page 6, you will see that the most needy areas in the world are not Latin America and the
Caribbean.
1
2
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enlightening. One area where these two organizations fall on complete opposite
ends of the spectrum is their ability to form relations with other INGOs. World
Vision ranks second in my social capital measure, which is discussed later in this
chapter. They are at the top of the ‘food chain’ in their ability to partner and reach
vulnerable populations. Food for the Poor, on the other hand, is nearly last; they
rank 45 out of 51 organizations. It is reasonable to assume, given the drastic
difference in the number of people assisted (47 million hungry people) that social
capital deserves attention to assist policymakers and INGO leaders in examining
resources, both material and social. I examine the food security network,
introduce methods for assessing social capital in organizations and seek to
understand to what extent social capital in the INGO sector assists in achieving
an important mission to stomp out world hunger.
Introduction: INGOs and Food Security
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs), like World Vision
and Food for the Poor, are now one of the largest categories of international
organizations in the world.3 The study of international organizations is well
established. Current scholarship is growing within the international relations
field. There are studies of organizational influence and interdependence
(Keohane and Nye 2001; Rosecrance et al. 1977; Tarrow 2005) international
organizational norms (Barrett and Finnemore 1999), and organizational
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

As of 2000, there were 45,674 international NGOs (see Ahmed and Potter 2006 and Boli and Thomas).
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governance and decision-making (Alison 1972; O’Neal 1990). INGOs are
important actors in global politics for three reasons. INGOs respond to global
emergencies where states are unable or unwilling to act; they propel the
emergence of new norms in an age of interdependence among states, challenging
policy decisions; and they challenge the traditional power structure of
international relations theory. Therefore, INGOs deserve further exploration in
international relations scholarship.
There are, however, few studies of international organizations and the
power they acquire from social interactions. Connections and social capital can
be a powerful asset to organizations, especially those operating in isolated
environments. When we narrow the focus further to non-governmental
organizations, we find little literature focusing on social capital of these
organizations. This is puzzling, as the INGO sector is based on global
partnerships, community building and collaboration. Why then, have we seen so
little in terms of the examination of the roles social resources play in the
promotion of these organization’s goals and missions in scholarly research?
I create a new model for examining organizational capacity, taking into
account material resources, such as revenue and human resources, as well as
social resources, which are historically underrepresented. In order to build these
new measures and test the affects of social capital, I have chosen a sector that is

4!

extremely relevant with growing international food prices, drought and global
crises—food security.
There are currently one billion hungry people in the world, 90 percent of
which are chronically hungry and malnourished. This is more than the
population of the United States, Canada, and the EU combined (The Hunger
Project 2011). Currently, 35 million people live with HIV/AIDS worldwide—not
even half the number affected by malnutrition. In addition, of the world’s 1.4
billion poor, 75 percent live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture and
related activities (FAO Report 2010). Hunger remains among the world’s top
public health challenges. UNICEF estimates that 60 percent of child deaths in
developing countries are from malnutrition. Those lucky enough to survive
hunger in the early stages of life are at risk for irreparable physical and mental
health issues as adults.
Food security is a global problem, although it effects certain regions more
predominantly. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the main concentration of global
food insecurity from the World Food Programme perspective (2012). An
examination of this map illustrates that although food insecurity is a global
problem, the most effected areas are primarily in Africa and South Asia

5!
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Source: World Food Programme’s Website, 2013!

(U.K.)

While food is the
most basic of human
needs required for survival,
on average, 1 in 8 people
go to bed hungry
each night.

It costs on average
just US 25 cents a day to
feed a hungry child and
change her life forever.

FIGURE 1.1: The WFP Global Hunger Map!
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Sudan
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and over
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*** Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

** A dispute exists between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands (Malvinas).

* The Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed on by India and Pakistan is represented approximately by a dotted line. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has
not yet been agreed on by the parties.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal
or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

© 2012 World Food Programme

Source: FAO, IFAD and WFP. 2012. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012: Economic growth is necessary but
not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition. Rome.

The map shows the prevalence of undernourishment in the total population as of 2010 – 2012. The indicator is an
estimate of the percentage of the population having access to an amount of energy from food insufficient to maintain a
healthy life. Further information is available at www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/
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Food security has attracted attention in international policy forums. The
United Nations (UN) established eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
ranging from decreasing extreme poverty rates to ending the spread of
HIV/AIDS, to opening access to universal primary education. The MDGs were
established as a roadmap for all countries and development leaders. They
provided agreed upon goals, with a target completion date of 2015. To address
growing food insecurity, MDG number one is to reduce global poverty and
hunger, illustrating the prominence of the issue and the necessity of a structured
response. However, the UN’s data in Figure 1.2 below illustrates, despite efforts
to increase programs to target hungry people, the 2015 targets are looking grim.
The final measurements regarding MGD goals will likely disappoint policy
makers. With results less than impressive, INGOs are inevitably going to face
challenges in changing programs and organizational practices to achieve lasting
results. Figure 1.2 below illustrates progress in Eastern Asia, South-Eastern Asia
and Latin American countries is almost diminished when we consider the drastic
setbacks in Africa and the Southern and Western regions of Asia over the last
decade. With new programs implemented at the turn of the century,
development experts expected more positive results. While declines in hunger
were once trending in a positive direction prior to the global market collapse in
the early part of the new millennium progress has now slowed drastically.
Estimates suggest that if contexts in the poorest nations do not change by the
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year 2020, we can expect the numbers of men, women and children fighting
preventable water-borne diseases, malnutrition and even death, will rise.
FIGURE 1.2: Millennium Development Goal Chart
Setbacks on hunger nearly outweigh progress
Region
Change in number of people with insufficient food
between 1990-2000 (millions)
Eastern Asia
-47
South-Eastern Asia
-12
Latin America & Caribbean
-7
North Africa
+1
Western Asia
+8
Southern Asia
+15
Sub-Saharan Africa
+34
Source: Millennium Development Goals Report, United Nations (2005, 8).

Figure 1.2 illustrates the lack of progress in an area desperate for improvement,
as 3.5 million children continue to die each year from starvation (Action Against
Hunger Website, October 2013). In fact, they estimate:
The number of undernourished people in developing countries using the
old estimate was 824 million in 1990-92. In 2010-2012, the number had
increased to 870 million people. So rather than being cut in half (to 420
million), the number has increased to 870 million (worldhunger.org
October 2013).
These statistics demonstrate the current response is inadequate, however, little
information exists that assists INGOs and policy-makers in building sustainable
solutions to combat the challenge.
In order to reach the larger growing food insecure population, I argue
INGO’s require social and material resources. INGOs, such as OXFAM, Save the
Children, Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Services, currently provide an avenue
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for reaching the world’s “bottom billion”4 –those suffering from severe poverty,
malnutrition and insecurity (Collier 2007). These organizations are pivotal in
enabling a global response to stomp out hunger. They also provide related
services such as creating access to clean water and administering vaccines
against deadly diseases. Although INGOs work in many areas, I focus on food
security programs these organizations developed and implemented. The
programs I examine aim to provide access and means of producing enough of
the right kinds of foods to provide healthy and nutritious choices for those facing
daily hunger. There are 51 such INGOs focusing on food security as one of their
major goals. I examine all 51 organizations to develop a complete global
network. This examination will allow a bird’s eye view of the organization’s
connections and resources, both within and outside the organization.
Understanding both the social and material resources and their interaction is
essential for INGO survival and achievement of their missions to alleviate the
pain and suffering associated with chronic hunger.
The ability of INGOs to respond to global emergencies, including growing
food insecurity, in any meaningful manner, is directly related to the resources
they are able to secure in relation to their missions. Yet their ability to respond is
constantly in jeopardy because these organizations, many of them working in
isolation, lack organizational capacity. An INGO’s effectiveness in targeting time
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
Paul Collier coined the term “bottom billion” in his 2007 book. Collier conceptualized the “bottom
billion” as those people in the world who have and are expect to continue, living under conditions of
extreme poverty, food insecurity, and limited access to development opportunities.
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and money to developing relations is tied to its ability to build organizational
capacity, drawing on both social capital and material resources. This dissertation
examines INGOs from a material and social standpoint to answer the following
research questions:
1. What makes INGOs effective? How can social and material resources be
differentiated to explain an INGO’s ability to reach hungry people?
2. How are social and material factors related to each other in the promotion of
global food security?
3. To what extent does an organization’s social capital predict its humanitarian
reach, when moderated by the organization’s material resources?
I propose that the organization’s social capital provides an alternative avenue for
reaching vulnerable populations. In order to examine these questions, I use
quantitative data to evaluate the material resources and social capital in relation
to reach, or the total number of people served by such organization’s food
security programs. In addition, a small sample of qualitative data gathered from
interviews will be used to further bolster the theoretical elements I aim to
develop for the use of organizational resources in Chapter 2.
Why Are an Organization’s Resources Important?
An INGO’s capacity to serve its constituency is dependent on its material
organizational resources, including its financial and human capital. It is also
dependent on social resources, such as its relationships with other actors
10!

engaged in the same and related relief activities. In a survey of 631 INGO
leaders (ALNAP 2012) from 183 organizations, this dilemma is highlighted.
These leaders were asked what they view as the largest hindrances to their
ability to deliver aid effectively. Seventy-five leaders agreed the biggest
challenge is related to poorly coordinated response efforts between INGOs. In
order to effectively respond, these organizations must coordinate. Ranking
second, was lack of funding, followed closely by social relations with local actors.
These results strongly suggest social relationships with local and INGO actors
and material resources are partly responsible for inadequate programs. Yet,
researchers have not taken this finding further to examine causal mechanisms or
developed predictive models to help aid organizations and policy makers in
combatting this challenge. The summary results of the survey can be found in
Figure 1.3 below.

11!

Figure 1.3: Survey Research Results Regarding INGO Resources

Biggest'Hindrances'to'International'Aid''
Poorly!Coordinated!Response!
Efforts!!
Inadequate!Funding!!
Not!enough!involvement!from!
local!actors!!

Number!of!Responses!!

Insecurity!(Violent!Crimes)!!
Limited!access!due!to!restricted!
host!government!
0!

20!

40!

60!

80!

Source: The State of the Humanitarian System, ALNAP, July 2012.

Despite understanding these resources are important, the interplay
between material and social capital capacities and the ability for INGOs to carry
out their humanitarian missions is understudied in social science literature. The
interaction of these two types of resources is important to understand. As
nonprofit organizations, INGOs must find the right balance between devoting
resources to networking and building relationships, on the one hand, and
competing with other INGOs in an effort to secure scarce funding for their work
and, ultimately, their organizational survival. To best assess the research
questions posited here, this manuscript is organized as follows. In the remainder
of Chapter 1, a brief overview of the concepts will be presented outlining key
12!

terms, including the importance of INGOs in world politics. I begin to discuss
the need for their material and social resources. Chapter 2 is devoted to an indepth discussion of the conceptual model, further developing the concepts
introduced here, as well as developing a theory of INGO resource interaction.
Chapter 3 will provide a literature review, used to explain areas to generate new
knowledge and build on existing research. Chapter 4 presents the design, data,
methods and analysis relating to social resources. Descriptive network results
will be presented to build the empirical social capital measure, using Social
Network Analysis (SNA). Inferential results, including a measure from SNA
results and moderated regression analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. In
Chapter 6, I present a brief narrative of one organization in the sample- Mercy
Corps, to illustrate my conceptual model in action. Finally, a discussion of the
importance and implications of this research is addressed in Chapter 7, with an
explanation of the goals of future research.
Importance of NGOs in World Politics
Nongovernmental organizations are important actors in global politics. As
international actors, they challenge traditional conceptions of power in
international relations theory. INGOs respond to global emergencies where
states are unable or unwilling to act, sometimes changing the policy decisions of
states. Together, they propel the emergence of new norms in an age of
interdependence. Currently, INGOs are key actors responding to global crises
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including climate change, poverty and hunger, the AIDS epidemic, and
catastrophic natural disasters including multiple tsunamis and earthquakes. It is
an understatement to say these organizations are essential to global governance.
These organizations enhance the global society’s capacity to respond to natural
and human-made emergencies.
INGOs play many roles in international politics; they are policy activists,
public educators, agenda-setters, monitors, project implementers and watchdogs
(Spiro 1995). The variety of roles they play highlights their unique position in the
governance system as catalyst of change. Understanding how and why INGOs
matter means taking a nuanced view of the international system whereby INGOs
are among the many players facing constraints and opportunities to effect
change in countries suffering and recovering from conflict, catastrophes, and
poverty.
The INGO sector has grown rapidly since the end of World War II, and
exponentially after the end of the Cold War.5 Most of these organizations are
located in America and Europe, although a few large INGOs are located in
Africa6. There are rival hypotheses regarding why this increase has evolved.
However, most scholars argue the transition is due to an international
environment that is moving from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world (Willetts 2001;
Lee 2006; Economist 1999; Mathews 1997; Risse-Kappen 1995). This means that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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6

As of 2000, there were 45,674 international NGOs (see Ahmed and Potter 2006 and Boli and Thomas).
Africare is one example of a large Southern NGO (SNGO).
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while the largest and most economically equipped nation states were the main
actors internationally prior to the Cold War, we now see other means of
international pressures, including actions from non-state actors and
multinational corporations. Some argue the rise is partly due to globalization
and our ability to communicate and travel across borders with ease (Singer 2002;
Rosenau 1980). Others argue increased affluence is responsible. Through a
correlation analysis between the rise in INGOs and status and credential
variables, such as the number of people earning advanced degrees, Turner
concludes that these elements co-vary (2010). Lester Salamon combines the
above reasons stating that growth is due to three factors: the global
communication revolution, the retreat of the nation-state, and economic growth
or affluence (2006).
The less studied, but more powerful explanation, relates to the
international institutional structures developed to support INGO participation.
This argument is parallel to the argument that there are many players in world
politics aside from just nation-states. However, the international
institutionalization argument does not suggest that nation-states are losing as
much prominence (see Willetts 2001). It is suggested that with the development
of the League of Nations, non-governmental participation was encouraged,
laying the stage for enhanced participation later. When the UN took over for the
League, and after the 1945 San Francisco conference, INGOs found a permanent
home in the intergovernmental (IGO) structure. During the drafting of the UN
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charter, INGOs were invited to participate and were instrumental in formulating
the preamble. Subsequently, the UN, through the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) created an INGO branch institutionalizing the partnership. The
“NGO charter,” under Article 71, entitles NGOs to act as consultants to the UN
on a variety of policy issues (Spiro 1995). Currently, over one thousand NGOs
have consultative status, which is far greater than the ninety participating in
1949.
INGOs have gained momentum in the international system over the last
forty years. Government support for INGOs also grew during the 1970s and
1980s. In 1973, the U.S. Congress mandated a “new direction” for development
and switched to supporting INGOs directly, in addition to supporting these
organizations through large bureaucratic aid agencies. INGOs, the Congress
believed, were in a better position, compared to large donor agencies, to reach
the poorest of the poor worldwide. The 1980s were coined the “development
decade” and INGOs seemed to become a favored partner of governments. The
transition was reflected in the levels of official development assistance (ODA) to
INGOs, which grew from $1 billion in 1970 to $7 billion in 1990 (Ahmed and
Potter 2006).7 Additional resources created opportunities for INGOs to
participate more broadly and influence global culture.
The rise of INGOs and their partnerships with states and IGOs has created
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

“In 1992, NGOs provided $8.3 billion in aid to developing countries, representing 13 percent of development
assistance worldwide. Securing government action is no longer always necessary to the bottom line” (Spiro
1995, p. 4).
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momentum for the expansion of a global civil society characterized by a variety
of horizontal relationships alongside vertical power structures. Global civil
society gave rise to collective action by groups whose activities are held together
by common purposes. Global civil society is said to be located outside the state,
but above individual non-state actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998) take the idea
further and suggest that the linkages among these actors in world politics form
networks. Their concept of transnational advocacy networks suggests that
INGOs and their interactions fall somewhere between civil society, domestic
governments, and international organization. Here, the interplay between
communities, governments, and INGOs forms a unique organization structure.
Actors work both in collaboration and competition with one another to address
such issues as global hunger.
The INGOs studied here work with an organizational imperative to
alleviate pain and suffering. As global food insecurity rises, the need to work to
combat hunger and advance development increases dramatically. Emergency
response efforts often include any combination of local, regional and
international action. However, the state of the international non-profit relief
organizations is under increased strain. The INGO sector is facing human capital
shortages, increased needs for response efforts and competition for scarce
programming resources and grant funding from donor organizations.
Considering these challenges, INGOs are squeezed between the need to create
programs and deliver necessary services and the need to develop material
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capacity, including after-action reviews and data collection to improve future
efforts. With natural disasters increasing in frequency and scale and food
insecurities at an all-time high, there are two strains that limit INGOs ability to
direct their own food security programming agendas, making them more
vulnerable to resource dependency. The resource dilemma and donor
dependency problems both play a role in INGO fieldwork and priority setting,
moderating the reach to communities, which will be examined later in this
research.
Organizational Resources and Challenges
All organizations face challenges, from vitality and relevance to stability
and longevity. INGOs prove no exception. As such, INGOs expand capacity
based on two divergent, yet related types of resource. I term these material
resources and social capital. By material resources, I mean the staff (leadership
teams, employees, volunteers) and total revenue (from contracts, grants and
donations). Together, the staff and funds available to the organization shed light
on the organization’s ability to complete projects and reach vulnerable
populations. These resources are examined to gauge an INGO’s reach, or the
number of food insecure people they serve. Studies in the INGO literature that
discuss organizational capacity focus on what I call material resources. Based on
the number of employees and size of the budget, material resources can be used
as a measure of influence. Considering only material resources, especially given
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the environmental context in which these organizations’ work, explains little.
Relationships with other organizations provide an enhanced ability to respond to
emergencies and build programs based on each organization’s comparative
advantage, such as the case with World Vision and Food for the Poor introduced
at the beginning of this chapter.
While material resources are important, an organization’s capacity is also
sensitive to its environment and social resources. By social resources, I am
referring to the organization’s collaboration with partners, former colleagues and
other INGOs working in analogous communities, which forms the organization’s
social capital. In addition, INGO and donor relationships are relevant to an
organization’s social capital. Organizations with a proven track record,
including long-term servicing of government grants, tend to be funded on multiyear and multi-award contracts. Given the diminishing development assistance
funds, importance is placed on established relationships. Relationships with
donors create a connection to funding opportunities, and therefore can increase
material resources simultaneously. Therefore, INGOs’ ability to develop such
partnerships becomes imperative for organizational survival. Here, I am
proposing that examining relations between and among INGOs and donors is an
alternate way of examining an organization’s resources— the organization’s
“social capital.”
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Organizational social capital is a complicated concept. I am using this
term to refer to the relationships the organization secures, which can be thought
of as their professional “friends” or “network.” The extent to which an INGO
networks, creates lasting relationships and communicates with other
organizations, can be seen as an asset. I propose that the organization’s social
capital provides an alternative avenue for reaching vulnerable populations. It
provides a resource outside material resources, including the ability to raise
money and hire highly qualified people. Within the challenging environment
that these organizations work, developing high levels of social capital may be
beneficial, but this hypothesis has yet to be tested. Within the INGO community,
anecdotal remarks suggest that social capital of these organizations helps
improve programming decisions, funding coordination and reach. Empirically,
however, no current measure or test of the impact of social capital exists in this
sector.
Moreover, INGOs face a range of pressures related to the work they do
and the material and social contexts in which they must operate. First, they face
a plethora of material challenges. To carry out their work, they need strong
leadership teams, knowledgeable staff, and support personnel with a proven
ability to reply to and receive funding.8 Capacity is built through surmounting
the challenge of recruiting and retaining staff in a highly competitive
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In most large INGOs, over 50% of their funding comes from government grants, and therefore
requires a strong ability to respond to requests for assistance (RFAs) from organizations like USAID
and DFID.
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environment, with limited monetary resources at their disposal. For example, in
2004, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami, INGOs including the largest such as
CARE, World Vision, Mercy Corps and Save the Children, all required highly
skilled water engineers to quickly protect the water tables after the flooding to
avoid contamination, with resulting threat of diarrhea, cholera, and typhoid
imminent. During a time of global catastrophe, these organizations were facing a
massive challenge to find, hire, orient, and deploy qualified professionals from a
very limited recruitment pool. Each organization, if competing with other
INGOs, would have to secure the necessary personnel to achieve their
programmatic goals and, inevitably reach affected communities alone. This
isolated agenda, however, is rarely successful. To be sure, INGOs needed a good
reputation to attract the best talent. Additionally, they need to offer the best
living arrangements, rest and relaxation packages, and compensation.
Overcoming the internal recruitment challenge means offering employee
support, training, and opportunities for advancement, whilst being compared to
the other organizations vying for the same personnel. Therefore, material
challenges and social pressures do not operate in a vacuum. They are sensitive
to the social challenges each organization faces.
As with material challenges, there are several social challenges INGOs
face. First and foremost, they must build relationships with other INGOs who
are often their rivals. These organizations compete to recruit employees and gain
access to scarce grant funds. With limited capacities, the ability to reach
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vulnerable populations depends on leveraged resources. INGO interaction takes
different forms. For example, INGOs collaborate on funding proposals, establish
best practices, and assist each other in providing housing and protection in the
field. When INGOs work in the same country and cooperate with the same
donors, they are connected intimately in the field. Considering food security, the
projects are themselves co-dependent (Pinstrup-Andersen 1999). The response to
food security issues requires collaborated efforts, such as simultaneously
addressing food insecurity alongside treating HIV/AIDS, access to clean water,
the development of sanitation infrastructure, and educating the community on
all of the aforementioned. As such, INGOs in the field tend to collaborate based
on their collective comparative advantage. Their interventions, then, tend to be
connected. Therefore, the social environments in which INGOs operate suggests
organizations working in the same location have programmatic connections.
Industry best practices suggest that when relationships are forged; the
opportunity for improved responses grows dramatically. For example, if Mercy
Corps and CARE propose a response to food insecurity in the Horn of Africa in
isolation, services can, and often are, duplicated; limiting the impact of scarce
resources. In order to develop collaborative responses, however, INGOs must
communicate, work together and be willing to establish partnerships, both
official and unofficial, to help the neediest populations. Without such
collaboration, the “NGO swarm,” is inevitable and the organization’s mission is
in danger (Cooley and Ron 2002). By NGO swarm, Cooley and Ron are
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explaining the effect of multiple INGOs working in the same location, without
collaboration, which evidence suggests is ineffective (Duffield 1993).
Partnerships are important, but funding is also essential to survive. In
most sectors, including those pertinent to food security, resources are scarce. The
dual imperative to secure funding and build partnerships can also create
organizational pressure. Most INGOs attempt to build diverse funding
portfolios, including a mix of government contracts, foundation grants and
private donations to alleviate fiscal pressures. However, the majority of INGOs
both currently and historically have strong government contract portfolios.
Servicing primarily government grants creates a tension between the
organization’s mission to remain apolitical and the public’s impression of these
organizations as servicers of government grants. The challenge arises when
INGOs are publicly aligned with political ideologies, especially in situations
where the alignment with a government entity can inhibit their ability to work
effectively in another state. For example, Mercy Corps is attempting to work in
the Afghan communities to limit opium production. However, they do not want
to take government grants to achieve the program goals because they could lose
the support of the Afghan communities, who have a high level of distrust of the
government. Here, Mercy Corps must forge a relationship with another INGO
who can work directly with the government, whilst Mercy Corps continues to
work at the community level. Understanding this organizational challenge
elucidates why we should focus on material and social challenges in tandem, as
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the mission and goals of the employees and organizations they serve are
sensitive to the social environments in which they operate. Table 1.1 below
summarizes the concepts that will be used in this dissertation regarding material
and social challenges, pressures and resources.
TABLE 1.1: Summary of Organizational Challenges, Pressures and Resources
Resources

Challenges and Pressures

Material
-Employees (leadership teams,
lobbying teams, paid staff)
-Volunteers
-Operating revenue (grants
and contracts)
-Recruitment and retention
-Lack of funding
-Other NGO competition
-Working in insecure
environments
-Providing employee support,
training and opportunities for
advancement
-Building diverse funding
base, including both
government and private
donors

Social
-Collaboration with other
INGOs and consortiums
-Partnerships with local NGOs
-Established relationships and
track records with donors
-Partnerships with businesses
-Building relationships with
other NGOs (whom are also
competitors)
-Operating in and across
niches
-Building trust with local
populations
-Including local partners in the
response efforts
-Operating as apolitical
organizations in political
environments

Influence and Survival in the Food Security Network
The unique challenge of operating in tumultuous environments with
limited resources drives a cultural adaptation of a network structure. Across all
sectors, INGOs have formed partnerships, such as LINGOS (Learning in INGOs)
and InterAction, which encourage inter-organizational collaboration and
information sharing. In the twenty-first century, a transition to seeing multiple
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actors in the governance system can be examined, which includes nongovernmental actors. This adaptation of the international system lends itself to a
network form of organization, rather than a bureaucratic or market-driven
system. Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy (2000, 48) identified the following major
evolutions in the government network system: (a) the traditional divides
between state, market and civil society are disappearing, while (b) the
interrelations between these spheres increasingly exceed the nation state, (c)
resulting in new coalitions between state agencies, market actors and civic
parties both on local and global levels (see also Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Marx
2011). Hence, interactions between and among actors are best conceptualized as
a network.
When INGOs operate as a network, they communicate frequently in the
field and through national headquarters, share human and other material
resources, and initiate programs based on comparative advantage. While large
INGOs operate programs in multiple sectors, most INGOs in fact have particular
operational niches, (Stoddard 2003). For example, CARE (food security),
Médecins Sans Frontières (health), and Oxfam (sanitation) and, Save the
Children, direct their programs at particular classes of beneficiaries. Therefore,
isolating and examining specific sectors within the INGO community may yield
insights about prominent actors and their relationships, the composition of
which is likely to vary. In sum, INGOs often become mutually dependent.
To be a powerful force in the food security network means more than the
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possession of financial resources and personnel. To be sure, such resources are
important to INGOs. For example, CARE is one of the largest INGOs in the
United States, operating with budget and staff numbers that far exceed many
other organizations, such as Africare, Concern Worldwide, and Food for the
Hungry. Nevertheless, some INGOs that lack these material resources have
managed to become prominent in the food security network, and effective in
carrying out their missions, by virtue of the relationships they develop with
other INGOs at both the international and local levels. The example regarding
World Vision and Food for the Poor at the beginning of this chapter illustrates
that similar material resource does not always mean analogous outcomes.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), for example, has built strategic partnerships with
Mercy Corps, World Vision, and CARE to expand their reach and deliver food
packages to insecure environments they might not otherwise be able to reach.
CRS, therefore, is not solely reliant on short-term contracts from state donors.
Moreover, due to their religious affiliation, they are able to diversify funds by
reaching out to Catholic dioceses in the United States and Europe.
Material resources do, to some extent, go hand-in-hand with the
development of ties among INGOs and donors, and these relationships in turn,
generate opportunities for accessing additional resources. However, there is also
reason to believe some organization that are poor in material resources, are able
to mitigate the disadvantages in carrying out their missions by relying more
heavily on relationships they have built over time with other actors in the food
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security network—that is, their social capital (Boli and Thomas 1999; Putnam
2000; Florini 2000; Salamon 2000). “NGOs live in a world where financial capital
is highly dependent on social capital—the reputation of an organization is
directly related to its ability to raise funds from governments and individuals”
(Salm 1999, 95).
Both material resources such as financing, staff, and volunteers and social
capital collaborations with other NGOs, local partners, and donors are essential
to an INGO’s effectiveness and longevity in the food security sector. INGOs need
to balance cooperation and coordination with the material imperatives of
organizational survival and growth. INGOs have developed strategies for both
organizational capacity building and the development of social relations. In
Chapter 6, a case example for Mercy Corps illustrates the types of collaborative
programs that depend on both material and social capital. To this end, INGOs
also need to diversify funds.
Because INGOs deal with constant human resource shortages, they are
engaged in recruiting and retaining a highly skilled workforce. Directing
resources to fundraising activities comes at some cost to assets available to
implement their assistance programs and carry out their mission. Socially, they
need to collaborate with other INGOs while at the same time competing with
them to secure scarce funding. INGOs also strive to maintain their autonomy,
balancing demands from donors against their own philosophies and experiences
concerning what works best in the field and what promotes the heath of the
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organization itself. Managing both material resources and social relations can
lead to competing initiatives to scale up and scale out; they must decide when to
use resources to build up material capacity and when to collaborate and build
social network capacity. A thriving organization strikes a balance between social
capital and material capacity building.
Developing Material Capacity and Social Coordination
As previously discussed, the challenges of staff recruitment and retention,
and the consequent push to build material capacity compete with the
organization’s imperative to dedicate resources to fundraising and
programming. These, and other demands on INGO resources, lead to more
donor dependency and encourages increased partnerships within the INGO
community in the global community—international and local—in an effort to
pool and leverage limited capacities. The food security network has become
more complex as a result, and navigating this terrain requires more staff and
other resources be dedicated to coordination and relationship building. When
successful, the INGO’s ability to reach its constituents is improved. When not,
the effort can further diminish the organizations material capability and
undermine its humanitarian mission.
Developing social capacity means building effective donor relationships
and creating working relationships with other INGOs. Evidence suggests tightly
run capital campaigns and collaborative INGO networks have a greater impact
on both funding and effective advocacy. The anti-landmine campaign is an
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example of INGOs forming a purposive international network and ultimately
influencing the policy agenda of a majority of states and key IGOs. This network
developed as a result of strategic relationships between and among international
and local NGOs.
There are many factors needed to develop social capital and relationships
with other competing agencies. As Yanacopulos (2005) argues, resource
dependent INGOs develop preferences for three strategies: coalition building,
tactical lobbying, and coordinated campaigning. Nelson (1996) supports this
argument and adds that coalitions form the basis for exerting influence over
donors. INGOs face a greater push to use partnerships, as the less developed
countries fight for a voice in their own development (Salm 1999). However,
where more coordinated effort and partnerships can lead to pooled resources
and greater reach, it can also lead to irrelevance or loss of autonomy, whereby
INGOs begin to experience countervailing imperatives, resist cooperation, and
strike more competitive postures. In different situational contexts, INGOs must
balance the need to cooperate with the need to maintain material capacity and
remain relevant within the food security network.
INGO success also depends on relationships with donors in the network.
Since the end of the Second World War, and especially since the INGO growth of
the 1980s, there has been an increase in the number of dollars distributed for
international development. The purpose of these funds is to develop better
standards of living in the third-world, reducing poverty and alleviating human
29!

suffering. INGOs, however, are often seen as agents and not partners with the
donors. INGOs have the clearest picture of what happens in the field and are in
a position to direct donor priorities. This rarely happens, however. Donors tend
to set the priorities and INGOs adjust to be competitive bidders for grants and
other aid allocations. As Ohanyan (2009, 476) states, “the inherent richness of
the interplay between NGOs and their donors mediates the linkage between
power differentials and policy outcomes.”
Studies have pointed to the frequency of complicated, often paternalistic
relationships between donors and INGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Edwards 1999;
Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Nelson 1997). As INGOs face material resource
scarcity, they are vulnerable to donor demands and priorities. Even when they
operate under a collaborative relationship, the INGO represents the interests of
the donor through acceptance of funds. Currently, CARE and Save the Children
have budgets with over 50 percent government short-term contracts. INGOs who
operate to service government grants risk losing sight of their humanitarian
missions.
There are costs to INGOs behaving like “public service” contractors in their
effort to adopt the proper mixture of assets in the service of both
humanitarianism and pragmatism (Madon 1999). INGOs have expanded
organizational capacities to make the best of their relationships with donors,
although their humanitarian missions may not be well served. As INGOs begin
servicing state needs and developing an uneven balance of ODA and private
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funds, they weaken their ability to assess situations on the ground and make
need-based decisions to allocate resources. INGOs like Mercy Corps, which
operate in food insecure environments such as Somalia, are at risk of becoming
enslaved to donor agencies. Most donor agencies have allocated limited
resources to Somalia despite the growing levels of malnutrition and starvation,
leaving the INGOs who operate there little room to develop programs to address
the documented needs. Instead, INGOs that are highly dependent on donor
agency funds may choose to service the perceived needs of the bureaucrats
rather than the perceived needs of the food insecure.
Moreover, INGOs acting as public service contractors become open to
scrutiny. The purpose of INGO activity was initially to act where governments
could not or would not. Servicing government grants, however, leads INGOs
back to becoming more political and less able to challenge states on areas of food
security programming. Cooley and Ron (2002, 13) state:
When an organization’s survival depends on making strategic choices in a
market environment characterized by uncertainty, its interests will be
shaped, often unintentionally, by material incentives.
Thus, when INGOs become public service contractors they are likely to accept
perverse incentives to secure survival. I posit, developing a diverse social
network can assist in combating this challenge.
Conclusion
As modern emergencies increase and the scale of demands rise, INGOs
must coordinate their limited capacities to effectively respond. Despite the
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MDGs effort to place importance on basic needs such as food and clean water,
the global community is still plagued with chronic hunger and food related
illness. Understanding the importance of material resources and social capital
can serve as a first step in identifying what an INGO needs to successfully carry
out its mission to alleviate pain and suffering of the world’s “bottom billion.”
Generally, INGOs lack the breadth or technical expertise and material resources
to launch responses in isolation. In sum, considering the co-dependence between
and among INGOs, an examination into their work without considering the
network structure within which they operate provides only a partial picture.
I examine the social and material capacities in tandem, illustrating how
organizations can use divergent sources of power to achieve their missions. In
Chapter 4, using 1186 projects delivered by INGOs, I examine social relationships
through Social Network Analysis (SNA). In Chapter 5, I examine the interactive
nature of these divergent resources through a moderated regression analysis.
The results indicated that social and material resources are important aspects in
reaching hungry people, although social resources can also harm an
organization, if material resources are not sufficient to withstand business
demands, which was contrary to my expectations.

In the next chapter, the

concepts introduced here will be fleshed out, building a theoretical model for
which the rest of this research is based, including the concepts of social capital,
material resources and organizational outcomes.
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Chapter 2: Resources and Reach: How INGOs Serve Hungry People

Introduction
In this chapter, I utilize multiple concepts to develop a model to measure
INGO performance, which encompasses different resource interactions. It is
posited that INGOs use a mix of resources to achieve their missions. Some of
those resources are material, such and human capital and revenue. Other
resources are social, gained through collaboration and fostering relationships
with other organizations, donors and public entities. The social resources form
the organization’s social capital. A theoretical representation of these resources
and their interactions is discussed, outlining the concepts and challenges related
to the following constructs: social capital, material resources, and organizational
outcomes. Information was gathered largely from the academic literature and
INGO reports. In an effort to build a thorough model, I also conducted
interviews with representatives from INGOs between December 2012 and March
2013. I conducted both in person and telephone interviews with influential
members, using a brief interview guide found in the appendix.
Prior to discussing the components of the theorized relationships between
social and material resources, the concept of food security is introduced. Next, a
brief explanation of INGO decision-making is discussed. Finally, the importance
of an INGO network is discussed. This chapter concludes with a complete
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overview of the theoretical model. I will then operationalize many of the
concepts developed here, when I present empirical models later in Chapters 4
and 5.
Food Security Overview
Food security can be a difficult concept to explain (Borton and Shoham
1998; Jaspers and Shohan 1999; Campbell 1991; Rosegrant and Cline 2003;
Pinstrup-Anderson 2009). INGOs are working to combat the world’s food
insecurity problem, addressing the millions of people who live each day without
enough to eat or the correct balance of nutrients to live active, healthy lives.
Therefore, INGOs are working to create a culture of food security. The word
“security” implies a sense of food safety, and that is not what we mean when we
examine food security. During the World Food Summit in 1996, the following
food security definition emerged, stating food security exists: “when all people
at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy
and active life.” Food security is a multifaceted concept, which includes both
physical and economic access to food. To meet the definition of food security,
programs must meet both a person’s dietary needs as well as their preferences
(Schanbacher 2010; WHO Website 2013). Across the globe, health problems
related to dietary excess and lack of access to food are an ever-increasing threat
(Barrett 2002). Moreover, malnutrition and food related illness coincide to create
additional risks to already vulnerable populations living in extreme poverty
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(WHO website 2013). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), food
security has three main pillars (2013):
•

Food availability: appropriate quantities of food available regularly.

•

Food access: sustaining sufficient resources to procure appropriate foods a
well-rounded and healthy diet.

•

Food use: appropriate use adhering to basic nutrition and care, including
appropriate use of water and sanitation practices.
Tackling the global food security dilemma is a complex sustainable

development issue, linked to personal health through malnutrition, but also to
sustainable economic development, environmental degradation, and fair trade
(Von Braun 1992; Pinstrup-Anderson 2009; Godfray 2010). Although there are
currently over 1 billion people in the world who are chronically food insecure,
there is debate around food security and the viability of action. According to the
WHO website (2013), some critics suggest that food insecurity is not as damaging
as international organizations suggest. Critics argue:

•

There is enough food in the world to feed everyone adequately; the
problem is distribution.

•

Future food needs can be met by current international production.

•

National food security is unnecessary due to global trade.

•

Globalization may lead to the persistence of food insecurity and poverty
in rural communities.
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Regardless of the debate and criticism, we have enough information to
show that food security is clearly linked to health and other outcomes such as
lower educational achievement and growth (Rosegrant 2001; Barrett 2002;
Tweeten 2008; McDonald 2010). Food security is also related to local economic
development efforts and poverty traps (Messer, Cohen and D’Costa 1998;
Tweeten 2008). Development experts argue with agriculture remaining the
largest employment sector in most developing countries, international
agriculture agreements are crucial to a country's food security and enabling
community’s access to employment (FAO Website 2013). Critics argue that trade
liberalization may reduce a country's food security by reducing agricultural
employment levels (Von Braun 1992; Godfray et al. 2010). However, critics of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) posit trade agreements pushing for
agricultural market liberalization threaten the food security of entire
communities, especially in the developing world (Dore 1983; Davis et al. 2001).

Food security is, and will remain, an important health and policy issue
throughout the 21st century (Brown 2011). Despite over fifteen years of efforts,
global food insecurity trends have worsened. Addressing food insecurity, as well
as the linked issue of poverty, remains at the top of the United Nation’s
development goals as a prominent area for international coordination and
attention (Barrett 2002; Schanbacher 2010). With the Millennium Development
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Goals (MGD) target completion date approaching9, much attention is being
directed at the cause and solutions to mounting food insecurity. INGOs are
leading the practical programming and policy debates surrounding food
security. This project explores the ways by which INGOs reach food insecure
populations, with an aim at shedding light on possible resource allocations and
policy prescriptions that might help increase an INGOs ability to provide
services to needy populations and create a more food “secure” world.

The trends in food security programs are traced to highlight why an
interconnected network approach to addressing food security is most
appropriate to combat the challenges programs have faced historically. Many
scholars outline the major developments in food security, from a change in
looking at food supply to examining the cycle of malnutrition and the link to
household security (Davis, Thomas and Amponsah 2001; Duffield 1993; Godfray
2010; Tweeten 2008). In order to create a system of sustainable solutions and
move away from the dependence on imports and foreign aid, scholars argue we
must develop solutions that promote knowledge transfers, aid reductions, and
respect the cultural elements of food production and farming in the developing
world. Each of these solutions can benefit from a network form of
communication and collaboration among the actors involved in food security
efforts. Von Braun states, “food security requires economic development and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
MDGs should be reached by 2015. We are in an interesting time for research and policy, as we now have a
good part of the MDG achievements behind us and we are able to assess the need for changes in the future to
address drastically unmet needs related to food access, health and nutritional variety.
9
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large-scale public commitment and is not achievable with a few cheap
interventions” and “nongovernmental organizations are important for
overcoming institutional deficiencies, but capital constraints are more difficult to
overcome” (Von Braun 1992, 4-3). As such, INGOs are the primary
implementers of food security projects, which can encompass a myriad of
elements, including water, sanitation, agriculture, livestock development and
microfinance. INGOs have limited material resources (Von Braun 1992).
Alternative avenues are necessary to provide the interconnected response called
on by experts in the food security field. INGO literature argues non-profits are
closest to the populations they serve. With growing policy failures paired with
the need to engage local partners, investigating the INGO response from a
network approach warrants examination (Boli and Thomas 1999; Edwards and
Fowler 2002; Madon 1999).
Overall, the need to evaluate future programs, and program specific
objectives, is an area ripe for research, and INGOs provide a great population for
investigation. Prominent food security author, Barrett, argues:
Where food aid was primarily seen as a lever to be used for diplomatic
ends, as a vent for farm surpluses, and as a trade promotion tool, the
dominant view of food aid since the early 1990s has been that of a safety net
used to guarantee access to food to the poorest population countries
(Barrett 2002, 49).
Barrett also points out many problems with targeting the right population for the
right reasons, other than over production or political ideology and providing the
right mixes of resources is problematic. In addition, the study of such
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phenomena is complicated by endogenous variables, a mix of indicators and
difficulty of identifying control variables that are observable. Regardless, the
argument that a mix of programming is necessary, as argued earlier, suggests we
need to examine the current food security sector response from an
interconnected approach, taking into account programs aimed at the primary
goals of food security and nutrition as well as secondary goals that include
gender equality, market integration, and irrigation systems. Projects linked to
both the primary and secondary goals are included in this project to assess the
sector systematically and identify gaps in the programs diversity and coverage.
An analysis covering the linked sectors and connections between actors can
illuminate areas for improvement in the development of food security programs.
INGOs: From Preference to Outcome

INGOs form the largest body of international organizations (IOs). They
work across humanitarian and emergency response sectors to combat global
crises, respond to natural disasters, and intervene during man-made
emergencies. The INGO sector has grown dramatically since the 1980s.
Sociologist Johann Galtung introduced an idea about governance relationships
that suggested the two prominent players—government and business—rely on
civil society and non-governmental agencies for stability. The non-governmental
sector, forming the base of a triangle was coined the “third force,” alongside
governments and business (Florini 2000). Today, there is mounting evidence of
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INGO’s “third-force” ability to pressure governments, change policy directions
and encourage international cooperation (Rosenau 1980; Barrett and Finnemore
1999; Sikkink 1993; Risse-Kappan 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).
From the landmine ban to human rights pressure in Argentina in the 1970s and
1980s, there are case specific examples of INGOs’ ability to put pressure on
governments and act as key players in changing the policy direction. Regardless,
there is limited literature that examines how global INGOs reach vulnerable
populations, and put pressure on decision-makers to motivate change, with
limited social and material resources.
INGOs tend to focus on issue areas directed at their organizational niche
(Spiro 1995; Ahmed and Potter 2006). For example, Mercy Corps focuses on
transitional programs between war or disaster and community development.
When we understand that INGOs are strategic decision-makers, we can examine
other motivations in project choice (Edwards 1999). In some instances, INGOs
choose projects due to their mission statements, feeling an obligation to respond
to alleviate pain, suffering, or mistreatment. For example, after a natural disaster
organizations such as the Red Cross, Save the Children, and Doctors without
Borders will respond because it is their organizational mission. The decision to
respond in these cases is not based on finances, professional networks, or other
issues. Therefore, understanding there are sets of organizational factors that
make-up the INGO portfolio helps to lay the groundwork for further exploring

40!

their actions at the sectored level (Nelson 1996; Boli and Thomas 1999; Salamon
2000).
Almost all organizations operate across and between sectors. For
example, some operate programs in both healthcare and agriculture (Madon
1999; Jordan 2000). The extent to which they broaden their scope often depends
on resources and capacity. Bread for the World, a small organization, focuses on
one sector, Food Security; while larger ones like CARE or World Vision have
over twenty sectors in which they simultaneously operate. Sectored diversity
can be seen as an asset, operating in myriad sectors may also act as a strain on
the organization, requiring additional funding, employee expertise and financial
assets. Regardless, the organizational mission and sector specialties provide
guidance of an organization’s preferences, whether pursuing donor funds,
recruiting employees with different specialties, or partnering with a like-minded
organization or agency.
In addition to domestic and international development, organizational
policies also provide insight into an INGO’s programming preferences and
strategic choices (Spiro 1995; Moss 2006; Ohanyan 2009). Development policies
over the last several decades tend to operate on a pendulum, with constantly
shifting priorities (Hirshman 1970; Risse-Kappen 1995; Yanow 1996). Goals
switch from global community development to local sustainability and from
local subsistence farming to large imported subsidies. The different policy
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directions can be either aligned or disconnected at the domestic locale, say the
United States or the United Kingdom, or in the international realm with perhaps
the United Nations or the World Health Organization (Lee 2006; Koo 2011; Jung
2010). Depending on policy priorities, organizations such as development
INGOs, may tend to shift organizational programming to meet the policy
direction. This, however, can cause issues for the insecure populations being
served, as their needs tend to be more static. If policy decisions change rapidly,
perhaps based on a global emergency or civil conflict, an INGO may refocus
precious resources to deal with the current tragedy. Meanwhile, child morbidity,
mortality, public health crises and local economic development activities are still
in need of much attention and resources. When attention is diverted, either
through policy or donor direction, often the people in need suffer most. The
organizations can survive fluctuations, as funding and capacity are still
maintained, albeit redirected (Mendelson and Glenn 2002).
Although understanding organizational motivations and preferences is an
important launching point for understanding why resources get to needy
populations, it tells us very little about the mechanisms by which these resources
become available, nor does it explain their allocation. In the next section, I
describe the two types of resources an organization may obtain. Moreover, the
model developed in the coming sections helps us understand the conceptual and
causal mechanisms at work in getting from an organization’s mission to serve
needy people to actually reaching those populations effectively.
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Social Capital Resources in an INGO
While INGOs have objectively measured the material resources at their
disposal, including revenue and human capital, there are other mechanisms at
play that aid an organization in reaching its mission. This mechanism I refer to as
social resources is more abstract and much harder to measure (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998; Adler and Kwon 2002). C. Wright Mills, however, eloquently
argued “we cannot allow the impossibility of rigorous proof keep us from
studying whatever we believe to be important” (1956, 363). We cannot, in every
instance, measure the mechanism for reaching hungry populations directly. We
can, however, measure social resources through a developed proxy. The
difficulty arises when developing social connections and providing
measurements for those relationships. How does one measure the capital gained
from social connectivity? This pursuit begins with a well-defined concept.
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s definition of social capital is adopted for this
project. Social capital is the “sum of the actual and potential resources embedded
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships
possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, 243).
The social unit is defined as the organization—the INGO. Social capital of
INGOs, in its entirety, encompasses the sum of resources embedded in the
organization’s relationships with donors, relationships with local partners,
partnerships with other INGOs, and private business partnerships. Each of these
relationships are explained, revealing how they add value and resources to an
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INGO. Figure 2.1 below displays the elements that make-up and INGO’s social
capital.
Figure 2.1: Social Capital Construct

While international development practices are making progress in establishing a
norm of collaboration, studying the impact of social capital is a research
imperative. These realizations led to the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra
Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008). In these declarations, the policy-makers focus
on:
…ownership, alignment of donors with country strategies and systems,
including making financial assistance more predictable and sustainable;
harmonization of external assistance, including pooled funding, joint
analysis and missions, reduction in fragmentation, division of labour,
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management for results, and mutual accountability. These principles are
integral parts of achieving sustainable improvements (SUN Policy Brief
2010, 184).
I also posit these relational resources and coordinated efforts are essential, and,
therefore, need to be established as part of the social science research agenda.
Relationships with Donors
All non-profit organizations must depend, to some extent, on
relationships with donors to survive and fund their endeavors (Nelson 1996;
Edwards 1999; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Ohanyan 2009). INGOs prove no
exception, and in fact, may be even more dependent on donor funding than other
types of organizations who operate locally. Due to the geographically dispersed
INGO constituencies, donors become even more important. There are multiple
types of donors who fund INGO work including: government agencies,
foundations, businesses, and churches. Each type of donor has guidelines for
funding, sets of criteria, and measures of success. In the INGO sector, a large
majority of funding comes directly from government agencies such as the
Department for International Development (DFID), the European Commission
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the United States Agency for International
Development, (USAID) and others. Moreover, foundations also fund a
substantial portion of projects, such as Helen Keller or the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation. Regardless of the type of donor agency, one thing is clear—INGOs
need donors to survive. Understanding this point, and relating to the policy
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discussion in the previous section, it is argued that relationships with and among
donors are an important social resource for INGOs. Relationships with donors
are both relational and financial. Here, the relationship, while still paternalistic,
is critically important to the social capital of INGOs.
Donors tend to work with organizations that are familiar, have a great
reputation and deliver results. The best ways for INGOs to illustrate they offer a
strategy donor’s favor, is to secure a project with a donor and achieve the
intended objectives, forming a positive reputation. These donors, while perhaps
fair and objective in the bidding process, favor organizations with which they
have a developed and lasting relationship. It is not by accident, nor coincidence
that large INGOs place policy and fundraising headquarters near a large
metropolitan hub where government agencies also reside, say Washington, DC,
London, England or Geneva, Switzerland, because social relationships can be
forged and sustained through frequent and consistent communication. The
choice is strategic and aimed at asset acquisition through developed and
nurtured relationships with donor agencies. These relationships are assets in the
sense that information is shared about upcoming Request for Assistance (RFAs)
release dates. In fact, INGOs with close ties to donors often hear bits of
privileged information before it is released to the general bidding community,
giving them a boost when a tight deadline for submitting project proposals is
released. Additionally, organizations funded by a donor, who successfully
complete projects are often afforded multiple awards and continued assistance,
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which puts those INGOs with less developed or non-existent relationships at a
disadvantage whist vying for scarce funds.
Moreover, relationships with donors aid in strategic planning (Sikkink
1993). In the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that policy helps direct
INGOs’ preferences and programmatic decisions. In addition to awarding
funding, donors facilitate agenda setting and often set the direction of future
programs (Ahmed & Potter 2009). In developing and maintaining relationships
with donors, INGOs have a strategic position by which they can engage in
dialogue with donors and develop a forward thinking agenda for programs,
mirroring the policy direction. This allows INGOs the ability to set out on multiyear programs and decide on long-term organizational goals that might be able
to secure future funding, if organizational goals emulate donor and policy
directions.
There are, however, instances where relationships with donors are more
natural, for example the World Food Programme is directly related to and
funded by the United Nations. The more obvious example of a natural, or valueladen, connection is centered on INGOs and donors with a religious affiliation.
World Vision, for example, is a Christian organization and its mission is
simultaneously religious. As such, funding for the organization largely comes
from churches as well as private donations from fellow members of the Church.
Other examples include Catholic Relief Services, where the Catholic dioceses
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fund large portions of the work. In these cases, the relationship transcends from
a natural commitment to deeply rooted belief systems. Those connections are
likely, due to their ideological nature, to be less fluid than government agency
connectivity, but also less-objective in the fact that shared belief systems is
generally a prerequisite to funding.
The relationships INGOs develop with donors may also provide an area
for concern. One of the biggest challenges INGOs face is the ability to operate
independently of donor demands. This challenge is consistently sited as
problematic in the literature (Ahmed and Potter 2006; Ohanyan 2009; Mendelson
and Glenn 2002; Duffield 1993). Ahmed and Potter (2006) trace the conditions
that encourage cooperation and also examine the problems with INGOs acting as
vehicles for foreign aid. INGO’s can become dependent on aid and their
programs become interdependent with funding agencies. Ohanyan (2009)
argues:
The inherent richness of the interplay between INGOs and their donors
mediates the linkage between power differentials and policy outcomes.
Indeed, the network-based model of INGO behavior presented here yields
certain network types in which dominant financial or political power does
not inevitably translate into an ability to control the policy process.
Network structures can heighten, as well as undermine, the positions of
international organizations and INGOs in global policy processes. In this
respect, networks are far from being passive transmitters of diverse
organizational goals and preferences, as many pluralist interpretations of
international organizations would suggest (476).
Here, Ohanyan suggests examining how network forms of organization can
change the INGO environment, regardless of financial capacities—material
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resources-- of such organizations. There are myriad arguments about the
adverse effects of foreign aid and INGO involvement, illustrating that
organizational and environment factors affect INGO capabilities. Regardless,
relationships with donors make up a portion of the social capital available to
INGOs through connections. However, these relationships may carry adverse
effects for an organization.
The social benefit of networking with donors is only a partial picture.
Sometimes the resources are easy to quantify, such as grants. In other situations
the resources are abstract, and difficult to quantify, as they come purely from
conversing, sharing information and building professional networks between the
donors and the INGOs that service their grants. In sum, relationships with
donors, while social, are also connected to material power, which will be
explored later.
Relationships with Local Partners
Local partnerships are also gaining attention in international
development. Where grass roots organizations have tended to opt for “groundup”10 development efforts, not all INGOs operated a model emphasizing local
partnerships and empowerment. In fact, much of the 1980s development work
was plagued with paternalistic and negative connotations of expatriates and
their impact on local community development. Expatriates, those employees of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This means that organizations allow for development projects to emerge at the local level, in an organic
manner, rather than through top-down management decisions.
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an INGO working outside their home country, had a reputation of exhibiting
negative attitudes and a sense of superiority towards local communities. The
INGO culture and norms was lacking a focus on local development. Local
community members were rarely involved in the project evaluations or
development, exhibiting evidence that INGOs did not view local communities as
part of the solution. Communities were less likely to be viewed as a partner,
actively taking a role in development projects.
In the twenty-first century, local organizations have become partners of
choice among INGOs. In an interview with one President of a large INGO in this
network, the dependence on local partnerships was apparent. He stated that
they really depend on local partners and local government when starting new
programs and see these as key actors. He said they rely on these partners to save
costs on program materials and design, stating: “Someone has already paid for it,
it’s just sitting in the district office. Setting up parallel structures undermines the
local government and creates dependency” (Interview, December 2013). From
civic organizations to local government organizations and local grassroots
NGOs, there is a paradigmatic shift in the way food insecure populations are
viewed. Local NGOs push other actors, such as INGOs, away from viewing local
people who are served through their programs as “beneficiaries” to “partners.”11

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This connotation was also evident in my interviews with INGO leaders, who are hesitant to even use the
word “beneficiary” to describe the community members they reach, as the relationship has transitioned to
focus on an empowerment approach.
11

50!

This shift has spurred an environment dedicated to achieving community
support, empowerment, and sustainable solutions.
Early critics of INGO fieldwork argued that by bringing in experts that
were non-native workers, and maintaining internal rather than local experts, the
solutions developed were likely to be unsustainable (Duffield 1993). Abandoned
clinics and schools that were built during the 1980s international aid boom,
which ended in minimal transfer of knowledge, now evidence this. Luckily,
INGOs learned and adapted. While they often start programs with a set of
experts, training local staff and community partners to sustain the project longterm is the overall program objective. Of course, local government support,
funding and the level of institutionalization and corruption are also factors in the
success of such endeavors. Program planning and national staff development
programs evidence the fact that local partnerships have become an asset and a
resource needed and sought by INGOs (Interviews, December 2012 and January
2013). While, previous skepticism still exists, current partnerships and
demonstrated program success suggests local partnerships add value to
programs.
Today, local partners range from small neighborhood associations, to
municipal government leaders, to influential community leaders and champions
for change (see Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003). Local civil society organizations
and community organizations form a rich basis for gaining support, reaching
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local communities and developing the cultural knowledge needed to build
sustainable programs (Florini 2000). INGOs can lean on local civic partners to
help with needs assessments, gaining access to community gatherings and
developing rapport with influential members of the village. One organization
sets criteria each location must meet before engaging in programs, including
evidence of endemic rural poverty, stable enough government to enlist a bottomup approach, and no evidence of corruption. If those criteria are not met, they
will not begin a project in a new location. I asked how they evaluate this
criterion, and the response was similar to the local partnership approach, rooted
in social capital concepts. They use a local leader with good social connections to
provide an assessment of the population that can in-turn help build social capital
locally. For example, in Senegal, a program currently being operated in over 200
villages, utilizes a parent led strategy. The parental groups network with other
NGOs for the purpose of building a stronger civil society and advocacy network.
INGOs, such as Food for the Hungry and The Hunger Project, use this model
more than others. However, shifting cultural norms to value local partners is
seen as an asset across INGOs. In addition, donors frequently require evidence
of local partnerships as part of proposal process, illustrating the marrying of
donor and INGO policy preferences. Therefore, local partnerships form one
aspect of social capital.
Although collecting information about local partners may be one of the
most important elements in explaining INGO social capital, it may also prove to
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be the least generalizable. It is my hunch that local partnerships will change
drastically depending on the social and institutional conditions at the local level.
Therefore, where we may see a high degree of social connection in one state with
a more inclusive governance structure. In contrast, we may examine fewer social
connections when organizations are working in hierarchical communities, such
as Syria or Tunisia. Additionally, we may see less partnerships and local
interactions between INGOs and local partners when there is a high level of
corruption, or perhaps a low degree of community activism within the
governance structure. In summary, each of these food security projects is
delivered in a different community. Each community has a divergent set of
barriers, including lack of civic engagement, government corruption,
authoritarian regimes, or other regionally specific challenges. Therefore, the
ability for an INGO to partner with a local NGO or other local organization may
be limited due to existing political and social structures. Given these constraints,
and likely the different types of connections, these relationships may be best
explored, at least as a cursory analysis, through a case study approach.
Partnerships with Other International Non-Governmental Organizations
One of the most interesting components of the social capital construct is
the connection between INGOs. This notion encompasses a switch from viewing
INGOs as strategic competitors to partners. While funds are scarce, and INGOs
need to have a strategic organizational plan to remain relevant, they also need to
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develop partnerships with other INGOs to play to their comparative advantage
and avoid duplication of services.
Three of the four representatives interviewed agreed that building
partnerships with other INGOs was extremely important to the success of their
programs. One organization reported that these partnerships help form the
“heart of their organization” (Interview February 2013). They reported that some
programs, such as nutrition, are easier to do with fewer partners, but all projects
can benefit from the right type of collaboration. When asked why they chose to
partner, there were some interesting responses. One respondent said that INGOs
do not tend to trip over each other in the field. This respondent said that if
INGOs did not partner and build collaborative programs, they would be tripping
over each other. Although all agreed that field level strategic coordination would
be ideal, in reality, these partnerships form due to proximity and are mostly adhoc, they report. The interviewees agreed that location is key in determining
partners, as the work is long, hard and performed in isolated environments.
Therefore, only those groups working in closer proximity have a full grasp on
the other programs and partnerships in the area. At the country level, it was
reported that more strategic cooperation on food security and nutrition is
needed, as well as at the local level. However, the ability to execute programs
effectively when working in the same locale requires INGOs coordinate.
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As discussed, INGOs were primarily agents of donors in the 1980s.
However, the environment changed in the 1990s and into the twenty-first
century. There are now programs conducted where an INGO acts as principal,
securing other INGOs as agents on projects or programs. Fieldwork is now
completed alongside other INGOs, sometimes working on the same projects, but
often sharing responsibilities and resources across projects. This shift is
interesting and also helping to build collaborative relationships, which may lead
to years of partnership and a trend toward enhanced development outcomes.
The choice to partner with another organization is motivated by different
perspectives, given the diversity of projects and INGO backgrounds. INGOs
often choose to partner with another organization based on ideals (Madon 1999).
For instance, where one INGO believes in holistic development and tackling
multiple problems in one area, another may prefer to focus on the highest level
need, like food security or AIDS. In this example, we may find that one
organization provides an AIDS prevention program across multiple regions,
attempting to eradicate a spreading disease. The other organization may work in
only one or two regions, focusing on food insecurity, which may lead to things
like eradicating prostitution. Prostitution is a common profession in areas with
high prevalence of food insecurity, to feeding hungry children at home. They
may need to develop a program focused on developing employment
opportunities to stop prostitution, which in turn leads to a program focused on
HIV/AIDS. This list can get quite long when attempting to dig into root causes
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in a community. Some INGOs, therefore, may find they work in fewer
communities, while cutting across multiple sectors. Others may work in many
communities, focused on one program, for example launching a breast-feeding
campaign. Considering this scenario, we may find that INGOs collaborate on a
specific issue, but generally, organizations with analogous visions collaborate
and the depth and scope of programs is one such area where organizations tend
to clash. Some organizations focus on crosscutting sectors, such as World Vision,
Mercy Corps and Oxfam. Many organizations, such as Food for the Hungry, The
Hunger Project, and Bread for the World, focus on only one issue and they tend
to coordinate with other ‘small scope, great depth’ organizations. In Table 2.1
below, a typology is presented that describes the type of partnerships that
emerge, and under what conditions partnerships are expected between different
types of INGOs and international governmental bodies, as discussed in the
previous sections. In Table 2.1, the rows refer to the different types of
organizations: governmental, religious, and secular. The columns refer to the
different types of relationships that form, either ideological or pragmatic.
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Table 2.1: Organizational and Social Relationship Typology
Organizational Type

Social Relationships
Ideological

Pragmatic

Governmental

Partnerships are likely to
form with other
governments that share
similar governance
structures, such as
between democracies. An
example of this
partnership would be the
United States and Europe
‘s shared food program
goals.

Partnerships emerge to
reach key personnel or
populations that cannot be
reached without social
resources from both
actors. An example is the
USAID programs funding
a program with the
Afghanistan government
to reduce opium
production from poppy
crops.

Religious

Interactions between
organizations emerge
based on shared religious
preferences, rather than
organizational
preferences. For example,
CRS and World Vision
may partner on a food
security program,
although they have
different organizational
goals (CRS focuses on
emergency relief, World
Vision on sustainable
development).

Two organizations may
align, even cross-sector
partnerships between
religious and secular
organizations to reach
populations or share
resources. The Mercy
Corps and CRS on-going
partnership offers a good
example of this type of
collaboration.

Secular

Partnership will emerge
with like-minded INGOs,
such as those
organizations focused on
community building or

Partnerships form across
sectors (religious,
governmental and secular)
to meet a development
goal. This is evidenced by
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gender-based programs.
Organizations will also
likely only partner with
other similar apolitical
organizations.

the response to the Horn
of Africa drought
response, where global
response was necessary to
respond to the level of
emergency.

Despite strategic shifts, where many INGOs align, there is still a balance to
be struck between competition and cooperation (Ohanyan 2009). There are many
INGOs operating globally (Turner 2010). In the INGO food security sector alone,
there are over 50 such organizations. When we include local NGOs, the number
is even larger. Each of these organizations competes for funding in two ways:
competition for 1) private donations and 2) for donor agency grants. Here, they
balance the need for collaboration with the need to complete for funding.
INGOs, then, are both partners and competitors. The push to partner with other
INGOs is favored by donor agencies, as they want to see less competition in the
field and more sustainable and long-term solutions developed by INGOs.
Even when a direct partnership is not evident, INGOs working in the
same location collaborate to some extent. For instance, they may connect at local
community gatherings, share housing, organize transportation, and collaborate
on new funding proposals through research (Mitlen, Hickey and Bebbington
2006). INGOs in the same locale are acutely aware of other INGOs actions and
programs. INGOs need to, when it comes time to renew funding, articulate why
they are still an important resource for the region’s vitality and development.
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Hence, there is a fine line between partners and competitors when work begins
on a new project. INGOs working in the same location during the present day
must stay connected and this connection becomes a valuable resource for
program success and continued funding. I will further explore these
relationships and develop a measure for examining local connections between
INGOs in the field in Chapter 4.
Private Business Partnerships
The final category of INGO social capital is found in their relationships
with private business partners (Strange 1966). From a local distributing and
refrigeration company, to global information technology sharing, INGOs
develop ties with for-profit organizations to improve programming and offer
services where it would be too expensive or impossible when operating in
isolation. In the food security sector, one such example is Mercy Corps’
partnership with a local logistics company in Africa. They partner with the
logistics company to transport commodities, including food. In their analysis,
Mercy Corps found it was a less expensive option to develop a business
relationship with the local logistics company when compared to securing a
logistics manager, procuring trucks and gasoline needed for transportation
(Interview, December 2012). Other organizations in the food security sector use
local business partners to: procure seeds, educate local partners, and refrigerate
food, to name a few examples.
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With limited funds, and the need to collaborate and build efficient models,
there may be more INGO-business partnerships emerging in the future. I posit
relationships and business partnerships between INGOs and for-profit
companies are a social resource. Through the development and nurturing of
relationships, long-term working practices and procedures can be developed,
aiding in efficiencies and best practices over time. Moreover, through an
established relationship, the advantage for future funding endeavors may be
enhanced, creating a network of preferred vendors.
Another great example of corporate partnerships is demonstrated by the
work of the Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (GMCR), a global corporation.
They partner with INGOs to develop sustainable solutions for farmers in Latin
American and Indonesia. GMCR is currently partnering with Mercy Corps, as
well as others, in Indonesian, Guatemala, Colombia, and Nicaragua. As part of
their corporate responsibility, GMCR has a commitment to prevent hunger and
poverty in coffee growing regions throughout the world. The company attempts
to understand the problems facing their workforce and builds programs that
help address the challenges of food insecurity, including seasonal hunger due to
underemployment.
In their partnership with Mercy Corps in Aceh, Indonesia, their programs
are serving more than 3,000 coffee-producing families. Collectively, they are
working to provide access to financial planning workshops to teach families how
to increase and manage their income. In addition, mothers are going to support
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groups that teach the benefits of breastfeeding and that helps them better
address their children's health and nutrition needs. Mercy Corps reports that
“decreased medical expenses and increased financial literacy are helping these
families build a safety net of resources that can be tapped throughout the year,
leading to greater resilience” (Mercy Corps Website 2012).
GMCR has also played an important advocacy role while partnering with
INGOs. They have taken on a leading role in convening coffee industry leaders
around the issue of food insecurity. They built a coalition of five companies —
Counter Culture Coffee, Farmer Brothers, GMCR, Starbucks Coffee Company,
and Sustainable Harvest Coffee Importers to established the Coffeelands Food
Security Coalition (CFSC) in 2012.
The new CFSC’s will soon begin work on a three-year program
"Empowering Food Secure Communities" in Nicaragua. Mercy Corps reports
that they will partner with CFSC and a local partner Asociación “Aldea Global”
Jinotega, to reach 150 women and their families to advance farming and business
techniques, develop additional sources of income through home gardens, and
diversified crop production (Mercy Corps Interview 2012). They plan to add a
policy element to the programs through engaging local governments to provide
assistance to people suffering from food insecurity in the region. Mercy Corps
reports:
The engagement and dedication of the CFSC and of GMCR and other key
industry players will pave the way for a future generation of coffee
farmers who are well-equipped with the resources and tools they need for
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success, food security and well-being for themselves, their families and
their communities (Mercy Corps Website 2013).

Other programs can learn from this partnership of local government, business,
and INGOs to build collaborative projects designed to positively impact food
security in other communities. The GMCR example illustrates how business
partners can enhance a project, add funding to existing programs, and provide
mutually beneficial outcomes for farmers and businesses.
In 2012, Mercy Corps also proposed a project in response to the Horn of
Africa drought. The drought caused severe hunger and limited access to fresh
water for drinking and irrigating crops. Mercy Corps needed to get food and
water into the region in addition to developing a solution that would offer longterm sustainable results. With severe drought, the crops were unlikely to
rebound for the following year’s harvest, which means the solutions had to offer
more than short-term food aid. In order to leverage resources, Mercy Corps
developed an integrated program, partnering with local community members to
disperse supplies, a local business to provide logistical support, and a local NGO
to provide local refrigeration of goods. Rather than develop a Mercy Corps
specific logistic, refrigeration and distribution base, the organization relied on
many local partners and social connections to get food distributed to the
communities in need (Interview, December 2012).
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Social capital, garnered through partnerships, can enhance program
outcomes. Moreover, these partnerships also prove important in the program
development phase. In order to bring these concepts to life, I chose a couple
brief examples of food security programs that encourage participation of
partners in business, the community and with other INGOs: Mercy Corps’
Tajikistan Program and the “Scaling Up Nutrition“ program referred to as the
SUN Movement.
Mercy Corps’ Tajikistan Education Program
Beginning in 2005, Mercy Corps implemented a program to reduce
household food insecurity and vulnerability in Rasht, Tajikistan, with funding
from USAID. The program targets pregnant women and mothers with children
aged 24 months and younger as beneficiaries. Mercy Corps developed several
partnerships to conduct the program, including acting as a member of the Food
Aid Consortium for Tajikistan (FACT). The program covers nearly 100 villages in
the six counties: Kalai Surgh, Askalon, Hoit, Boqi Rahimzoda, Obi Mehnat, and
Yasman.
The program focused on two strategic objectives. First, to increase
utilization of food through the adoption of important health and nutrition
practices. The second objective was to improve the availability of nutritious
foods in communities. Together, the objectives meet two of the three WHO
pillars in food security, showing the program’s integrated approach. To meet
these two objectives, the program combined biannual food distribution with
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educational seminars that focus on improved health and agriculture practices.
Program recipients agree to attend weekly educational seminars in exchange for
flour, oil, and lentils. In total, 297 Mercy Corps volunteers, half of whom were
women, conducted nearly 11,500 seminars on health- and agricultural-related
topics throughout the program.
While Mercy Corps’ intended education to increase and food security to
decrease, the program had unintended outcomes as well related to
empowerment and growth in social capital. Throughout the duration of the
program, Mercy Corps staff learned that the woman’s mother-in-law acted as the
head of household and directed much of the young woman’s life activities,
including how to care for and feed children. Building a network for young
mothers to leave the house and engage in activities with other community
members around health, nutrition and education led to greater sense of
empowerment as well as a greater sense of social support and personal social
capital. In interviews, women involved in the program reported emotional and
cognitive growth, which was shown to increase health, overall (Mercy Corps
2013). In this program, Mercy Corps relied on local partners and the
collaboration with civic groups to achieve their intended outcomes.
Program Engaging Partners Across Sectors: SUN Movement
A final example of a program that highlights collaboration and
partnership, across sectors is the “Scaling Up Nutrition” (SUN) movement. This
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movement incorporates existing INGOs, NGOs, governments and corporations
into a total health program that focuses on the first 1000 days of a child’s life,
which includes pregnancy. The movement secured funding to create a SUN
movement secretariat. Programs evolve at the local level, where involved
countries need a focal point. The programs are developed on a country-tocountry basis. Country leadership, local government officials, policy analysts,
NGOs, community organizations and health care professionals all need to be
involved in the program to strengthen child nutrition and health. Currently,
there are 8-9 countries involved in the program. Results are not yet analyzed to
examine the difference in a collaborative versus ad-hoc response to child and
maternal health. Regardless, donors are very fond of this program and see it as
an easy funding focal point, as it is an initiative that can be replicated across
geographic regions.
This program is one of the first to establish partnership requirements
across all sectors, as identified in my social capital construct. The research brief
published by the SUN advisory board suggests, “There are two complementary
approaches to reducing under nutrition—direct nutrition specific interventions
and a broader multi-sectoral approach. Action on both is urgent” (2010, 180).
Here, the SUN policy experts argue that multiple actors must engage in the
solution in a collaborative fashion to experience results. They state:
There is also widespread agreement on a broad framework for action to
counter this neglect and a growing partnership for collective action among
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key stakeholders — United Nations (UN), multilateral and bilateral
development agencies, foundations, developing countries,
nongovernmental organizations and other civil society organizations,
researchers, and the private sector (2010, 178).
Currently, over sixty agencies have signed a declaration of support for this
project.12 As SUN evolves, it could be a very interesting case study regarding
INGO social capital in the food security sector, given its focus on multi-sector,
multi-partner collaborations.
Despite the anecdotal evidence provided here, there is a shortage of
empirical studies that examine INGO and for-profit collaborations. Therefore,
INGO relationships are not adequately examined in scholarship, possibly due to
the relatively new phenomena. However, it is evident that these relationships,
based on the examples provided, aid organizations in reaching populations
through a developed social connection with local vendors and products. INGOs
can stretch funding and build support networks with other similar organizations.
Finally, through connecting all the actors, similar to the SUN movement, I posit
INGO program results are enhanced.
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12!"Scaling up Nutrition: A Framework for Action" is based on a collaborative effort of a wide range of
developing country partners, community service organizations, UN, multilateral and bilateral agencies. An
extensive consultation process conducted over a number of months included a series of face to face meetings
hosted by the Center for Global Development, the European Commission and the International Conference
on Nutrition (ICN), the United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition (SCN), USAID, UNICEF, WHO
and the World Bank. Financial support was provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
Government of Japan, UNICEF, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the World
Bank” (International Nutrition Foundation 2013). More information can be found at:
http://www.inffoundation.org/publications/policy-brief.htm
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Social Networks and Social Capital
Scholars argue that networks are important and can aid organizations in
meeting outcomes, such as increased learning or program effectiveness (Powell
1990; Andrews 2010; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Before discussing the need
for material resources, this section will discuss how social networks emerge, why
they are important and what can be gained from conceptualizing the
relationships described above. More importantly, this section will examine why
networks offer the best conceptual mechanism for establishing social capital
within an organization.
Network forms of organization emerge when coordination is necessary,
environments are unstable and resources are limited (Powell 1990). Social
networks can be defined “as a set of nodes or actors (persons or organizations)
linked by social relationships or ties of a specified type. A tie or relation between
two actors has both strength and content” (Castilla 2000, 219). Networks are
based on non-hierarchical coordination and horizontal embedded relations
between actors (here, organizations). Some authors consider networks as
distinct type of governance outside the hierarchical structure of governmental
organizations and bureaucracies and markets (Borzel 2011; see also Williamson
1979; Powell 1990; Torfing 2012). Because a plethora of organizational forms
from both the public and private sector now engage in policy discussions, “the
notion of ‘policy networks’ does not so much represent a new analytical
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perspective but rather signals a real change in the structure of the polity (Mayntz
1993, 5; quoted in Borzel 2011, 52). This means there is a transition to seeing
many actors involved in the decision-making and policy process. The process,
once reserved for elected officials and governmental actors, now encompasses
outside actors who place pressure on the state governance system. INGOs are
one such actor, now more heavily involved in the policy process, which has
changed the polity view from its state-centric origins. When considering INGOs,
the different techniques to address food insecurity are also influenced by
network interactions, similar to the changes in the governance structure.
The importance of social networks, and the social capital which emerges
out of networks, is discussed in policy studies and academic literature across
disciplines (Ostrom 1990, Woolcock 1998; Bourdieu 1984, 1988; Coleman 1990;
Podolny and Rauch 2007; Putnam 2000; Barabassi 2002; Buchanan 2002; Sabel
and Zeitling 2012; Torfing 2012; Lobel 2012; Rhodes 2012; Gilardi and Radaelli
2012; Uzzi 1997). Social interactions can provide opportunities for organizations
to grow, through knowledge sharing, resources pooling and offering a level of
social support between and among employees. These interactions form a
network, which can enhance performance. Networks assist with policy
outcomes related to learning, reduction of uncertainty, increased quality of
decisions and performance. Networks have also proven to be important in
understanding international cooperation and world order. Slaughter (2004) and
Martínez- Diaz and Woods (2009) focused on networks as a key concept in order
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to understand current development processes in a global order. Martinez-Diaz
and Woods (2009) identify five functions of networks, namely agenda-setting,
consensus building, policy coordination, knowledge production and exchange,
and norm setting and diffusion. These five functions have the capability to
enhance organizational outcomes because INGOs operate in a collaborative
environment to achieve outcomes, such as to diffuse policies, share knowledge
and challenge traditional international norms.
Finally, the conceptualization of social networks (the linking of actors in
diverse settings) provides the ability to model social connections in the INGO
sector. Considering food security programs, there are INGOs working in many
countries on inter-related programs. As social networks account for connections
to other actors, using the network concept, researching the content of these
relationships is possible. The strength of the relationship can also be modeled
through network theory. The analytic tool for modeling networks will be
introduced in Chapter 4. Regardless, the network conceptualization assists in
connecting the abstract concept of social capital to a set of theoretical and
analytic tools designed to account for inter-organizational relationships.
In Chapter 3, the social capital literature is examined to illustrate how
other scholars have used the concept, and how it can be measured empirically.
Also, Chapter 4 will review the design methods and results exploring social
capital of INGOs. However, it is important to note while developing this theory,
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that INGOs work in an environmental context, where information is shared both
formally and informally. Interactions are based on comparative advantage and
sustained partnerships, overtime, enable organizations to achieve outcomes that
monetary resources cannot accomplish in isolation. In the next section, the types
of material resources INGOs use will be explored, highlighting alternative
mechanisms used to sustain the organization, before proceeding to a discussion
about the interaction of the two types of resources.
Material Resources
Social capital, no doubt, plays an important role in getting information,
resources and services to vulnerable populations, especially in food insecure
regions. In fact, one interviewee in this project argued that you can have all the
money and staff in the world, but without social connections and a solid
reputation, between INGOs and the community members, not much would get
accomplished in this business. Moreover, I propose social capital is not enough,
on its own. During an interview, one INGO CEO said, “you need money, but
not all that much money. What you need is a social structure and connections”
(Interview, November 2012). Therefore, the direct relationship is not just
between material resources and reaching vulnerable populations, as indicated in
the introduction of this dissertation with “A Tale of Two Organizations.” The
relationship between social capital and reaching vulnerable populations is
moderated by an organization’s material capabilities. Material capabilities can also
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serve as a direct link to the hungry populations, but this is speculated to be less
effective. Intuitively, it makes sense, that an organization with limited resources
would be less likely to reach those in need, regardless of the social relationships
acquired.
Currently, far more literature and research is dedicated to the concepts of
social capital and organizational survival in isolation, rather than in tandem.
Scholarship is lacking information on the affects social capital and material
resources have on one another within the organizational setting. The conceptual
framework surrounding material resources is presented here, which includes:
private funds, grants and human resources. These resources taken together may
change the relationship social capital has regarding an organization’s ability to
reach hungry populations. In the next sections, I describe this construct, its
components and how they interact with social capital. Figure 2.2 below
illustrates the concepts included in the material resources construct.
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Figure 2.2: Material Resource Construct

Private Funds
International NGOs seek donations from private parties to develop
programs, conduct research and support administrative personnel. Moreover,
INGOs also rely on fundraising departments to increase private revenue flows.
An example of an effort to elicit private funds can be seen in Save the Children
and World Vision’s public awareness campaigns asking for donors to sponsor a
child in need for just pennies a day. We also see local news media, generally
around the end of the tax year, encouraging people to donate to a charity for a
good cause. In the INGO sector, donations, either of cash or of material goods by
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a private party are considered private funds, and are categorized and competed
for differently than grant funding.
INGOs compete for private funds, even more so than grants. Often pleas
for generous donation are accompanied by a claim that 90% of all proceeds
raised go directly to those in need. Private funds are raised by INGOs as a means
to support parts of the organization that are under served by grants or other
capital in the organization. Private funds, unless the donor places stipulations on
their use, are available to be allocated as the organization sees fit. These
donations are a “no strings attached” gift from the private donor and they are
highly sought after by INGOs. While private fund influx generally ebbs and
flows depending on the time of the year and the current economic forecast13,
large donations generally accompany emergency situations. For example,
although people are starving everyday in Africa, during the 2010 Horn of Africa
drought, there was a spike in private donations, as pictures of starving children
pull at the heartstrings of humans across the globe. Similarly, during the Iranian
Earthquakes in 2002, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 or the more recent
Haitian and Japanese earthquakes, private donations dramatically increased in
the immediate aftermath and then trickled off as media attention was diverted.
INGOs compete for funds through campaigns, advertisements and social
media. Some campaigns argue INGO “A” is using 90% of their funding on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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During recessions and depressions, with less disposable income available for charity, INGOs, like other
not for profit organizations struggle to seek funding from private parties.
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programs, while organization “B” uses a whopping 18% on programs and the
other 82% on administration. While this example is just for illustration, we can
see how INGOs complete for private funds, by advertising and appealing to the
public interest in order to secure material resources that support the
organization, including overhead operating costs. Operating costs include such
things as lights and computers to adding needed components to programs that
were not covered under a grant award. Private funds are used in very diverse
ways, but regardless, they create an additional resource accounting for a portion
of an INGO’s wealth. Private funds are unstable, nevertheless the are needed to
bolster funding on many underfunded projects and under-staffed project teams.
Grants
International NGOs seek private funds as much as possible, but there is
not a single INGO in this network that currently survives solely on such
donations. In fact, grants generally account for 50-60% or more of an INGO’s
revenue, with over 50% of grant funds stemming from government grants. This
category of revenue accounts for any funding that comes to an organization by
means of a bidding process (RFA, RFQ, etc.) and is provided by a donor agency,
such as a government agency (USAID, DFID, etc.) or a Foundation (Gates
Foundation, Helen Keller International, etc.). Grant awards are an important
part of INGO survival because they do account for such a large portion of each
organization’s annual revenue. Moreover, much of international humanitarian
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work is funded through aid agencies, which disperse funds through formalized
bidding processes. Awards provide both the means to develop programs and
the program staff to deliver results.
Grants, however, come with stipulations. In order to secure grant funding
from donors, agents must be willing to build a program that is aimed at
addressing a concern of the donor. When examining food security, for example,
the donor may have a food distribution program in mind, while the INGO
bidding has an expertise in economic development. The INGO, in this example,
could develop a microfinance program for food distribution for example, a cash
for work program. The bidding organization must make a compelling case to the
donor agency that they have the expertise, knowledge, and ability to meet the
outcomes of the grant program if they receive the funds. Therefore, funds are
not available for the INGO to allocate as they see a need, especially if needs fall
outside the award guidelines. Here, terms such as “donor dependency” are
associated with situations where an organization is operating with a high
percentage of grant funds (Duffield 1993; Edwards 1999; Cooley and Ron 2002).
To put it another way, organizations that have many grants to implement have
less freedom to develop and implement programs they see as top priority. The
INGO’s priority must reflect the donor’s priority to receive consideration.
Funding from grants, while essential for survival, can also place a strain
on the human resources within an organization. Securing grant funds requires
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having in-house expertise in proposal writing. A large part of most INGO
program and project manager’s job is to keep a finger on the pulse of donor
agencies and prepare for bidding opportunities. This preparation requires welldeveloped research and writing skills. Therefore, the need to develop stellar
proposals is tied to the human resource discussion in the next section. The time
and energy headquarter staff devote to proposal development accounts for the
largest part of their job description. In turn, the human resources developing
and administering programs must remain socially connected to donors to
execute proposal development efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, servicing grants requires dedicated personnel time. Internal
operations servicing grants requires time from a finance officer who is
knowledgeable about allowable costs, budgeting and fiscal reporting to a
plethora of donor agencies. Finance officers work hand in hand with program
managers to ensure deadlines are met, billings are processed and annual reports
are submitted on time. Therefore, while program managers are working to
coordinate the project’s success on the ground, they are held accountable to the
people they are trying to reach. This means that the INGOs are simultaneously
accountable to their partners and the grant agencies that fund them.
Coordinating all the moving parts not only requires sector-specific experience,
but skills in grant management and coordination. INGO program and finance
managers must work together, demonstrating the interagency social connections.
These key personnel must also coordinate with partners at the donor agency for
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bidding and reporting purposes, requiring inter-organizational social relations.
Taking into account the complexity of securing and managing grants helps better
explain the material capacity an organization must maintain to compete for
scarce grant funds. Understanding this complexity, the linchpin, securing social
capital and material resources begins to emerge. I argue that it takes
coordination and partnership to secure many grants and operate in various
environments. This creates an environment where INGOs begin to build
material and social capacity in tandem. After explaining the components of the
human resource construct, it may be more evident why social and material
resources are both important aspects of an organization’s performance.
Human Resources
Social capital, although directly related to organizational outcomes, does
not operate without some form of material resources. Material resources, in
addition to serving as a direct link to organizational outcomes, also act as a
leveraging factor between INGO’s social capital and their performance.
Like all organizations, INGOs cannot operate without the workforce needed to
execute programs and provide operational support. Although the internal
operations of an INGO are similar in many ways to other types of organizations,
they operate in two fundamentally different ways. First, they operate at both a
headquarters level with general administrative support and grant writing staff as
well as strategic leadership functions and they operate at a field level with staff
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to implement programs and international leadership. This requires two entirely
different skill-sets and creates an environment where career paths are not
straightforward between the two levels of the organization. Second, it is evident
that most INGOs in the development sector operate from a bottom-up model.
The best way to picture this divergent operating model is to turn an
organizational chart on its head, whereby, leadership and strategy consultants
are on the bottom and the field-driven work is at the top, directing decisionmakers. This is not entirely evident in practice, but theoretically, INGOs are
mission and field driven, not led from headquarters, as one my intuitively think.
Disaggregating the components of human resources is fairly
straightforward. However, as one scholar puts it: “There is surprisingly little
research into the ‘meso’ issues of how the people and organizations that
implement much development activity are managed, motivated, or lead” (Hailey
and James 2004, 345). There are three main personnel categories within the
INGO structure: fulltime employees, part-time employees, and volunteers.
These employees operate at two levels, either the headquarters or in the field.
Volunteers, particularly due to the risk involved in field work, tend to be focused
on headquarter tasks, although there are exceptions.14 Also, its essential to
consider the leadership capacity in coordination with employees, as some
organizations have high powered, big name leaders that assist in fundraising
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14 Many INGOs, in an attempt to build a pipeline of entry-level program managers, now have volunteer field
positions, such as summer internship programs and short-term projects operated by volunteers.
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and advocacy initiatives, while others do not. International NGOs need strong,
capable employees to carry out their missions, with personnel as a key ingredient
to organizational capacity, and thus a cornerstone to the material resources
available to the organization.
Conversely, securing and retaining topnotch employees and volunteers
proves to be more difficult than might be supposed (Salamon 2003, 33, 77-78).
Although the pool of individuals vying for positions in an INGO is large, many
are not qualified and lack international field experience, which is key for success
in the industry. Finding the right fit for the programs and the organization can
be a challenging endeavor for INGOs. First, employees must possess a
background in international work and have a strong employment and education
record. Even many entry-level positions at INGOs require a master’s degree and
five or more years of experience. Therefore, applicants must have found another
way to “break-in” to the industry than applying directly with an INGO. This
takes persistence on the one hand and the ability to be flexible and work in
insecure environments on the other hand. The Peace Corps is one such avenue,
but not every young professional has the time and means to volunteer two years
after earning a college degree. The dilemma then becomes finding someone who
is both experienced and willing to dedicate much time into securing a position at
an INGO (Smillie 1995; Fowler 1997; Eade 2000; Lewis 2001; Smillie and Hailey
2001; Edwards and Fowler 2002; Hailey and James 2004; James 2005). Often
positions are open for more than a year while applicants are vetted, which puts a
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strain on the organization and pulls on the internal resources available to execute
programs.
Although the recruitment dilemma is an arduous task for the recruiter and
applicant alike, the human resources struggle does not end when an offer is
extended. In fact, it is often a difficult transition, especially for new employees.
Often working for an INGO means long hours, difficult work environments and
stressful encounters, specifically in the field. Workers in the INGO field are at a
high risk for burnout, making retention an important and strenuous aspect of
securing long-term material resources. Organizations employ strategies such as
generous rest and relaxation packages as well as organizational learning
programs to help keep employees refreshed and engaged. As mentioned
previously, even hiring entry-level employees can be difficult at times, so it is
essential to the organization’s longevity employees be developed so they have a
strong pool for senior level positions in the pipeline.
Developing a pipeline of leaders is no less challenging. Leaders in INGOs
require specific skills, knowledge, and experience that are not easily transferred
from other professional experiences (Mitzberg 2006; Jiang 2008). For example, a
corporate CEO may decide he or she is ready to embark on the next phase of his
or her career and pursue a position in development. Although the former CEO,
no doubt, has much business experience and developed an impressive
professional portfolio, the skills the applicant possesses are not always directly
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transferable to a similar role as a Country Director or President of an INGO. As
the pool of qualified applicants narrows with more professional field experience
necessary, employers are even more inclined to focus on internal career paths
and professional development opportunities to secure a qualified leadership
pool.
Within the INGO field, career paths are not straightforward. In fact, they
often bounce between programmatic positions and field positions, and often
between agencies.15 Therefore, having a connection to the human resource
function within INGOs is important to their material resources and social capital.
Through networking and working together on social endeavors, INGOs become
aware of the strong players and the upcoming leaders. They work together in
the field, network at conferences and interact through advocacy efforts. Creating
an avenue for INGO leaders to diversify experience and build internal capacity
within agencies helps to build a stronger organizational network and ensure
leaders are trained and ready for future emergencies and organizational needs.
An INGO’s ability to retain quality leaders, especially in senior positions,
is one of the biggest challenges they face. One of the most prevalent factors in
the literature relates to the environmental contexts in which the leaders live and
work (Fowler 1997; Smillie and Hailey 2001; James 2004; Hailey 2006). Other key
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The transitioning we examine of employees from one INGO to another for professional development can
also be seen as a potential for social capital between INGOs. As senior leaders develop professional
relationships with many organizations, they tend to collaborate with familiar organizations and share
resources among peers.
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factors effecting the sector’s ability to retain leadership personnel include:
burnout, lack of funding, inability to provide comparable pay and benefits,
stress, security, overwhelming accountability requirements and the challenges
associated with working in complicated political environments (Salamon 2003,
32-35). Lack of support and feelings of isolation are also of importance in the
supporting literature (Hailey 2004).
In conclusion, human resources form an important portion of the material
resource construct, as the positions are not easy to fill, are essential to meet
organizational outcomes and are sensitive to the social environment. As
discussed, full-time employees, part-time employees and volunteers together
make-up an INGO’s human resource construct. While the resources and the
challenge securing them can be a strain on the organization, having enough
employees and volunteers to implement programs, secure grants and develop
reports is essential to the organization’s survival and achievement of their
mission. In this section, the interplay between the internal resource construct
and the social capital of INGOs is beginning to emerge, as the more INGOs
coordinate and share resources, the better they can combat some of the
challenges in career development and filling leadership positions within the
INGO community.
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Organizational Outcomes
In order to determine if material and social resources are effective,
organizations must have measurable outcomes. I argue that leveraging social and
material resources can enhance organizational performance. Why do we care
about performance? First, performance of the organization is essential to gaining
more material resources. Put another way, organizations that can demonstrate
their programs are effective though examining a set of indicators, are more likely
to gain access to funding in the future and attract high performing employees.
Second, and more importantly, if programs are ineffective, people will continue
to starve. Therefore, performance measures are fundamental in the furthering of
research that examines the capacity of INGOs and the effectiveness of their
organizational prerogative. I examine under what conditions organizations
perform to meet established goals. And, when fail to perform, I provide some
guidance and theoretical motivation for changing resource allocations.
Food security outcomes can be measured in myriad ways. INGOs collect
data on some performance factors, such as the number of people served, the
number of programs implemented, the cost per participant for programs, the
pounds of food delivered, the number of seeds planted, the percentage of acres
cultivated, the number of livestock provided to a community, etc. Programs run
through the INGOs are evaluated based on program criterion, generally
established by the donor agency. For a hypothetical example, a donor may say
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that for a $1 million food distribution program, the INGO must deliver food to
500 thousand people. In addition, a program may state the total number of
people that must be enrolled, such as in an agricultural education program. Data
such as these are collected based on the type of program. For instance, while a
microfinance program may determine a total amount of revenue that must be
generated from the new enterprise, an agricultural program may set a threshold
of land that should be developed, and an education program that will determine
the number of enrollees expected. The data collected across programs varies,
except for one data point. That is, INGOs collect information of the number of
people served through each program, which can be aggregated at the nationstate level, or examined based on local programs.
Alternative indicators of performance of global food insecurity, which are
not reported by INGOs and donors, are available. In Chapter 1, I introduced the
MDGs and illustrated that the trends recording progress have drastically slowed
from the year 2000. Here, the UN is tracking progress based on the total number
of people globally facing food insecurity, as defined by the WHO. The Global
Hunger Index aggregates national data regarding the world’s hungry
populations, providing an indicator of the overall health of a nation’s population.
It could also be argued that infant mortality rates, and other global health
indicators could reveal where there are health issues, for which food insecurity
may play a part. Although these are not organizational indicators, and we
cannot attribute their success or failure to the INGO, they help the international
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community assess the current conditions of a given country. Moreover, national
data is used to motivate donor-funding trends, in an attempt to target aid to the
neediest populations.
Donors and INGOs alike track performance and use these measures to
monitor programs across INGOs. In order to be successful, INGO’s need to be
able to demonstrate they are reaching hungry people, they are using resources
wisely (i.e. not spending too much per participant on programs that measure
individual expenditures) and they are targeting the neediest. Donors look for a
track record of proven success in program implementation to reward future
funds. INGOs, however, also use performance as a way to identify partners and
pragmatically choose with whom to align. Therefore, outcomes are an important
element for social relationships, material relationships and organizational
success.
My empirical model will use a measure attributable to the INGO, to avoid
confounding variables. Therefore, in Chapters 4 and 5, when I begin introducing
and operationalizing variables, I work with the indicators collected and reported
by INGOs regarding performance.
Evidence for the Need to Study Outcomes in INGOs
In most food security literature, INGOs are criticized for the lack of
transition to sustainable living conditions in developing countries. While only
one empirical study could be found that measures an INGO’s organizational
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outcome, related to social resources (Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003), the literature
summarized below provides evidence to suggest that INGOs are not meeting the
intended outcomes. Moreover, the need to develop a study that analyzes the
best ways to stretch limited resources could be useful to INGO decision-makers
that are criticized for the lack of improvement in the food security sector.
Foreign aid allocated to assist in moving from hunger to food security often
faces challenges regarding unintended consequences, such as prolonging social
unrest (Bonner 1989; Duffield 1990), creating conflict (Messer, Cohen and
D’Costa 1998) or decreasing local motivation to participate in development
initiatives (Borton and Shoham 1989). When considering motivation, the food
security debate offers alternative views about aid allocations limiting another
state’s motivations to become self-sufficient (Weber, Staatz and Holtzman 1988).
The dependency argument suggests that developed states offer assistance using
means to limit paths to self-sufficiency by the less developed (Dos Santos 1971).16
Development projects are often criticized from a market perspective for
removing the state’s motivation to provide for its own needs because the society
can rely on foreign aid (Brown 2011; David et al. 2001; Barrett 2002; Schanbacher
2010; Moss et al. 2006; Edwards 1999).17 Understanding the criticism INGOs face,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

16 Although a careful look at dependencia is outside the scope of this design, it should be mentioned when
considering aid dependency. For a detailed account of dependency, See Emmanuel Wallerstein, “Dependence
in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World
Economy,” African Studies Review 17-1 (April 1974): 1-26. Also see Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of
Dependence,” American Economic Review 60-2 (May, 1970): 231-236.
17 Similar measurements of good policy in the food security debate can be examined at the time of the USSR
crisis and countrywide famine crisis. “Despite Henry Kissinger's famous aphorism about no child going
hungry to bed, the World Food Conference of 1974 was born largely out of shock at the sharp rise in world
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it seems appropriate to examine the organizational outcomes associated with
food security in a systematic way.
Criticism of food assistance programs is easy to find, albeit based in
anecdotes. Very limited evidence qualitatively or quantitatively, is available to
systematically assess food assistance outcomes globally. The lack of evidence
illustrates the need for research to examine outcomes. While there are wide
arrays of food aid projects, some have received more scrutiny than others. Food
distribution programs based on donor country surpluses have received the most
criticism (Duffield 1993; Hopkins 1992). Other forms of aid, such as cash-forwork or voucher programs receive more positive feedback, as they tend to
respect the community’s autonomy and develop local capacities (Hopkins 1992;
Schanbacher 2010). The limited findings suggest that food aid and food
assistance program (FAP) are most effective when INGOs utilize a targeted
approach built from a foundation of program diversity including cash assistance,
food distribution, or tax incentives (Barrett 2002). Nevertheless, INGOs’ role in
the food security network, which is aimed at improving programs and
transitioning from aid to development, is an important part of the equation.
As discussed, INGOs are criticized for their dependence on donor funds
and their lack of autonomy about programming decisions. One example is
Oxfam’s strategy in Africa to combat hunger, which was evidence based, was
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
food prices in the preceding two years and fear that the world food system was running out of control. Hence
the emphasis in the final report on world food supply and prices, and on the need to secure the system against
risks, like those posed by the failure of the harvest in the USSR in 1972 (UN, 1975).” See Maxwell, p. 156.
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overthrown by donor priorities (Duffield 1993, 146). The literature suggests
INGOs are no longer independent; they are implementers of donor policy
(Borton and Shoham 1989). Failures of INGOs are due to lack of resources and
dependence on donor funds (Bonner 1989) and food aid and trade liberalization
impede food security (Taylor 1992, sited in Duffield 1993, 149). INGOs overtime
have failed to reach their full potential working on development initiatives.
They suggest that INGOs must work on both interventions and structural
reforms while navigating the political economy in which they are a part (Mitlin,
Hickey and Bebbington 2006). This in turn, leads to resource dependency and
lack of strategic initiative. One strategy to overcome the current dilemma is to
develop closer ties to a larger development network. These arguments clearly
point out that INGOs could better coordinate and develop partnerships to
enhance programs, both from a material and social perspective. The descriptive
elements of the food security network will be examined to assist INGOs in better
connecting their organizations.
Social Capital and Material Resource Interactions
I have reviewed all three conceptual constructs: social capital, material
resources and organizational outcomes. In Figure 2.3 below, the complete
conceptual diagram is displayed, illustrating the interplay between the
constructs and the outcome. INGOs use social capital as a means to gain
influence, negotiate contracts, effect policy and coordinate programs in the field.
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The communities affected by endemic poverty and food insecurity are generally
slow to trust international partners, as years of intervention efforts have proven
unsuccessful. Therefore, social capital provides a direct link to the food insecure
populations, as the development of trust and a reputation for developing helpful
programs are needed to gain access to the communities in need. Development of
social ties, I argue, is necessary before material resources become meaningful.
Through the development of social capital, INGOs can reach vulnerable
populations, who are otherwise hard to reach. However, social capital is not
enough.
Material resources are also essential in building programmatic capacity.
Organizations, through social ties, need to develop winning proposals and
secure private donations to procure the material resources needed to accomplish
the food security programs. I theorize material resources moderate the
relationship between INGOs’ social capital and their ability to reach more
people. Therefore, while material capabilities can, theoretically, provide a direct
link to outcomes, the most effective use of resources is established when material
capabilities help leverage, the more important, social capabilities, leading to
long-term stability in the organization. I argue that the outcome will be longterm stability because organizations that pursue social relationships with donors,
other INGOs, local partners and businesses have diversified their “toolbox”
when it comes to resources they can draw on in times of need. In contrast,
organizations with only material power would experience less flexibility in
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programmatic choices during a time of organizational shock or economic
difficulties.
Therefore, due to the moderating effects, I speculate that the relationship
between social capital, material resources and their effect on organizational
outcomes will not be linear. There may be a limit to the benefits of social capital
if an organization lacks the material resources needed to develop programs. And
for some organizations with little means of material resources, the ambition to
secure social capital may be too much and diminish their ability to reach people
by focusing resources and efforts on relationship building. Conversely,
organizations focused on developing material capabilities and neglect
relationship building and collaboration, will also lack the capacity necessary to
sustain programs overtime.

90!

Figure 2.3: Conceptual Diagram

Resource Interaction Propositions
The resource interactions posited here can form a variety of outcomes. In
this section, I develop a typology of the interaction between the two main
categories of resources and the expected outcome regarding organizational
performance when the material and social resources are at varying levels. There
are three categories of effects: high impact, moderate impact and low impact.
The resources are categorized as either high or low, with four outcomes
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available: high social and high material; high social and low material; low social
and high material or low social and low material. I further develop these
relationship interactions, ending with a summary found in Table 2.2.
High social and high material resources
Proposition 1: Organizations who have both high social capital and high
material resources experience greater organizational outcomes. As mentioned,
material and social resources work in tandem. Therefore, organizations
successful at developing both will achieve the highest impact. Through material
resources, they can attract and retain the best talent. They will also inevitably
have a strong track record with donors, establishing a social and material
resource base. When high social resources are examined, the INGO will have
developed connections between and among other INGOs, local partners,
businesses and donor agencies. This will allow them to diversify their funding
base to create stability in the organization long-term. Moreover, the strong social
connections establish a strong reputation and rapport with local communities,
allowing these INGOs to work in the most vulnerable areas, which can be
hardest to reach due to political and social instabilities. While social resources
are theorized to be more important in reaching the hungry people in the world,
organizations with high levels of social and material power will be able to
achieve the best outcomes in reaching hungry people and stomping out hunger.
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High material and low social resources
Proposition 2: Organizations with high material resources and low social
resources have limited organizational performance. Organizations with high
material capabilities may be thought to have more power. However, in this
sector, that is not expected to be the case. In order to gain access to the
communities in need, organizations must develop social ties, encouraging
cooperation and building relationships with local communities. The first step in
achieving this goal is to develop relationships with organizations performing
similar work in the area, demonstrating the INGO’s willingness to work with
partners to achieve a mission. I suspect organizations with high material power
and low social capital are also the organizations that carry a paternalistic
reputation. The lack of impact expected is attributable to little coordination and
information sharing in the field, which limits access to the populations needing
service.
High social low material resources
Proposition 3: Organizations with high social resources and low material
resource will have moderate organizational performance. I suspect moderate
outcomes, as long as the organization develops enough organizational capacity
to maintain social resources overtime. These organizations need some form of
material resources to hire staff, pay for travel, and purchase materials. However,
they do not need that much money, especially if they can latch onto existing
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infrastructure. Organizations who refrain from “recreating the wheel” and enter
into a food security project with a collaborative mindset can stretch their
resources through developing partnerships. Social capital, however, enables
access to the populations in need of assistance, so organizations without much in
the form of material power are still ahead when it comes to reaching those in
need. Therefore, social resources will make-up for the lack of material resources
in the form of partnerships and collaborative projects, as well as access to those
in need.
Low social and low material resources
Proposition 4: Organizations with low material and low social resources
experience low performance. The inverse of the discussion in proposition one is
true for this combination of resources. An organization that does not have
material or social resources does not have the capacity to survive in the longterm. A mix of resources is necessary. In this scenario, the organization is
deprived of connections with donors and partners. They will also lack the
material resources necessary to successfully develop and sustain these
relationships. Organizations with low material resources can enhance
performance by building strategic partnerships, which may start with ideological
preferences. However, without some material power, and pragmatic
relationships, an organization cannot survive in the international development
environment.
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Table 2.2: Propositions Regarding Resource Allocations
Material Resources

Social Capital
High

High

Low

High Impact

Low Impact

Moderate Impact

Low Impact

Low

Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the concepts used to examine
INGO capacity to achieve an organizational outcome by means of social capital,
material capabilities and the interaction between the two types of resources.
Although this theoretical model was developed specific to measure INGO
outcomes related to food security programs, I expect the model to remain
consistent across sectors, including emergency response programs, gender
equality, education and the like.
Interviews with food security professionals confirmed partnerships and
social capital are a great asset for their programs. They also suggested these
partnerships come at a cost to the organization, in the time and money they
require to flourish. Food security partnerships emerge locally, at the city or
village level. The evolution of partnerships and collaboration is very contextual
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and generally develop in the field. In some cases, the connection is personal.
One case in point came from Zimbabwe, where a partnership between two
INGOs forged because the country directors found they worked well together
and had similar interests. The social relationship led to a future proposal to build
a collaborative program in the region. In other cases, a partnership is spawned
due to necessity. Some partnerships create a strain on the organization. Other
partnerships are sustained by prolonged interactions. Mercy Corps and Save the
Children have partnered for years in Tajikistan. The partnership has flourished
overtime and now runs smoothly with little cultivation.
Material resources were also discussed. I suggested that private
donations, grant funds and human capital together account for an organization’s
material power. While material power is necessary to achieve organizational
outcomes, these resources alone cannot sustain an organization operating in
tumultuous environments. To be sure, money and personnel are vital aspects of
fulfilling program requirements. However, without the social resources needed
to enhance capabilities, organizations cannot withstand external shocks, reach
leery populations or gain favorable positions with donors. I concluded that
material resources and social capital interact to enhance outcomes.
Using information from interviews, published work, and INGO reports, I
develop a complete conceptual model, presented here. In forthcoming chapters,
these concepts are used in an empirical model, whereby key elements are
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operationalized and data was collected to examine the practical interplay of
social capital and material resources. An organizational outcome is evaluated to
examine the interaction of the two resources and their connection to
performance. In Chapter 4, I examine the social relationships through
descriptive analysis. In Chapter 5, the results of Chapter 4 are added to an
empirical model to test the interactive effects of the two types of resources.
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Chapter 3: Social Capital: The Measurement Problem
Introduction
Various relationships are identified regarding INGOs, their connections
with partners, the interaction between material and social resources and the
effect of social and material resources on meeting organizational outcomes. As
discussed in Chapter 2, there are two types of resources, social capital and
material resources that assist an organization in meeting desired outcomes.
While many researchers examine the consistent patterns of malnutrition and
hunger, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and rural Asia, limited information
currently exists that examines food insecurity systematically from a resource
perspective. Moreover, emphasis tends to be on patterns of accountability and
transparency, with little emphasis on programmatic outcomes. In scarce economic
times, already lean organizations are facing multiple challenges—to build
material capacity to respond while building social partnerships to combat the
issues in a multifaceted, collaborative effort. Regardless of the importance and
emphasis placed on resources, and the inherent need to collaborate, there is
currently limited literature that exists to examine the relationship between the
two, particularly in studies of non-governmental organizations18.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18

Studies of social and material resources are generally aimed at private organizational structures and firms,
looking at ways to increase business outcomes and enhance employee performance, but little emphasis is
placed on government and non-profit organizations from a social perspective to examine outcomes.
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Literature relating to INGOs, as well as food security, is relatively
sporadic and primarily developed for reports from the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) or the United Nations (UN). Little of the research is focused
on the INGO, and investigation is not geared at examining organizational
outcomes, or social capital. Considering the examination of social capital and
material resources in the promotion of food security, this chapter reviews the
empirical studies examining social capital in an organizational setting. I present
the quantitative and qualitative empirical literature that addresses the
relationships I posit in this study. More importantly, I review what the literature
leaves out to provide evidence of the gap in social science when considering dual
resources and organizational outcomes.
Organizational Social Capital
Organizations are complex entities (Scott 2003). As such, the inner
workings of organizations are not easily categorized. When interest is targeted at
the interplay between and among organizational units, the task is more difficult.
This section of the reviewed literature focuses on organizational social capital,
and particularly INGO networks. Social capital emerged in sociological literature
in the early 1900s, with Jane Jacob’s work on American Cities (1917) and was
later adapted to political science in the 1990s, with Robert Putnam’s inaugural
book, Making Democracies Work (1993). Since then, the concept expanded to
use in a plethora of environments, across disciplines and at myriad levels of
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analysis. Social capital provides an alternative mechanism for viewing resources.
Researchers argue social capital is a resource for the individual, the organization,
the township, and the nation state.19 A World Bank proponent of social capital
and development, Michael Woolcock, states:
Social capital provides . . . a fruitful conceptual and policy device by
which to get beyond exhausted modernization and world-system theories
and make potentially important contributions to questions of economic
development. . . . Social capital’s greatest merit is that it provides a . . .
comprehensive multi and interdisciplinary approach to some of the most
pressing issues of our time (Quoted in Cohen and Prusak 2001, 6).
Woolcock’s explanation demonstrates why social capital is particularly
important in development contexts. Social capital is compared to other resources
in the literature and is explained as the resource that is available to an
organization through the function of its location on a social structure (Adler and
Kwon 2002). In the next section, I review: 1) definitions of social capital; 2)
conceptualizations of the construct; 3) different forms of measurement including
control variables; and 4) the connection between social capital, benefits and
outcomes.
Definitions of Social Capital
There are many definitions of social capital in organizations, describing
social capital as something that is internal to the organization, external to the
organization or a combination of both. Social capital is categorized into two sub!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See the Inglehart’s (1997) work on the World Values Survey for the first National attempt to capture social
capital.
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groups: internal and external. Similar to this study, Adler and Kwon have
determined that social capital can exists within organizations, outside
organizations or both. This is important because the conceptualization of social
capital was inherently developed within organizations, and shared across
departments and referred to as bonding social capital. The definitions emerged
overtime, conceding social capital presented a resource external to the
organization as well. Therefore, organizations can “share” social resources in
much the same way they can borrow material resources, also referred to as
bridging social capital. Bridging social capital refers to connections between
various heterogeneous groups that are more likely to foster cooperation and
inclusion when compared to bonding social capital (Coleman 1998). Bonding
social capital is the connections within smaller subgroups; but not linked to
outside members. As such, connections between employees in one organization
would represent bonding social capital, whereas, inter-organizational
cooperation constitutes bridging social capital. Some researchers have
developed working definitions of social capital that encompass both bridging
and bonding social capital. This conceptual argument opens doors in research,
allowing us to examine inter-and intra- organizational collaboration with
definitions that examine bridging and bonding capital in single definitions,
outlined here. My research identifies inter-organizational social capital or
bridging social capital, while also considering bonding social capital. In Table 3.1
below, adapted from Adler and Kwon (2002) summarizes the key definitions of
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social capital in all the prominent and cross-disciplinary literature, linking
internal and external definitions to a concept that encompasses both.
Table 3.1: Adler & Kwon’s Summary of Social Capital Definitions
Internal
versus
External

Authors

Definitions of Social Capital

External

Baker

“a resource that actors derive from specific social structures
and then use to pursue their interest; it is created by changes
in the relationship among actors” (1996: 619).

Belliveau,
O’Reilly & Wade

"an individual's personal network and elite institutional
affiliations" (1996:1572)

Bourdieu

“the aggregate of the actual or potential resource which are
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or
recognition ” (1985: 248).

Bourdieu &
Wacquant

“the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (1992: 119).

Boxman, De
Graff & Flap

“the number of people who can be expected to provide
support and the resources those people have at their disposal”
(1991: 52).

Burt

“friends, colleagues, and more general contracts through
whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and
human capital” (1992: 9).
“the brokerage opportunities in a network” (1997: 355).

Internal

Knoke

“the process by which social actors create and mobilize their
network connections within and between organizations to
gain access to other social actors’ resources” (1999: 18).

Portes

“the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of
membership in social networks or other social structures”
(1998: 6).

Brehm & Rahn

“the web of cooperative relations between citizens that
facilitates resolution of collective action problems” (1997: 999).
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Coleman

“social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single
entity, but a variety of different entities having two
characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of
social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of
individuals who are within the structure” (1990: 302).

Fukuyama

“the ability of people to work together for common purposes
in groups and organizations” (1995: 10).
“social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a
certain set of informal values or norms shared among
members of a groups that permit cooperation among them”
(1997).

Both

Inglehart

“a culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks
of voluntary associations emerge” (1997: 188).

Portes &
Sensenbrenner

“those expectations for action within a collectivity that affects
the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members,
even if these expectation are not oriented toward the economic
sphere” (1993: 1323).

Putnam

“features of social organization such as networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate cooperation and coordination for
mutual benefit” (1995: 67).

Thomas

“those voluntary means and processes developed within civil
society which promote development for the collective whole”
(1996: 11).

Loury

“naturally occurring social relationships among persons which
promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in
the marketplace…an asset which may be as significant as
financial bequests in accounting for the maintenance of
inequality in our society” (1992: 100).

Nahapiet &
Ghoshal

“the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded
within, available through, and derived from the network of
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social
capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that
may be mobilized through that network” (1998: 243).

Pennar

“the web of social relationships that influences individual
behavior and thereby affects economic growth” (1997: 154).

Schiff

“the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations
among people and are inputs or arguments of the production
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and/or utility function” (1992: 160).
Woolcock

“the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in
one’s social networks” (1998: 153).

Table adapted from Adler and Kwon 2002, 20.

Examining this comprehensive set of definitions, I adopt Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s
definition, emphasizing the internal and external nature of INGO collaboration,
as outlined in the social relationships presented in chapter 2, encompassing
collaboration with other personnel, as well as partners from a set of
heterogeneous organizations including other INGOs, donors, businesses and
local partners.
Conceptualization of Social Capital
Within the literature, some of the most pertinent is the work that focuses
inter-organizational collaboration. As argued in Chapter 2, social capital is a
resource separate from material resources, which is essential for achieving
programmatic outcomes. This type of social capital emerges when multiple
actors engage in food security programs.
Adler and Kwon (2002), through a meta-analysis, develop a new
framework for conducting social capital research. They synthesize over 20 years
of theory to develop a common framework across disciplines. In Figure 3.1, their
conceptual model is presented, which identifies: types of relations, sources of
social capital, contingencies and values that come from the benefits and risks.
They define social capital as “the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its
source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s relations. Its effects flow
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from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actors”
(Adler and Kwon 2002, 23). Through the social structure, they operationalize a
tripartite of relations by which social capital emerges: market, social, and
hierarchical relations.
They argue, through market, social, and hierarchical20 relations with other
actors, the sources of social capital arise from opportunity, motivation, and
ability. By opportunity, they mean actors have the opportunity to engage in
social transactions that may include shared information, leverage contacts, etc..
By motivation, they argue actors must have a reason to participate in the
exchange of information and resources, even if opportunity is present. They
suggest that in research focused on organizations, motivations are
“instrumental” (2002, 25). Instrumental motivations are based on rational
calculations and dyadic exchange, whereby actors determine what they can gain
by entering into a social relationship, which is generally based on trust. If an
actor determines there is little to gain, the relationship may not develop.
Relationships between INGOs and donors illustrate this argument, as INGOs
need to be able to provide donors with a reason to fund their projects. In other
words, the donors need to be able to determine their return on investment.
Finally, social capital emerges out of ability, which they define as “the
competencies and resources at the nodes of the network” (2002, 26). In sum, the
actors must possess the knowledge and abilities necessary to add value in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 In my research, relationships with donors represent hierarchical relations, relations with INGOs social and
relations with businesses market.
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social relationships they enter, similar to the comparative advantage argument I
make regarding INGO program development. Adler and Kwon argue that all
three sources, opportunity, motivation, and ability, must be present for social
capital to emerge.
When social capital does appear, there are three benefits or outcomes
identified by the authors: information, influence, and solidarity (Adler and Kwon
2002). The most straightforward is information. Through collaboration and
connectivity, information flows more freely when transaction costs are low.
Therefore, one organization can gain knowledge through engaging in
information exchanges with another organization. Information sharing, however,
can have drawbacks, including loss of power when information is shared across
organizations. Second, social capital can create power for the organization
through influence. One organization can rally support from partners to gain
power and influence over other organizations. Also, actors who act as “bridges,”
meaning they connect a disenfranchised member to the larger group through
their network tie, can exert influence over the disconnected groups. Finally,
solidarity is a benefit of social capital. Solidarity exists when strong social norms
and beliefs are associated with high degrees of closure in a network. Solidarity
can assist in integrating disadvantaged or isolated groups through bridges. This
benefit also comes with the risk of becoming isolated from outside views and
creating cliques where other groups feel unwelcome. In Figure 3.1 below, Adler
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and Kwon’s conceptual model is presented, summarizing the information in this
section (Adler and Kwon 2002, 23).
Figure 3.1: Adler and Kwon’s Social Capital Construct

Aside from Adler and Kwon’s (2002) meta-analysis, other researchers
have argued that social capital is important to organizations. Nahapiet and
Ghoshal (1998) argue social capital is a resource within an organization,
encompassing structural, relational and cognitive dimensions, which together
benefit an organization in ways not achieved by other means. The three
dimensions include: structural, cognitive and relational social capital.
Structural social capital includes: network ties, network configurations,
appropriable organization. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) contend that network
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ties are central to social capital theory, as the network ties provide access to
information. Information sharing is regarded as one of the greatest benefits of
social capital and therefore, can be examined through ties or links between
entities. They further argue that network configuration is equally important in
determining information flow, as networks vary in form from density,
connectivity and so on. Different configurations are linked to various outcomes,
such as development of intellectual property, which is the topic of their most
recent article. Finally, they suggest that patterns of social connectivity in one
context may be transferred to other contexts. They refer to this concept as
appropriable organization, where norms and values from one organization
transcend organizational barriers and infiltrate other structures, creating a
greater ability to motivate information sharing.
Cognitive social capital includes shared codes and language and shared
narratives. Many aspects of language and shared narratives assist in social
capital exchanges. The most obvious aspect relates to the ability to connect and
communicate effectively without linguistic barriers. Language forms the basis
for our ability to exchange information and develop shared perceptions.
Networks often develop a shared set of concepts and codes, and these are
communicated through a shared language, illustrating membership and shared
understanding. In addition to shared language, networks that develop a shared
narrative afford members a way to connect socially, developing a sense of
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belonging and shared experience. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) suggest this
happens through sharing “myths, stories, and metaphors” (254).
Relational social capital includes: trust, norms, obligations and
identification. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) examine through previous research
that high levels of trust are also associated with an actor’s willingness to engage
in a social exchange. Therefore, developing trust within a network structure
enhances connectivity and information sharing. Developing trust in the network
allows actors to engage more openly and anticipate and react to challenges.
Where trust is high, networks can weather external shocks better, as members
connect and respond collectively rather than disengage. Norms, which emerge
overtime, represent a mutually understood set of actions, such as a norm of
cooperation or a norm of engagement. Agreed upon actions, therefore, can
become a mechanism for control within a network, as they can regulate behavior.
For example, humanitarian norms in international society create a perceived
obligation to react when human rights are violated. This external form of control
binds network members; say from democratic states or another network
configuration to act according to agreed norms of behavior. Obligations are
similar to and closely related to norms, except obligations are a predetermined
code for future actions between actors. Using the previous example, democratic
states have an obligation to respond to actions against partner states. The action
is based on normative behaviors, but expected at a future date, should a set of
conditions arise. For humanitarian aid organizations, such as the INGOs in this
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network, they share a norm of compassion and have an obligation to act when a
global shock affects a population’s ability to access enough food. Finally,
resulting from developed norms and trust and obligation, actors form a sense of
identification. Identification is one’s ability to see them as belonging to a group
or network. Salient group identification, thereby, increases an actor’s motivation
to engage in an exchange relationship (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, 256).
Similar to Adler and Kwon (2002), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) do not
employ methods to test hypotheses, however, their conceptual work assists
researchers in making sense out of the various social capital scholarship. Most
organizational social capital literature employs the above dimensions in
examining empirical cases. In INGO studies, social capital spans across all three
dimensions, however, little empirical research exists examining these
relationships, especially when we consider research with large samples21.
Development scholars also deliver conceptual arguments in regard to
social capital. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) examine social capital and its
effects on development from a policy perspective. They examine the network
structure of social capital and find synergy between network structures and
valuable institutions structures is the best type of social capital to help reduce
poverty in communities. They postulate collaboration between actors in a
network is most effective when institutional elements support the transaction. I
posit a similar proposition, stating an organization’s material capital must be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Moore et al. (2003) use only one case. Ohanyan (2009) uses only 4 INGOs.
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able to withstand the development and fostering of relational resources, but
when the two align, organizations benefit.
Social capital, Narayan and Woolcock argue, is a tool linked to outcomes,
even in the absence of material capital. One example regarding microfinance
programs demonstrates this point particularly well, stating, “poor village women
with no material collateral are given loans on the basis of their membership in a
small peer group, which helps them start or expand a small business and thereby
improve their families welfare” (232). I make a parallel argument regarding
INGOs. Even an INGO with limited material resources, can achieve outcomes by
using the material power of a partner INGO. This concept, illustrated by the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which is well known for its successful
microfinance program, can expand to include other areas of research. In
Woolcock’s model, the resources provided to the poor villager represent an
opportunity to improve one’s well-being (A). However, they argue returns of the
initial interaction reach a peek (B) and begin to diminish especially if they rely on
bonding rather than bridging social capital. Continuing the same microfinance
example, resources then may diminish, as the program becomes overwhelmed
by a new group of beneficiaries applying for loans. In this instance, the benefits
to the existing members decline, as resources are diverted and stretched to
accommodate new applicants (C). When this happens, they argue members
“divest” themselves of the initial asset, while simultaneously seeking connection
to the broader community. This represented the expansion from “bonding” to
111!

“bridging” social capital. Here the person in need of services connects to other
resources offered by partner systems, creating a more diverse personal network
(D). The network is then comprised of more members from heterogeneous
backgrounds and the bridging social capital allows them to leverage the
resources to achieve a greater sense of stability (E). Woolcock and Narayan’s
(2000) model, which illustrates this overall argument, is displayed below in
Figure 3.2.
This argument works well regarding relations between INGOs. While
INGOs may develop strong intra-organizational ties, and establish bonding
social capital, they will not be able to reach greater outcomes. By developing ties
to other organizations via bridging social capital, they can achieve greater
outcomes through the leveraging of additional material resources from other
organizations. Together, the organizations can achieve more than when
implementing their projects separately or in isolation from the other.
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Figure 3.2: Woolcock and Narayan Social Capital Model

Figure recreated from Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 232.

Using this model, Woolcock and Narayan argue there is a relationship between
network density and poverty. Binary network density is simply the proportion of
all possible ties that are actually present in the given network (i.e. of all the actors
that could be connected, what proportion are actually connected). In a dense
network, the proportion of actual connections to possible connections is high.
Woolcock predicts communities with high network density also have lower
poverty indices. This proposition is testable using a social network approach,
however, no empirical results are presented in their research.

113!

Moreover, conceptualizing group collaboration in policy realms emerge
from divergent perspectives within the INGO literature. Examining aspects such
as issue development, issue framing and venue shopping, Keck and Sikkink
(1998) explain the way groups emerge and how they succeed. Each of these
stages of “gaining influence” is tied to the ability to exchange information and
create effective campaigns, through bridging social capital. Nelson suggests
influence within the INGO network is tied to donors, creating a more
intertwined web of connectivity and strong linkages (1996, 608). Nelson argues
strong network relationships begin with funding collaboration, not common
projects (612). From the conceptual literature regarding INGO collaboration,
social capital emerges due to the need to build collaborative practices to attack
difficult social problems.
While studies reviewed in this section help form the basis for
conceptualizing and defining social capital within organizations, they do not
measure social capital or provide analytic tests of their assumptions. Although
the aforementioned conceptual pieces help illustrate the importance of studying
structural or network power and the connection between actors, these works
constitute “soft” networks and offer little in the art of advancing empirical
studies in social capital scholarship. In the next section, I examine studies that
attempt to measure social capital in the public and non-profit sectors to assist in
filling the void.
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Measurement and Empirical Studies
In order to test propositions, the concepts provided in the previous
sections need to be operationalized. When the literature is narrowed to include
articles that deliver empirical, rather than theoretical findings, the results are
disappointing. Within the literature, only one study examines interorganizational collaboration in the public sector (Andrews 2010) and one
examines inter-organizational collaboration between INGOs (Moore, Eng and
Daniel 2003). In addition, a few studies attempt to empirically test the
conceptual arguments presented above within the private organizational setting
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon and Very 2007; Bolino, Turnley and Bloodgood 2002; Cross
and Parker 2004). In each of these studies, organizations and individuals with
enhanced social capital performed better, however, very few examine
organizational outcomes based on bridging social capital and organizational
structure.
I argue social capital can be influenced by an organization’s structure
(Bolino, Turnley and Bloodgood 2002; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Andrews
2010). After a review of the organizational literature, it is evident my argument
can benefit most from the Andrews (2010) study because it represented the only
examination of inter- rather than intra- organizational social capital in the public
or non-profit sector. Moreover, he utilizes a moderated regression model, such
as the one proposed in this research. Andrews (2010) using panel data, examines
structural social capital on the performance of 100 governmental organizations
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between 2002 and 2005. He argues a higher level of social capital equates better
organizational outcomes. He adds in new elements as controls for the social
capital effects, referred to as organizational structure, used as a moderator. The
three moderating variables that are classified as structural variables include:
centralization, formalization and specialization. Centralization is focused on
management and decision-making. He conceptualized a centralized
organization as one with decisions coming from top management, whereas in a
decentralized organization, decisions are made at various levels. Formalization
is a measure of the presence or absence of written policies. Organizations with
policies and procedures guiding decision-making are considered formalized.
Specialization measures job skills as either specialized or unspecialized. When
an individual requires specific training it is specialized, likewise, when the
individual’s skills to complete a task are easily transferred to the skills are
termed unspecialized. In Table 3.2 below, the survey items used in Andrews’
analysis are presented; illustrating the single item scale he uses to measure the
different types of social capital and organizational structure moderators (2010,
603).
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Table 3.2 Andrews’ Survey Items
Organizational Characteristics

Survey Items

Structural social capital

Co-ordinated and joint working with other
departments is a major part of our approach to the
organization of services.
Cross-departmental/cross-cutting working in
important in driving service improvement.
There is a high level of trust between top management
and staff.
There is a high level of trust between officers and
politicians.
The authority concentrates on achieving its mission,
values and objectives.
The authority’s mission, value and objectives are
clearly and widely understood and owned by all staff
in the service.
When our results deviate from our plans, the decision
to take appropriate corrective action usually comes
from the top.
Written policies and procedures are important in
guiding the action of employees.
We frequently transfer or second staff to different
services/departments (inverted).

Relational social capital

Cognitive social capital

Centralization

Formalization
Specialization
Table recreated from Andrews 2010, 603.

Here, Andrews demonstrates that social capital has a direct relationship
with organizational outcomes. As his dependent variable, Andrews used the
self-reported views of stakeholders on the service performance of local
governments in the United Kingdom (UK). He finds relational social capital and
cognitive social capital have a positive and significant relationship with
organizational performance, while structural social capital does not. Table 3.3
summarizes his results from an OLS pooled regression analysis (597). To test the
argument in Adler and Kwon’s conceptualization, to see if there are also negative
effects of social capital, Andrews also examined a quadratic effect in the same
regression models and did not find a change in the results. These results suggest
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the positive effects of social and cognitive social capital are not likely to turn
negative (602).
Table 3.3: Andrews’ Results: Organizational Social Capital and Performance
Independent variables
Slope
Slope
Organizational social capital
Structural social capital
Relational social capital
Cognitive social capital
Control variables
Lone parent households
Population growth
Age diversity
Ethnic diversity
Social class diversity
Population (log)
Population density (log)
Service expenditure per capita
F-statistic
R2
N of observations
+p <.10; *p<.05, **p<.01

-.05
.30**
.19**
-.18+
.30**
-.23**
-.55**
-.001
.10+
.31**
.21*
16.16**
.32
387

-.30**
.30**
-.08
-.47**
.02
.06
.35**
.26**
21.60**
.45
387

Table recreated from Andrews 2010, 602.

As evident in Andrews’ analysis, regarding structural social capital,
elements within an organization can either enhance or strain the relationship
between material and social resources. I use a comparable model to
conceptualize material resources as the moderating organizational structure. As
INGOs vary little in Andrews’ form of organizational structure, I see minimal
variance in specialization and formalization. INGOs are flat, decentralized,
formalized organizations. However, other variables regarding organizational
structure and capacity could yield interesting results, and vary drastically across
the population.
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Social Network Analysis (SNA) can also be used to measure social capital.
Two scholarly articles utilize SNA to measure social capital within the INGO
literature, only one of which actually conducts the analysis. Moore, Eng and
Daniel (2003) use SNA to examine crisis response and coordination in one case
study, focused on Mozambique. The paper uses two sets of data, INGO
coordination and links to other organizations and beneficiary numbers. Using
three measures of centrality (degree, eigenvector, and betweenness), the authors
examined the link between the centrality measures and beneficiary numbers. Put
simply, these researchers examined a group of actors, including INGOs, after an
emergency to test whether their interactions with each other formed social
resources that aided their outcomes to reach flood victims. The links between
organizations were established using a proxy (shared location), comparable to
the one proposed in the next chapter. In Figure 3.3, the conceptual model used in
the Moore, Eng and Daniel study is presented below.
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Figure 3.3: Moore et al. Conceptual Model

Figure recreated from Moore, Eng and Daniel, 2003, 306.

They hypothesized the organizations with higher centrality would also have
higher numbers of beneficiaries. My research uses the same dependent variable.
Analogous to my analysis, they measured beneficiaries as the sum of all
categories of persons receiving services after the floods. To test this hypothesis,
the authors used a Mann-Whitney U test. They examined degree, eigenvector,
and flow betweenness centrality measures in relation to beneficiary outcome
data. The authors dichotomized scores into ‘high’ and ‘low’ categories, using the
mean as the cutting point. Mann-Whitney U determined whether the ‘high’ and
‘low’ district affiliation categories differed in numbers of beneficiaries. The
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results indicated the link between centrality and more beneficiaries was in fact
significant, using a 95% confidence interval.
The authors point out two main limitations to the study. The first is
related to the data. There could be a bias in the sample, as the data utilized was
from a self-reporting system. In addition, due to the type of data and statistical
tests related to the levels of measurement, there was not a mechanism for testing
causal hypotheses. Therefore, the conclusions are limited to the descriptive
analysis, suggesting a relationship between centrality and benefactors.
One limitation not examined by the authors, is the moderating effect of
the size of the organization and their access to donors in other words power and
influence. The study concludes that INGOs have the highest degrees of
centrality as well as the most beneficiaries. Contrary to the other INGO studies,
this piece examines what I call social capital, without considering material
capabilities. The effects of the larger organizations to attract and secure more
resources were not examined, which also strengthens the argument for
networked studies of emergency response and humanitarian aid.
The second study, conducted by Ohanyan (2009) examines INGO
autonomy from donors in the policy process. Her research question is:
As non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their donors, each
usually with much different policy orientations, coalesce within interorganizational networks, what determines whose policy preferences are
pursued, implemented, and delivered on the ground? (2009, 475).
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Ohanyan’s design focuses on the microfinance sector in Bosnia Herzegovina.
She uses two variables: 1) the level of policy coherence and 2) the degree of
power concentration. Utilizing these two variables, she created a typology of a
network-based structure. In table 3.4 below, Ohanyan’s typology is presented to
illustrate her four possibilities combinations for distinct network types.
Table 3.4: Ohanyan’s Network Typology

Degree of Power
Concentration (DPC)

Low
High

Level of policy coherence (LPC)
High
Low
Unstructured concord
Insular embeddedness
Vertical specialization
Diffused pluralism

The network she examines is comprised of dyadic relationships between NGOs
and donors. She finds that NGOs donor relationships that fall in the realm of
“insular embeddedness” fare best in terms of developing the right mix of
partnerships and autonomy. These NGO’s are able to balance reliance on donors
and policy and programming autonomy. One nice aspect of this model, relevant
to my current research is Ohanyan’s departure from a donor-recipient
relationship to focus on the network attributes and patterns or relationships that
enable enhanced policy outcomes. In some cases, donor priorities are pursued
regardless of NGO preferences. In other cases, donors and NGOs act more like
partners, each directing aspects of programming. She finds, “INGOs vary widely
in their influence over global policy outcomes, and that influence is contingent
on an INGO’s external network environment. Moreover, INGO autonomy is
sensitive to the network structure in which the INGO operates rather than the
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financial or organizational resources of the donors funding the INGO, as
commonly believed in the literature” (498). She examines one NGO in each of
the four quadrants in her model and examines that each form of networking
between NGOs and donors creates a divergent outcome in microfinance policy.
One of the major strengths of this study, although limited in scope, is her ability
to model exact relationships in the network, as measured by donors who fund
these NGOs. Here, she is able to demonstrate that through direct, and not
through a proxy relationships, different levels of power concentration and policy
coherence lead to different organizational outcomes. These findings support my
conceptual model, suggesting that relationships between donors and INGOs are
important in determining ways to enhance organizational performance and
reach.
Both the Ohanyan and Moore et al. studies begin to examine INGOs as
networks and uncover more mechanisms for collaboration. However, Ohanyan’s
generalizations are made from a sample of four INGOs, which seems inadequate
considering the size of the field. The area is underdeveloped and will benefit
from more extensive use of cases and additional variables.
In development studies, Woolcock and Narayan argue developing a direct
measure of social capital is difficult, and the development of a common measure
may be impossible. They suggest “more comparative research is required that
uses precise measures of social capital to examine within-country and acrosscountry variations in poverty reduction, government performance, ethnic
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conflict, and economic growth” (2000, 239). Alternative proxies are presented,
which includes: membership in informational associations and networks, density
of associations, and norms and values that facilitate exchange. They recommend
researchers measuring social capital “…unbundle social capital into its
dimensions and to generate new data sets that are comparable across many
countries” (Woolcock and Narayan, 240). Although they do not evaluate any
measures, the advice from their development perspective is crucial and
illustrates why a global network analysis of INGOs is important in developing a
common tool; building a base for future empirical studies to expand. One
important finding is the author’s recommendation to use structural social capital
or network ties when organizations are competing in dynamic environments.
Outcomes and Benefits from Social Capital
There are many benefits and outcomes associated with empirical studies
of social capital. Social capital can increase efficiencies (Nahapiet and Ghoshal
1998), form new ways of learning and associating and create new norms
(Fukuyama 1995; Jacobs 1965; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993), provide access to
resources through network ties (Burt 1992) and be strengthened over time
(Bourdieu 1986). Conditions that make people or organizations more dependent
on one another strengthen social capital. On the contrary, social capital is eroded
when organizations are less dependent on one another(Coleman 1990). In
examining INGOs, this seems intuitively correct, as resources become stretched,
INGOs are more dependent on donor funds and may increase the viability of a
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lasting relationship between INGOs and donors, but not necessarily between and
among INGOs themselves.
Social capital is also closely related, and moderated through material
resources. Social resources can enhance material resources and vice versa. This
includes recruitment, professional development, and networking to build new
proposals. Social capital creates an atmosphere that influences professional or
career success (Burt 1992; Gabbay and Zuckerman 1998; Belliveau, O’Reilly and
Wade 1996). Furthermore, social capital helps jobseekers gain employment and
creates a better pool of applications for organizations to draw from (Granovetter
1995; Lin and Dumin 1996; Fernandez, Castilla and Moore 2000). The difficulty in
obtaining material resources, discussed in Chapter 2, increases the importance of
the social capitol benefit in the INGO population.
Social capital is also an important resource between, and not just within
organizations. Social capital facilitates inter-organizational resource exchanges
and competitive innovation, which can help create new knowledge and
technologies (Gabbay and Zuckerman 1998; Hansen 1998). As such, social
capital creates intellectual capital and cross-functional team effectiveness
(Hargadon and Sutton 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Rosenthal 1996). Social
capital has also been shown to strengthen relationships among firms (Asanuma
1985; Baker 1990; Dore 1983; Uzzi 1997; Kraatz 1998) and allowed access to other
resources (Burt 1992). This in turn leads researchers to examine the effects social
capital has on the motivation to create collaborative relationships and maintain
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them overtime. The temporal aspect is the most important aspect of social capital
(Coleman 1988). In Cohen and Prusak’s book, In Good Company, (2001), they
examine how social capital aids organizations in accomplishing their work, while
enhancing performance. They argue social capital is a mechanism that high
functioning businesses use to get work done. When social capital is present,
Cohen and Prusak argue high levels of trust exist and vibrant communities of
practice emerge. They suggest the real benefits of social capital, although
sometimes held at the individual level, accrue at the organizational level. The
collective arguments from Cohen and Prusak (2001), as well Nahapiet and
Ghoshal (1998) support the importance of examining INGOs at the
organizational level. Moreover, the social capital they obtain aids organizational
outcomes, which deserves examining.
Considering the above arguments regarding social capital and its benefits
to the organization internally and externally, the literature overwhelmingly
concludes social capital is indeed a type of “capital” that can aid an organization
and assist in achieving outcomes. Aside from Andrews (2010), no other studies
examine an organization’s structural elements in conjunction with the
establishment of social capital. Andrews’ sample consists of local government
offices in one European country. I propose the one-county sample needs to be
expanded to a global analysis with varying business structures, including nonprofits. Considering social capital is an important and widely studied concept in
sociological and organizational literature, it is important to turn attention to
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social capital in development organizations to learn how we can measure and
assess social capital within INGOs, adding to the World Bank research.
Limitations of Current Measurement Strategies
The current social capital literature is well developed on the theoretical
and conceptual dimensions, but weak in empirical illustrations of its
measurement and value in organizational studies. I reviewed the various
definition of social capital, arguing the emergence of definitions that combine
elements of bridging and bonding capital will assist in examining interorganization research, including this project. I presented two empirical studies
that examine social capital and its benefits through analyses in relief INGOs and
the UK government. While these studies were both helpful in the formation of
the conceptual model developed for this study, they also illustrate a real gap in
empirical work that examines connections between and among organizations
and their material resources. Andrews (2010) does an exemplary job applying
one of the many social capital models in an empirical study. His
conceptualization of moderating effects fills a gap in the literature, which needs
to be expanded to include more variables regarding organizational capacity that
might include size and financial power. He illustrates social capital does have an
effect on organizational outcomes, but there are some limitations with his study.
First, all of his measures are 1-item self-reported scale, which may be unreliable.
Secondly, his dependent variable is a self-reported perception of performance,
rather than an objective measure of performance. Finally, his study argues that
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structural, social and cognitive elements are essential for organizations to meet
outcomes, but he does not empirically model any of those connections. This is
the biggest weakness of his work, which I plan to overcome through a formal
social network analysis to examine the structural elements and network ties.
Also, his study uses a very small sample, which is geographically limited in
scope. With a model that connects over 1186 projects on every continent, I hope
to add value as the first international adaption of these models of social capital.
Based on this literature review it is evident there are gaps in the research
regarding material resources, leading to a plethora of future explorations needed
to understand why and how material resources, such as employees and revenue
effect an organization’s ability to perform. As outlined in Chapter 2, INGOs are
facing a huge human resource challenge in recruiting and retaining qualified
personnel. The ability to develop a strong pipeline of future leaders is
challenging when turnover is so high. There are, however, no current studies
that examine the direct connection between social and material resources, or
between material resources and organizational outcomes. The small body of
applied research that does exist in this arena is focused on conceptual arguments,
with no empirical findings. There clearly needs to be more research dedicated to
global analyses of resource interactions in order to better understand and
address the capacity building issues holistically (Hailey 2006, 27). The need to
examine the material resources and social capital interactions is
underrepresented in the literature and requires investigation.
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Moreover, the literature in the field of INGO networks is inadequate. The
extents to which organizational structure and external environments effect
programmatic outcomes are not developed well or evaluated systematically. In
part, the goal of this project is to develop a measure of social capacity that can be
used in later studies, so environmental and organizational contexts become a
larger part of INGO scholarship.
The two current SNA studies examined in this review are limited to one
country, and one issue each, microfinance in Bosnia and flood assistance in
Mozambique. This research, while limited to the one issue area of food security
would offer the first large-scale global analysis, combining projects in every
region of the world. Information regarding organization’s connections is
difficult to obtain, however, efforts to examine large international networks are
not unfeasible. INGOs are best studied in an interconnected fashion, as they
work collaboratively, advocate collectively, and unite in their fieldwork. It is also
examined that INGOs that work together in the field have shared organizational
ties. Yet, the extent to which collaboration is an effective means to achieve
organizational outcomes, including reaching vulnerable populations, requires
exploration.
This project provides value for scholarship and public policy within the
INGO framework, as it develops a social capital construct and it examines the
interplay of two types of resources, generally studied in isolation. Material
resources and social capital will be examined empirically through a network
129!

analytic approach. The network approach will connect the key players, INGOs,
the levels of social capital, centrality in the network, and the moderating factors
from a material resource perspective. While relationships between actors are
normatively explained in some INGO literature, very little empirical work exists
to test hypotheses regarding coalition building, network structures, and actor
behavior. More importantly, I could not find a current research project that
examines an organization’s performance while accounting for both social and
material resources. Perhaps there are factors that limit aid effectiveness other
than donor-recipient dependency. These factors can include: lack of local
capacity, inadequate funding and an inability to sustain material resources. In
their summary of future research, Adler and Kwon identified examining these
factors as highly important, after reviewing the last 20 years of empirical work.
They state:
Social capital's ultimate value depends on several moderating contingency
factors…As we have indicated, factors that some researchers treat as
moderating contingencies will appear as resources in other accounts.
Debate over such issues is inevitable and healthy. This domain of research
seems a high priority one, particularly if we are going to understand the
conditions that determine the balance of benefits and risks (Adler and
Kwon 2002, 35).
More work is necessary to understand the linkages, control variables, and
collaboration between INGOs, NGOs, local constituencies and donors. This
research is the first step. I develop new constructs and test hypotheses, while
providing practical outcomes for organizations hoping to reach more hungry
people with limited social and material resources.
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Chapter 4: Examining Social Relationships Among INGOs
Single entities can deliver interventions; the right partnerships can deliver
transformations.
~Paul Dudley Hart, Mercy Corps’ leader on Global Partnerships

Introduction
A mix of both social capital and material resources are essential for INGOs
to achieve their missions related to food security programs. As discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, the importance of social networks, and the social capital which
emerges out of networks, is discussed in policy studies and academic literature
across disciplines (Ostrom 1990, Woolcock 1998; Bourdieu 1984, 1988; Coleman
1990; Podolny and Rauch 2007; Putnam 2000; Barabassi 2002; Buchanan 2002;
Sabel and Zeitling 2012; Torfing 2012; Lobel 2012; Rhodes 2012; Gilardi and
Radaelli 2012; Uzzi 2007). Social networks can be defined “as a set of nodes or
actors (persons or organizations) linked by social relationships or ties of a
specified type. A tie or relation between two actors has both strength and
content” (Castilla et al. 2000, 219). Networks are based on non-hierarchical
coordination and horizontally embedded relations between actors. Some
authors consider networks as a distinct type of governance outside the
hierarchical structure of governmental organizations, bureaucracies, and firms
(Borzel 2011; Williamson 1979; Powell 1990; Torfing 2012; Keck and Sikkink
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1998). Because a plethora of organizations, both public and private, now engage
in policy discussions, examining non-governmental actors within a network
model is essential. Moreover, INGO's and their network interactions influence
the different techniques and policies favored by donors for reducing food
insecurity. As examined in Chapter 3, academia currently lacks empirical
evidence illustrating the best factors in predicting INGO performance,
particularly from a material and social resource perspective. In order to examine
if social capital is a resource that aids INGOs in enhancing performance, the
development of a method to assess social capital is needed. I examine the concept
of social capital through social network analysis (SNA), providing an avenue for
visual inspection of structural attributes, including centrality of the actors, and
density of the network.
The concept of social capital, as examined in Chapters 2 and 3, emerged
from patterns of behavior within hierarchical, social and market interactions.
These patterns of relationships are examined using SNA. These patterns can be
empirically measured through network centrality and density. What it means to
act as an influential partner is assessed through an organization‘s role in the
social network. In the following subsections, hypotheses, data collection
techniques, methods, and descriptive results are presented. I discuss why,
theoretically, INGOs are well suited for an examination of a network form of
organization.

132!

Why Study INGOs as a Network?
Networks create social capital for individuals (Burt 1992; Bourdieu 1985)
and communities (Putnam 2000; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) as well as
organizations (Andrews 2010). Network forms of organization are an alternative
to markets and hierarchies (Powell 1990). Almost by definition, INGOs working
together in the field share a connection. They often work in the same sector, each
of which has a food security dimension: agriculture; disaster management;
economic recovery and development; education; environment; food aid; health;
human rights, democracy, and governance; peace and security; protection;
shelter and housing; or water, sanitation, and hygiene. INGOs that work closely
together share resources and connect socially and professionally, developing
shared norms and procedures. The literature suggests these connections are
essential for survival. There are consequences associated with repeated
interactions, where actors are likely to associate in the future. In situations of
solidarity and reciprocity, organizations working in close proximity are not only
likely to cooperate; they are also likely to develop a social form of punishment
for those who do not align, perhaps in the form of material resources or
knowledge sharing sanctions (Axelrod 1984). As INGOs are likely to work
together on future projects, motivation to maintain positive relational ties is also
high.
Based on theoretical social network premises, those in close proximity
tend to collaborate (Rodgers 1962; Rodgers 1965; Rodgers 1981; Coleman, Katz
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and Menzel 1966). Moreover, the unique challenge of operating in tumultuous
environments with limited resources drives a cultural adaptation of network
structures, which is accentuated by actors’ close proximity. Across all sectors,
INGOs have formed partnerships, such as LINGOS (Learning in INGOs) and
InterAction, which encourage inter-organizational collaboration and information
sharing. In the 21st century, a transition to seeing multiple actors in the
governance system can be examined, which includes non-governmental actors.
This adaptation of the international system lends itself to a network form of
organization, rather than a hierarchical or market-driven system.
A network form of organization relies on interdependent preferences and
choices among actors as well as shared norms and reputation concerns (Powell
1990, 300). This form of organization is comprised of three elements driving
network configuration: know-how, demand for speed, and trust (Powell 1990,
324). In developing a theoretical framework for network forms of organization,
Powell argues:
Non-market, non-hierarchical modes of exchange represent a particular
form of collective action, one which:
• Cooperation can be sustained over the long run as an effective
arrangement;
• Networks create incentives for learning and the dissemination of
information, thus allowing ideas to be translated into action
quickly;
• The open-ended quality of networks is most useful when resources
are variable and the environment uncertain;
• Networks offer a highly feasible means of utilizing and enhancing
such intangible assets as tactic knowledge and technological
innovation (1990, 322).
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The network form of organization is, therefore, an ideal organizational structure
for the examination of INGOs.
INGOs working together in the same sector share the four qualities of a
network developed by Powell. First, they build long-lasting relationships with
other organizations. Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Services offer one good
example, as they have over 15 years of experience building cooperative
programs. Second, INGOs share information across organizations, and develop
conference presentations, shared advocacy agendas, and consortiums like
LINGOs that are designed to help disseminate information and learn through
other organization’s best practices and challenges. Third, and probably most
important in sustaining a network structure, is related to the dearth of resources,
both personnel and monetary. Resource shortages, paired with the challenge of
operating programs in warzones or areas devastated by natural disasters and
high degrees of social unrest, demand coordinated efforts, which are
geographically different. An INGO’s day-to-day work likely operates in one of
the most uncertain environments known to international business. Finally,
INGOs share resources and experts across organizations. Often, after burning
out from fieldwork, senior INGO staff will develop a repertoire of short-term
consultancies in many different organizations. Moreover, in certain emergencies,
such as floods, where a high level of expertise is essential, such as water and
sanitation engineering, personnel are shared between projects and across
organizations. Hence, given Powell’s (1990) conceptualization, interactions
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between and among non-governmental actors are best conceptualized as a
network.
When INGOs operate as a network, they communicate frequently, in the
field and through national headquarters, share human and other material
resources, and initiate programs based on comparative advantage. While large
INGOs operate programs in multiple sectors, most INGOs in fact have particular
operational niches. For example, CARE, food security; Médecins Sans Frontières,
health; and Oxfam, sanitation; or as in the case of Save the Children, direct their
programs at particular classes of beneficiaries (Stoddard 2003). Therefore,
isolating and examining specific sectors within the INGO community may yield
insights about prominent actors and their relationships, the composition of
which is likely to vary. In sum, INGOs have often become mutually dependent.
Therefore, to be effective at developing programs as well as securing funding
from a limited number of donors requires that INGOs collaborate. In fact, these
organizations often develop proposals and programs in tandem.
Examples of this type of collaboration are evident in practice. One
example came up in an interview at Mercy Corps. The organization decided to
partner with another INGO in Africa, because the other organizational already
had established offices in the location necessary to complete the work, which
saved money and time. A further example is, Catholic Relief Services (CRS),
built strategic partnerships with World Vision and CARE to expand their reach
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and deliver food packages to insecure environments they might not otherwise be
able to reach due to their religious affiliation.
Expected Relationships within the INGO Community
Social capital is an essential resource assisting INGOs in achieving their
missions related to food security. I explore the social capital construct and
present results regarding INGOs and the relationships they forge. Reviewing
literature and talking to INGO professionals brought the relational elements
between INGOs to the forefront. Social capital scholars argued for a more global
analysis of social relationships (Woolcock and Narayan 2000), for an examination
of bridging social capital, which includes inter-organizational connections (Adler
and Kwon 2002), and finally, for an examination of the norms and values that
bond organizations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Interviews with prominent
food security personnel were conducted with the purpose of further building my
conceptual model. Through the interview process, the importance of examining
INGOs in relation to the network in which they operate was cited (December
2012-February 2013). This is due in part to the environments in which these
organizations work. Project locations are generally isolated, insecure and often
in areas of political and social unrest. As such, INGO personnel need to build
inter-organizational bonds to operate efficiently and safely because the closest
team members from their organization are often cities, and sometimes countries,
away. Considering the information gleaned from interviews and the literature,
expect a couple of relationships to emerge in this network.
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First, I suspect that those INGOs best endowed with material resources
are not necessarily the same INGOs with the most social connectivity. I predict
social resources are linked to organizational outcomes, which I will examine
further in chapter 5. However, I also posit organizations low in material
resources, such as revenue, will still be able to achieve a central role in the
network through their ability to form alliances with other organizations, sharing
resources, knowledge and commodities, such as housing. Thus, social resources
form an alternative mechanism for building up organizational capacity.
Organizations with a talent for fostering lasting relationships and leveraging
social capital are not necessarily the organizations with high material resources.
In fact, organizations with high levels of social capital may be those with little in
the form of material resources, as the lack of material power provides more
motivation to seek partnerships. I predict some organizations low in material
capital will therefore be able to achieve a central role in the network, suggesting
material resources are not the only precursor to organizational capacity. During
my interviews, the number of stories illustrating how an “underdog”
organization was able to achieve great outcomes through the strategic
partnerships they chose struck me. I examine this notion, suggesting outcomes
can be achieved with the right mix of partnerships.
Second, I posit that relationships often form over ideological preferences,
as discussed in Chapter 2. I predict that relational resources form when
organizations share similar ideological stances, evident in network ties. In these
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data, I suggest organizations with similar religious preferences partner. I am not
suggesting religious or secular organizations are more central actors in the
overall network. However, where I examine links between organizations, I
expect the presence of ideological “glue” assisting in maintaining partnerships.
Evidence suggests motivation to collaborate often emerges from an ideological
position. As Powell conceived:
Networks should be most common in work settings which participants
have some kind of common background—be it ethnic, geographic,
ideological, or professional. The more homogenous the group, the greater
the trust, hence the easier it is to sustain network-like arrangements.
When the diversity of participants increases, trust receded, and so does
the willingness to enter into long-term collaborations (1990, 326).
Moreover, religious groups have an established infrastructure for which
partnerships naturally emerge (Powell 1990, 326). As sociological literature
suggested, developing social resources at the onset can be costly, therefore, it
may be beneficial to collaborate with other organizations with an established
framework (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 231). Religious institutions provide
one such framework, although there may be others. I suspect the ideological
foundations are evident in the structure of ties between organizations in the food
security network.
The remainder of this chapter will present the data collection techniques,
operationalization of the SNA variables and links, a description of SNA methods
and presentation of the descriptive results.
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Data Collection
In order to examine the relationships posited above, data were collected
from multiple sources. The data were collected between June 2011 and February
2013 and compiled into one database. These data are cross-sectional, collected
across multiple organizations at one snapshot in time. All the quantitative data
used are archival meaning it already existed prior to this research. However,
these data are used here for the first time in this manner. Data were collected
from three sources: InterAction’s Food Aid Map, GuideStar’s website, and
interviews with INGO staff. Data regarding the organizations were collected
from multiple archival databases because field-level information is almost
impossible to obtain from a primary source considering the decentralized nature
of INGO work. Headquarter staff are connected to projects in the field for their
area of expertise; however, fieldworkers are extremely difficult to reach. In order
to get a complete picture of the organizational connections, without using a
proxy, primary information would need to be gathered from field staff, which is
not likely in a global analysis. INGO work is spread globally and often located in
areas with limited connections to the outside world including access. Collecting
survey data from the entire population by either traditional mail or electronic
means was unfeasible. In network analysis, there is not a mechanism for dealing
with missing data. Hence, conducting network research with a population that
is difficult to contact is even more troublesome, leading to a pragmatic approach
to information gathering.
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In an effort to enhance reliability, the data utilized here were collected
from required reporting systems. For example, GuideStar uses the national
revenue service data, such as IRS 990 forms, for US based organizations, to
collect organizational information regarding the number of employees,
volunteers, and revenue. Additionally, InterAction is a consortium well
connected to INGOs reporting staff and donors. Through funding from the FAO,
InterAction researchers spent the last five years collecting project level
information regarding INGO work in hot-topic sectors, such as food security.
When INGOs are required to report project specific information to their donors,
they also report this information to InterAction. The food aid researchers at
InterAction collect data in the following areas: number of beneficiaries, project
costs, primary and secondary project sectors, location of the projects, and the
funding agency.
Although I attempted to stick with required reporting data, the
information gathered is not without flaw. Both InterAction and GuideStar collect
data based on INGO self-reporting, which could be problematic. However, I
chose data required for federal reporting standards to avoid data that may be
overinflated by INGOs. Therefore, I feel confident the information reported here
is accurate, as reporting false data to donors and federal agencies such as the IRS
has negative legal repercussions. I also considered using information gleaned
from INGO’s annual reports, but quickly found two problems. First, the metrics
reported varied by organization, and often disaggregated project information
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was not reported. Second, these reports are written for INGO board of directors
and potential private donors, so the temptation to over embellish on
accomplishments, such as organizational outcomes, is great. As such, I decided
to use data validated by a reputable third party, even though it was also selfreported.
The first step in completing this project was identifying a comprehensive
set of actors. In order to identify the actors, a complete list of all INGOs working
on food security projects was created. I was able to get a full list of INGOs
working on food security programs from the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), as they are working on a research mapping project of INGO
programs related to food security. I constructed a spreadsheet with the name of
the organizations in one column. Then, in order to examine the organizations
and their connections and structural attributes, various other facts were collected
from InterAction. First, I collected information regarding all the projects each
organization was working on globally. The projects were varied in scope and
size, ranging from a food distribution program in Haiti to a microfinance
program in Central Asia. All programs listing food security as a primary
objective were included in my dataset. Information regarding the projects,
included the location of operation by country and village, and the funding
agency and the sub-sector, such as agriculture, education, or health. Finally, I
compiled the names and email addresses for the food security program officer at
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each organization. These data were collected using InterAction’s Food Aid map
(April 2012).
Organizational attribute data was also collected. I examined if the
organization was secular or religious, and if they had a headquarter office in the
United States or Europe. This information was collected from the organizations’
websites. Material attributes of each organization, including the financial and
human resources were collected from GuideStar. I collected information about
each organization in the network, including: total revenue for 2012, reported in
dollars, total number of full and part-time employees and, total number of
volunteers. This information will be used later in Chapter 5, when the inferential
model is introduced. After completion of data collection, the network consisted
of 51 INGOs, operating in 83 countries, servicing 1189 contracts (InterAction
Food Aid Map, April 2012).22
Operationalization of Concepts
Given the hypotheses formulated, concepts and empirical constructs were
developed. When the data collection process was complete, I was able to
operationalize some of the concepts identified in the model presented in Chapter
2. In this section, my operationalization of INGO inter-organizational social
capital is explored. INGO operations within food security sector will be
examined through a network analytic approach, connecting the conceptual
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Country and contract data is up-to-date as of April 30, 2012 (from InterAction’s Food Security Aid Map).
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model of social capital to the empirical tool used for modeling interconnected
relationships, SNA.
Examining the Network: Social Network Links
The main independent variable used in this study as discussed above, is a
relational measure, used as a proxy for social capital. Researchers suggest
examining social capital in relation to organizational capacity, which will also be
introduced regarding material resources in the next chapter (Woolcock 2000;
Adler and Kwon 2002; Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003; Ohanyan 2009). However,
the concept of social capital modeled by coordinated efforts, social interaction,
feelings of solidarity and information exchange fits SNA well. Within SNA, links
are established between two actors, for any given pattern of communication,
partnership, or collaboration. When conceptual models of social capital are
analyzed empirically, SNA is a common tool utilized to model such interactions
(see Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003 for an empirical example using INGOs).
In order to examine social capital in the INGO population, a reasonable
representation of connections between and across organizations was established.
Due to the necessity of information flow in the network, links needed to capture
the geographically dispersed nature of the work. I had to consider the best proxy
for a measure of direct coordination, not likely to create artificial connections.
There are pros and cons to each operationalization, as a measure of direct
connection is not available, however, I will explain the options available in this
section.
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Developing a social capital based on a relational proxy is an arduous task,
often plagued with criterion deficiency, as each operationalization may plausibly
miss aspects of the true relationships. There were several operational ties to
consider in the INGO food security network, including shared sector, shared
country location and village location. I propose that considering the three
operational options, shared village location is the best proxy for communication.
An operational measure that presents a link between two INGOs based on their
work within the same sector or the same country will overestimate the extent of
working ties within the INGO community. There are two reasons for this
distinction. First, INGOs may work in the food security sector and choose not to
coordinate. One organization may work only in Latin America, where another
organization chooses to work only in Central Asia. Although both organizations
work in the same sector, it is not reasonable to assume they are connected in a
social manner, while geographically dispersed such that collaboration, solidarity,
and information flow are unfeasible (see Adler and Kwon 2002). Furthermore,
INGOs often operate in the same country, as the need is greatest in certain areas
of the world. However, the organizations working in different regions will have
the same difficulty sharing resources and information, as the areas in which they
work are often isolated from outside environments. Simply located in the same
country does not provide a reasonable geographic proxy due to the inability for
information flow and shared resources to transcend great distances. My
interviewees confirmed this idea and suggested using a more moderate
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expression of partnerships, at the municipal level, where programs and projects
are intimately connected.
Previous operationalizations of this work were based on shared country
ties. Although previous results were significant and in the expected direction,
the datasets were re-constructed to establish links at the local, rather than state
level, which may have over-estimated connective parameters (Kraner and
Kinsella 2012). There is reason to believe organizations working in the same
country share connections, especially considering the nature of development
work, however, I chose to use the more conservative measure to avoid
overestimates of social capital. I also avoided the most conservative measure,
those INGOs connected to the same project. The reason I avoided this measure,
as discussed in the previous section, is because I learned from field experiences
and from INGO reports that these organizations choose divergent projects in the
same proximity to remain competitive and offer services that are best suited for
their organizational capacity. For example, Save the Children may pass out
nutritious snacks to youth in Quito. Meanwhile, CARE may deliver nutrition
classes to parents of the same children. The work is in fact interconnected, albeit
focused on divergent project objectives and target populations. In this example,
CARE and Save the Children work in collaboration with divergent beneficiary
populations to combat the same problem- malnutrition in the Quito area.
Considering this example, using the same project as a proxy for social capital
development, projects with these types of collaborative efforts would be missed.
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Therefore, a decision to use connections based on shared location rather than
projects was made.
Based on the problems identified with other possible operationalizations,
through interviews with subject matter experts, and through a review of the
literature, links were established at the local level. Link operationalization at the
city or village level is partially based on elements presented in the INGO
literature, sharing resources in the field and program development based on
comparative advantage. Social capital conceptualization places solidarity and
information sharing at the forefront, meaning close proximal ties are essential,
especially where technological advance allowing for quick transmission of
information are not readily available.
Throughout the INGO literature, researchers argue that partnerships are
important and that INGOs work together in the field (Ohanyan 2009). As
discussed above regarding the reasons to study INGOs as a network, it is evident
that proximity to one another in the field represents a reasonable connection
between organizations. These organizations communicate frequently, leverage
resources, share housing, and propose mutually beneficial programs (Rodgers
1962; Rodgers 1965; Rodgers 1981; Coleman et al. 1966; Moore, Eng and Daniel
2003; Ohanyan 2009). Organizations working on food security programs, and
are co-located in the field, collaborate as a network, sharing material resources.
The INGO literature supports the assumption that close proximity, at the village
level, indicates that INGOs are connected within a network (Moore, Eng and
147!

Daniel 2003). In addition, the precursors, opportunity, motivation and ability,
that need to exist for social capital to emerge are available at the city level,
whereas the geographically and disenfranchised nature of the global network
limits the ability for these conditions to emerge across countries (Adler and
Kwon 2002).
Moreover, through interviews, interviewees who run these programs
confirmed that proximity in the field offers a good indication that collaborations
are present to some degree. When asking interviewees about the suspicion that
INGOs in the same city collaborate, share information, human resources and
communicate regularly, they confirmed this operationalization of links is
appropriate and accurate given the typical interactions in fieldwork. In addition
to the relational elements modeled in my social capital construct, interviewees
suggested cognitive and structural social capital emerge when organizations
work in such close proximity, simply based on the need to socialize and connect
with other aid workers when missing home, feeling insecure or unsafe and
witnessing grief and devastation. Many INGO workers form lasting bonds over
their experiences in the field, which was brought up in each interview as a
possible mechanism by which inter-organizational social capital forms. As
Woolcock states, it is unreasonable in international analyses to assume we can
model direct connection, but developing reasonable proxies for collaboration are
essential (2000, 239-241). Taking the two reasons suggested in the literature and
confirmation from field interviews, the network was constructed assuming a link
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between organizations working on a food security program in the same city or
village.
Constructing the Network
After researching the best proxy for collaboration, I needed to construct
the network. The social capital variables were constructed using data from
InterAction’s Aid Map (April 2012). Social capital, by definition is the “sum of
the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social
unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, 243). As such, I decided to examine these
INGOs empirically, based on their interactions with other INGOs, forming
network ties to measure social capital indirectly through a locational proxy, at
the village level. While this measure is not void of criticism, it is the best option
given the ability to directly and objectively measure collaboration and
information sharing. As the definition implies, social capital does not take into
account formal established relationships. In fact, the potential resources
embedded within a community are important to collaboration. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that even where direct coordination is not present, similar
working conditions and shared proximity offer a reasonable expectation that
potential resources may emerge.
To create the connections, making analysis possible, the network was
constructed using project data derived from InterAction. These data were used
to examine affiliation and adjacency of the nodes. In network analysis,
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adjacency tells us whether there is a direct connection between two actors for undirected data. This analysis uses shared project location as a proxy for direct
connections. Moreover, affiliation means the actors share a property in common,
such as the political climate in which work is conducted, the type of projects, etc.
I constructed an affiliation matrix and a square adjacency matrix connecting
organizations that worked in the same location at the village level (Yij= {1, if
relation is present; 0, if no relation is present}). An affiliation matrix examines a
list of nodes, in one column, with rows of defined characteristics. In Table 4.1
below, an example of an affiliation matrix is provided that shows organizations
as the nodes in the first column, to assist readers in better understanding how
shared properties can be utilized to create an affiliation matrix. The
characteristic, a list of countries, appears in the top row. If the organization is
working in that country, a 1 appears; if not, a zero appears.
Table 4.1: Example Affiliation Matrix
Organization

Africa

Belize

China

Denmark

Mercy Corps

1

0

1

0

Save the
Children

1

1

0

0

World Vision

1

1

1

1

An adjacency matrix can be created from an affiliation matrix, which is
how I constructed my data. In an adjacency matrix, the nodes appear as the row
and column headers, with a 1 denoting a connection between the two nodes and
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a zero indicating no connection. The nodes, or unit of analysis, in this study are
the organizations themselves—the INGOs (N=51). The INGOs as the nodes in
the network represent a mix of global nongovernmental organizations both
secular and religious. Links can also be weighted, using numbers to indicate the
frequency for which two nodes collaborate.
Links here are operationalized based on project proximity at the
municipal level. The location where the project takes place offers much
information about social connections, which offers a building block for social
capital, as there is opportunity, motivation, and ability to share information,
build solidarity, and develop influence. Therefore, in this network, specifically, a
link is present if two or more nodes (INGOs) are connected to a project in the
same city, or analogous unit. As such, I established a “link” between two
organizations working in the same village, therefore creating an adjacency
matrix. Analyses are based on a one by one (INGOxINGO) adjacency matrix,
similar to the example provided in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Example Adjacency Matrix
Link: shared
location

Mercy Corps

Save the
Children

World Vision

Bread for the
World

Mercy Corps

1

0

1

0

Save the
Children

0

1

0

1

World Vision

1

0

1

1

Bread for the
World

0

1

1

1

151!

The adjacency matrix was then imported into UCINet and analyzed using
SNA techniques to assess various measures, which will be covered in the
following section.
Methods: Social'Network'Analysis'Overview''
Social network analysis (SNA) is an analytic approach mainly concerned
with a set of actors (nodes) and the connections between them (links).
Introduced in the social sciences first in the discipline of sociology, SNA is now
gaining prominence across disciplines, including political science, international
relations, criminal justice, and business administration. “The fundamental
difference between a social network explanation and a non-network explanation
of a process is the inclusion of concepts and information on relationships among
units in a study” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 6). The social network perspective
highlights myriad levels of analysis, and offers an analytic tool for examining
such relations (SNA). In SNA, differences among actors are traced to study the
constraints and prospects that arise from their enclosure in networks; the
structure and behavior of networks, and the local exchanges among actors. I
examine the least complex ideas of the formal network analysis methods,
including descriptive analysis. Despite the simplicity of the ideas and definitions,
excellent theoretical reasons and some empirical evidence contend the basic
properties of social networks have vital results based on connections.
First, patterns of connections emerge in social network analysis. These
connections expose elements that can explain information flow, disenfranchised
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actors, cliques and bridges. While some actors possess many connections, others
have few. Divergent patterns of connection among actors are significant for
understanding their attributes (material or otherwise), behavior and importance
in a social system. More connections often mean these organizations are
introduced to diverse information and possess greater opportunities to diversify
program portfolios because they are connected to additional actors, abilities and
donors. In turn, many connections could mean organizations can specialize
because they can trade services based on abilities of a partner organization (see
Andrews 2010 and Adler and Kwon 2002). Many connections may also be a sign
of influence (Woolcock 2000). Highly connected individuals or organizations
may be more influential or, on the contrary may be more influenced by other
actors in the network. Remember Adler and Kwon’s warning regarding solidary
and the potential to develop a mind-set based on similar ideas, limiting the
inflow of new and innovative solutions to social problems.
Second, the difference within populations regarding the level of
connections is also significant. For example, rumors and diseases spread more
quickly where there are high rates of connection. However, these connections can
also spread valuable information, which is identified as one of the most
important benefits of social capital. Furthermore, densely connected populations
may be better able to mobilize their social and material resources. This in turn
makes organizations better able to bring varied and diverse perspectives to bear
while wielding solutions to difficult problems. Differences in connections explain
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much about the stratification of groups, which is highly important in
development studies because many groups with low levels of connection and
participation are also the most impoverished (Woolcock and Narayan 2000).
Finally, social network analysis allows researchers to model social
relations among nodes, which can represent organizations, individuals,
countries, or so on. The relational modeling allows us to examine structural
elements of actors (nodes) interactions and connections. An examination of this
type elucidates powerful actors in a sector, shows avenues for communication
and highlights those actors “bridging” information and connection. A bridge is a
link connecting two subgraphs. Simply put, if one actor connects two
subgroups, through one link, they form a bridge between the two subgroups,
and therefore, socially connect two groups. Many studies in the social sciences,
and specifically organizational literature, ignore structural elements in analyses
of cooperation and conflict and SNA allows us to add these elements into
analyses to examine how and when a node’s placement within a network effects
their interactions and business processes. Therefore, examinations of network
structure deserves a prominent place in the literature and adequate attention
from political scientists and policy experts.
Constructing and Choosing Network Measures
There are myriad measures of centrality in SNA: degree centrality,
closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and Eigenvector centrality. This
analysis will focus on measures of centrality as a proxy for social capital (see
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Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003, for an empirical example of this measure within
INGOs). I was interested in measures of centrality, density, and structural
equivalence. Of these measures, centrality offers information within a network
associated with the creation of social capital; opportunity, motivation and ability.
Centrality refers to the group of measures termed betweenness, Eigenvector,
closeness, and degree, which aim to quantify the importance or influence of a
particular node within a network. Density represents the proportion of direct ties
in a network, in relation to the total possible number of ties in the given network.
A dense network is one with many connections between and among nodes. A
sparse network has limited connections between nodes. While density is not a
direct measure of social capital, the denseness of a network will provide some
information about the benefits of social capital and how they transpire, including
how information flows or the connectedness and solidarity assumed of a given
network. Another descriptive measure of SNA is structural equivalence.
Structural equivalence is the measure of the extent nodes mirrors one another’s
connections. In other words, it is the extent to which two nodes share the same
social environments. Scholars often hypothesized that structurally equivalent
nodes will be similar in other ways as well, such as in attitudes, behaviors, or
performance. While structural equivalence measures can demonstrate what
actors are similar, it will not demonstrate the relationally derived properties of
social capital, which is the purpose of this study.
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The ties are non-directional in this network. This means ties are
dichotomous, they either exist or they do not exist. It does not make a difference
in the data whether one organization provides services to another organization
or if one is a sub-contractor. The connection arises based on the shared location
and sector.23 Based on these connections, various measures of centrality are
explored, which offer divergent perspectives regarding relationships in the food
security sector.
FIGURE 4.1: Eigenvector Centrality & Degree Centrality

Source: umasocialmedia.com
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The formulas and equations for these measures are presented in the analysis.
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As illustrated in Figure 4.1 above, degree centrality and Eigenvector
centrality, both measures of an actor’s connections, provide different information
regarding the structure of relationships. Taking node “B” in Figure 4.1, as an
example, using a measure of degree centrality, “B” has a score of 4, the highest in
the network, as opposed to an Eigenvector value of .091. When comparing “B”
to “A”, it is evident “B” has a higher degree centrality than node “A,” however
their connections in the network are structurally different. Node “A” has an
Eigenvector value of .182 and a degree measure of only 3. While degree centrality
provides a measure of overall connectedness, Eigenvector scores measure of the
influence of a node in a network. The Eigenvector score assigns relative scores to
all nodes in the network based on the concept that connections to high-scoring
nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question than equal
connections to low-scoring nodes. Betweenness centrality also measures
structural properties of an actor’s role in a network. Betweenness centrality
refers to the number of times an organization needs a given node to reach
another organization. Loosely defined, betweenness is measured as the number
of paths that pass through a given point. As I want to consider each INGOs
centrality, taking into account possible bridges, examining both degree and
Eigenvector centrality assists in accounting for these nuances.
In the INGO food security network, it is essential that I consider the Eigenvector
scores for a couple of reasons. The Eigenvector score of each node will take into
account actors who are only connected to one or two other actors in the network,
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while controlling for the connection to more central actors. In the food security
network, the connection to other well-connected actors may provide one
successful mechanism for overcoming resource shortages. For example, when an
INGO is small and has limited time and money to spend on relationship
building, they need to consider the best strategic partner to enhance reach. It
does a small INGO like Bread for the World little good to spend limited
resources connecting with Food for the Poor, a larger, but not well connected
partner. On the contrary, Bread for the World would be better off building a
relationship with say, the Hunger Project or World Vision, as these relationships
have direct and indirect benefits. Just like other networking projects, say
searching for a new job, the goal is to connect with other well-connected people
or entities. If a job seeker spends all his or her time connecting to other job
seekers, who also possess limited connections (and thus opportunities), the time
is wasted. If the job seeker chooses to network with just a few well-connected
people, they may have fewer direct connections, but many indirect connections,
thus creating maximum connection for minimum effort. This analogy is the
same in the food security network, because resources are scarce and time limited.
Therefore, examining the Eigenvector scores gives us a measure of quality over
quantity regarding social connectivity.
Social Network Analysis: Descriptive Results
This network is made up of organizations and each organization is
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measured in terms of its attributes, including size, wealth, breadth, and global
reach, which are examined later in Chapter 5. The relationships between
material and social capital are provided below in Table 4.3 using correlation
coefficients. The correlation coefficient demonstrate a strong (r=.82 or higher,
p<.001) relationship between and among variables measuring material resources,
revenue, employees, and volunteers. Similarly, both social capital variables
degree and Eigenvector, are highly correlated (r=.956, p<.001). The outcome
variable, reach, is moderately correlated with measures of both material and
social capital, revenue, degree, and Eigenvector centrality (r=.33, .37 and .34,
respectively). These results suggest that there is a relationship between social
and material resources and the outcome of an organization; however, the causal
mechanism has yet to be established.
Table 4.3: Correlation Coefficients- Material Resources and Social Capital
Revenue

Employees

Volunteers

Reach

Degree

Revenue

1

Employees

.829**

1

Volunteers

.826**

.935**

1

Reach

.332*

.046

-.008

1

Degree

-.08

-.081

-.190

.375**

1

Eigenvector

-.118

-.096

-.200

.340*

.956**

Eigenvector

1

There were 51 INGOs in this analysis, forming a global food security
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network. Each organization was examined in many areas to build measures of
material and social capabilities. These organizations work, on average, in seven
countries. They also work on average with between 3 and 4 different donors,
which are primarily government agencies. These organizations together form a
global network that is currently servicing 1189 projects in 83 countries. Projects
span 13 cross cutting sectors related to food security, including: agriculture,
health, education, water and sanitation, environment, food aid, and economic
recovery. Food security affects many countries simultaneously, however the
presence of INGOs working in multiple countries does not follow the same
pattern.
To analyze these data further, I employ various descriptive methods from
social network analysis (SNA). The food security network in this study consists
of 51 nodes, all INGOs working on food security projects. In previous work,
operationalizing the links between nodes in various ways, including the state
level and donor connections were utilized. However, through interviews and
research, as discussed in the previous section, it became evident that the links
need be assessed at the local level to establish an accurate proxy for direct
relationships. Developing links between INGOs was difficult, and took much
experimentation, as described. The INGOs use unique project names for their
activities, which do not match the project names used by other INGOs even
when they are working closely in the field. The question became which
alternative, indirect measures best proxy the sorts of direct working relationships
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I am interested in examining. In the design section of this chapter, I support the
connections through a proxy of shared municipal project location.
I also measure density of the given network. The density of a binary
network is simply the proportion of all possible ties that are actually present. In
a network with s nodes, the maximum number of directed ties between them is
s(s − 1). In an undirected network, such as this, the maximum number of ties is
half that of the directed ties. The density of the same-sector, undirected INGO
network, is 0.93. With a density of .93, we examine a network in which almost all
nodes are connected to other nodes, forming a dense, interconnected network.
When I operationalize links as existing when two INGOs working in at least one
community—subnational level in common, network density is 0.299 (standard
deviation= 0.954), which is much closer to a realistic representation. Figure 4.2
shows the corresponding “sociogram.” Because the network is moderately dense,
the geodesic distances, or the number of paths any given node needs to travel to
reach another node, are generally small. This suggests that information may
travel pretty quickly in this network.
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Figure 4.2: Network Sociogram

SNA includes various techniques for measuring the prominence of nodes
and their strategic positioning relative to other nodes and groupings. As
previously explained, SNA data are arranged as a square “sociomatrix” in which
there is both a row and a column for each node in the network. A cell in the
matrix contains a 1 if the actor represented by row i, designated ni, had a
relationship with the actor represented by column j, designated nj, in which case
xij = 1; otherwise xij = 0. These data are nondirectional in that a tie between two
nodes represents a conjectured relationship rather than a sent or received
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communication or other exchange; thus, xij = xji. But in subsequent research on
ties connecting donors and INGOs, it may be useful to consider directional ties.
In this case, an actor’s outdegree, d(ni), is the number of other actors to whom that
actor has directed some form of communication or exchange (for example,
funding); indegree, d(nj), is the number of actors from whom a communication or
exchange has been received. That is,
d(ni ) =

and d (n j ) = ∑ x ji , (1)

∑x

ij

∀i ≠ j

∀j ≠ i

which are, respectively, the row i and column j totals of the sociomatrix.
In most social networks, certain actors are more prominent than others
and the evidence of their prominence is often the number and type of social ties
they maintain with other actors. The centrality of a network actor is sometimes
indexed as its outdegree, indegree, or both, but since these measures are greatly
affected by the number of actors in a network, it is useful to normalize the index.
Thus, the normalized outdegree and indegree centrality indexes can be
computed as

∑x

ij

C D" (ni ) =

∀j ≠i

s −1

and C D" (n j ) =

∑x

ji

∀i ≠ j

s −1

. (2)

Again, because the data used for this analysis are nondirectional—the
sociomatrix is symmetric—the formulas in (2) give the same result. In Table 4.4,
the normalized results of degree, Eigenvector and betweenness centrality are
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displayed for each INGO in the sample.
Table 4.4: Social Network Centrality Results
Organization
Action Against Hunger
ACDI/VOCA
Adventist Development
African Medical and R
Africare
American Jewish World
American Red Cross
Ananda Marga Universal
Baptist World Alliance
CARE
Catholic Relief Service
CHF
Christian Reformed World
Church World Service
Concern Worldwide
Counterpart International
Episcopal Relief & De
Food for the Hungry
Freedom from Hunger
Food for the Poor
Heifer International
Helen Keller International
International Medical
International Rescue
International Relief
Islamic Relief USA
Life for Relief and D
Lutheran World Relief
MAP International
Meds & Food for Kids
Mercy Corps
Mercy-USA for Aid and
Operation Blessing In
OXFAM America
Pact
PATH
Planet Aid
Plant With Purpose
Relief International
Save the Children
Stop Hunger Now
The Hunger Project
Trickle Up
United Methodist Comm.
Winrock International
Women for Women Inter

Degree
.420
.560
.420
.140
.380
.320
.000
.000
.000
.400
.660
.000
.400
.480
.440
.100
.500
.360
.000
.280
.760
.380
.400
.200
.000
.000
.420
.540
.020
.000
.460
.120
.280
.000
.340
.120
.120
.380
.120
.380
.000
.560
.300
.340
.060
.300

164!

Eigenvector
.235
.310
.235
.076
.215
.181
.000
.000
.000
.230
.355
.000
.222
.261
.267
.267
.277
.277
.000
.170
.370
.236
.221
.105
.000
.000
.303
.303
.000
.000
.264
.050
.162
.000
.191
.073
.070
.216
.046
.222
.000
.315
.174
.185
.035
.183

Betweenness
.011
.016
.008
.000
.007
.001
.000
.000
.000
.006
.026
.000
.012
.017
.003
.003
.012
.012
.000
.001
.074
.002
.009
.001
.000
.000
.004
.011
.000
.000
.006
.001
.000
.000
.004
.000
.000
.003
.002
.004
.000
.014
.003
.008
.000
.000

World Concern
World Hope International
World Neighbors
World Relief
World Vision US, Inc.

.600
.360
.280
.320
.720

.314
.212
.184
.184
.362

.034
.002
.001
.001
.056

Figure 4.3 presents the degree centrality measures visually, arranges INGOs in a
sphere.
Figure 4.3: Degree Centrality Sociogram
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Supplementing degree centrality, Eigenvector centrality was examined for this
network, which helps with examining influence, in addition to connectivity. To
measure Eigenvector centrality, the following formula (3) is used24:

. (3)
Eigenvector centrality takes into account actors who are connected to other actors
through indirect links, illustrating prominent actors in the network, by which
information must flow. The difficulty of relying only on degree centrality is
related to the structure of connections. For example, two organizations could
have the same degree, but one organization knows only other organizations that
know hardly anyone, while the other organization knows other INGOs who
know lots of other organizations, expanding indirect connectivity.
In Figure 4.4 below, Eigenvector centrality results are presented visually,
showing larger nodes for those organizations with higher levels of Eigenvector
centrality. In Figure 4.5, below, the scaling is presented in an alternative view to
show organizations with little or no Eigenvector scores (isolates) on the righthand side of the diagram and those with the highest levels on the center,
followed by mid-range scores on the left-hand side of the diagram.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!For

i.e.

a given graph
if vertex

with

number of vertices let

is linked to vertex , and

be the adjacency matrix,

otherwise (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
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Figure 4.4: Eigenvector Centrality: Shared Location
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Figure 4.5: Network Sociogram

The descriptive SNA results demonstrate some organizations continually score
higher in their level of social capital, as measured by Eigenvector centrality and
degree centrality. A combination of secular and religious organizations, like The
Hunger Project, World Vision, Heifer International, and Catholic Relief Services
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form the center of the network’s core. Others, such as Oxfam, Planet with
Purpose, and Africare, form the periphery of the network, with few connections
to other organizations. These organizations are able to gain prominence in the
network because they have established a mission that favors collaboration and
cross-organizational projects. In addition, they have created an organizational
brand that allows for their fundraising campaigns to be effective. Therefore, they
established the ability to bring in material resources and have established a
mechanism and infrastructure that allows for partnerships to emerge in their
field offices.
However, are these INGOs, with potentially high levels of social capital,
also organizations with the greatest material resources at their disposal?
GuideStar, a provider of information on nonprofits, reports various statistics
taken from IRS Forms 990, which are filed by tax-exempt organizations (see
www.guidestar.org). For each of the INGOs examined here, I have collected data
on net revenue, number of employees, and number of volunteers, which will be
further analyzed in the next chapter. Two INGOs with high centrality measures,
Catholic Relief Services and World Vision, are also among the top ten in terms of
revenue and employees, but the others rank below this in one or both measures
of material resources. In fact, Heifer International, raked number one for social
capital and is ranked 18th among the sample for revenue. The Hunger Project,
ranked fourth for social capital and is scaled nearly at the bottom for revenue,
ranked 38th out of 51 organizations. Here, social capital measures provide some
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evidence in the ability to leverage resources, as organizations at the top of the
social list are not always those with the highest level of material resources at
their disposal. This suggests that social capital development is not solely
dependent on revenue. For a list of the top ten organizations in regard to social
capital, compared to their revenue ranking, see Table 4.5 below. From this table,
it is evident those INGOs highest in social resources are not those INGOs highest
in material resources, with the exception of World Vision and Catholic Relief
Services, which are high in both.
Table 4.5: Top 10 INGOs for Social Capital
INGO
Heifer International
World Vision US, Inc.
Catholic Relief Services
The Hunger Project
World Concern
Action Against Hunger
Life for Relief and Development
Lutheran World Relief
Episcopal Relief & Development
Food for the Hungry

Eigenvector Centrality
0.37
0.362
0.355
0.315
0.314
0.31
0.303
0.303
0.277
0.277

Revenue Rank
18
3
4
39
33
29
35
30
37
20

As this is a descriptive analysis, I am unable to determine if social capital
has a causal relationship related to organizational outcomes. However, in the
next chapter, I explore how social capital of these INGOs relates to material
resources and organizational outcomes. To be a powerful actor in the food
security network means more than the possession of material resources. To be
sure, such resources are important to INGOs. For example, CARE is one of the
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largest INGOs in the United States, operating with budget and staff numbers that
far exceed many other organizations, such as Africare, Concern Worldwide, and
Food for the Hungry. But some INGOs with limited material resources can
manage to become prominent in the food security network by virtue of the
relationships they develop with other INGOs. The example regarding World
Vision and Food for the Poor in Chapter 1 illustrates that similar material
resource do not always equate to analogous outcomes.
Conclusion
The results here indicate social capital is stronger in some organizations
than others. As discussed, with a descriptive analysis, I cannot deduce what
organizational factors caused the variance in social connectivity. However,
based on interviews, field experience and a review of common elements in the
literature, I suggested two propositions regarding resources and the
relationships I expected to observe. In this final section, I revisit these
propositions and provide some insight as to why we may be seeing these
patterns of relationships emerge.
I argued that those organizations with the highest material power might
not always be the same actors best connected socially. In these data, it was
examined that both organizations with high and low levels of income were
indeed located in the core of the network. One might expect holding a central
and influential role in a development network requires large amounts or material
resources. This research, however, argues organizations with limited resources
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are able to secure programs by building relationships with other organization,
which in turn becomes an alternative resource called social capital. As presented
in Figure 4.8, small, medium, and large organizations operate at the core of the
network, as well as at the periphery, suggesting material resources are not the
only precursor to building social capital. Based on the ranking of material
resources and social capital, I can conclude that material resources are not the
only prerequisite to building social capital. Organizations with limited material
power have successfully maintained central roles in this network. Additionally,
these results have face validity within the INGO community. When interviewing
members of this network, I shared results and rank-ordered lists with
interviewees. One of the key questions I asked interviewees was regarding the
validity of results, especially since my measure of connectivity was based on a
proxy for collaboration, where I might expect social exchanges in the field. The
INGO representatives thought the results were accurate based on their
experiences. One interviewee suggested that some of the INGOs they would
expect to see at the center, such as World Vision, had achieved this position
through developing relationships through both ideological and pragmatic
means. Interestingly, two of my interviewees pondered over the names of
organizations on the periphery, asking questions about their work, as they were
not well known in the industry. This reaction led me to conclude that many of
the organizations on the periphery are not well connected and their disadvantage
is evident in their ability to reach more hungry people.
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As with material resources, I expected to see organizations of both
ideological backgrounds to have central roles in the network, although I
expected them to partner with similar organizations, as posited at the beginning
of this chapter.. Figure 4.6 below represents a network sociogram, demonstrating
Eigenvector centrality scores. In Figure 4.6, below, religious organizations were
identified with a red circle.
Figure 4.6: Sociogram- Religious and Secular INGOs

As demonstrated by this sociogram, both religious and secular organizations are
central players in the network. However, I can examine that all religious INGOs
aside from isolates, are connected to at least one other religious INGO. Secular
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INGOs are also connected to religious INGOs, suggesting ideology is not the
only influence in building partnerships across sectors. In Chapter 2, I suggested
that organizations do sometimes choose to partner based on shared belief
systems, but given the resource shortages in the industry, we could also expect
pragmatic partnerships to emerge.
Based on Figure 4.6, I can also examine several of the religious
organizations, as well as the secular organizations partner. There are also a
myriad of links between and among various different ideologies, suggesting that
organizations build ties strategically and ideologically, but tend to prefer likeminded organizations. I can see an alliance of religious organizations on the
right side of the sociogram in Figure 4.6; however, I can also see links to secular
organizations, which I would have expected.
The limited ability of these findings is based on limited data and my
ability to measure only “downstream” relations. By downstream relations, I
mean the INGO connections to one another in the field. These relationships are
only one piece of a much larger collaborative network that includes donors, local
organizations and business relationships. These relationships, I argue in Chapter
2, are all part of the social capital construct, yet I am not able to model these
relationships at this time. Therefore, my estimations of social capital are weak
and underestimate the probably connections forming between these INGOs and
the other classes of organizations not examined here.
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In the next chapter, I explore some of these social capital findings in more
detail in relation to material resources and programmatic outcomes.
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Chapter 5: The Interactive Effects of Material and Social Capital
Introduction: Material Resources and Social Capital
Social resources, I argue, although beneficial, are best examined
considering an organization’s capacity. I offer results on the predictors of INGO
food security activities, including the relative importance of their material
resources and social capital. In Chapter 4, the social capital of INGOs was
explored, illustrating there are mechanisms within social relations that form
within traditional organizational structures. While I was interested in structural
properties of the food security network, like density, I was also interested in
properties of actors, namely INGOs, which derive from their positions and
connectivity within the network. In Chapter 2, I discussed the difference between
INGOs material resources, like financing and personnel, and their social capital,
which derives from their relationships with other actors in the network.
In this chapter, I also explore how the social capital of the organization
interacts with the material properties, such as fiscal and human capital. This
study, therefore, examines the social capital of organizations, in relation to
material capacity. I test three empirical models. A cross-sectional design will be
utilized, examining all current INGO projects globally. No sampling technique
will be used, as the purpose of a network approach is to have a complete set of
data, to examine structural elements of the entire study population.
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The chapter is organized as follows: 1) the hypotheses are presented; 2)
data collection techniques and sources are reviewed; 3) concepts in the empirical
models that were utilized are operationalized; 4) the methods utilized are
explained; and 5) the results are presented concluding with a review of the
findings related to the hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Examining structural elements of INGOs (network centrality), I elucidate
what resources, both material and social, assist these organizations in reaching
improved outcomes. Using both social network analysis to measure social
capital in Chapter 4, and a moderated regression analysis in the current chapter, I
examine the interplay of social and material resources to test the following
hypotheses.
I examine both social and material resources to explain the variance in an
organizational outcome related to the food security sector. I suspect that both are
important aspects of the model. However, I propose that social capital is the
main source of improved performance. Moreover, although both social and
material resources are hypothesized as important in explaining reach, I suspect
social capital, as measured by the Eigenvector centrality, explains more of the
variance than revenue.
H1: The social connectedness of an INGO is positively related to the outcomes
they achieve.
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Second, I investigate material resources and the relationship to reaching hungry
people. Although I suggest that social resources are more important in the
promotion of enhanced organizational outcomes, a certain level of material
resources are necessary to achieve program goals. I suspect all resources are
inter-related, however, and that both social connectivity and material capabilities
are necessary to achieve enhanced outcomes.
H2: Material resources enhance an INGO’s ability to achieve greater
organizational outcomes.
Finally, I predict that the level of material resources moderates the
relationship between social capital and an outcome variable. Therefore, I suspect
in organizations with higher levels of revenue, the returns of social capital on
reach are higher than those organizations with little revenue. Previous social
capital research suggests building and sustaining relational resources is time
consuming and costly (Powell 1990). Although there are hypothesized benefits
related to developing social capital, the pursuit of relationship building may
strain an organization from a material perspective. Current studies of social
capital are divorced of the material elements necessary to explain this interplay
of resources. I posit that material and social resources interact to form divergent
outcomes given an organization’s capabilities. This argument, in turn, suggests
some organizations are better off than others at pursuing social capital.
H3: Material resources moderate the relationship social capital has on reaching
vulnerable populations.
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The remainder of this chapter will lay out the research design, including data
collection and methods, before providing the results and discussion related to
the posited hypotheses.
Data Collection
In order to test the hypotheses outlined in this chapter, data needed to be
collected. In addition to the data collection processes explained in Chapter 4
related to social capital, I needed information that could serve as the
organizational outcome, or dependent variable of this study. I collected
information related to the total number of people served by each project, within
each organization. This information was gathered in April 2012 from the
InterAction Aid Map on InterAction’s website.
In addition to the food security project specific information, I also
collected information about each of the 51 organizations in this network. This
information was utilized to complete the material resources construct. I collected
information about the organization’s human resources, such as number of
employees and number of volunteers, about their operating budget including
grant funds, donations, and contracts, and information about their organizational
preferences, such as the number of local partners. I also determined the type of
donors for each project, categories include: private, IGO, other NGO,
government donor agency, and whether the organization was secular or
religious. These data, both categorical and continuous in nature, were added to a
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database. Together, these variables providing an overview of the sector and the
organizations that make-up the food security network.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, these data regarding projects, revenue,
populations served and required for federal reporting systems, such as the IRS,
donor agencies, etc. Therefore, with legal ramifications possible, the validity of
these measures is not expected to be compromised by INGO self-reporting. The
data utilized here were collected from required reporting systems. For example,
GuideStar uses the national revenue service data such as IRS 990 forms to collect
organizational information regarding the number of employees, volunteers and
revenue. Additionally, InterAction is a consortium well connected to INGO
reporting staff and donors. When INGOs are required to report project specific
information to constituents such as donors, they also report this information to
InterAction.
Both InterAction and Guidestar collect data based on INGO self-reporting,
which could be problematic. However, I chose data that is required for federal
reporting standards, such as revenue for tax purposes, to avoid data that may be
overinflated by INGOs. Therefore, I feel confident the information reported here
is accurate, as reporting false data to donors and federal agencies such as the IRS
has negative legal implications. The alternative sources of information
considered was the INGO’s annual reports. However, as this information is
written for a different audience, INGO board of directors and potential personal
donors, the temptation to over embellish on accomplishments, such as
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organizational outcomes, would be great. As such, I decided to use the data that
was validated by a reputable third party, even though it was self-reported.
These data represent a large portion of the elements I outlined in Chapter
2. There are however, limitations. I was not able to gather information about
business partnerships and specific information about local partners outside the
INGO framework. Regardless, these elements will prove important aspects of
future research on this topic. In the next section, the concepts operationalized for
this analysis are presented.
Operationalization of Concepts
In Chapter 4, I introduced the concept of social capital and
operationalized the links between and among INGOs within villages. I argued
that the geographic proximity of INGOs working on food security projects
provides a proxy for all the elements necessary for social capital to emerge. That
is, there is opportunity, motivation and ability for the organizations to coordinate
(Adler and Kwon 2002). Moreover, the environmental contexts in which these
INGO’s work requires a network form of organization, as resources are tight,
shared information is crucial and solidarity between project teams is essential for
the safety of the personnel working in the field (Powell 1990). After establishing
and analyzing the social capital measures, the next logical task is to examine the
predictive and interactive effects hypothesized above. To investigate how the
social resources interact with the material resources and outcomes, other
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indicators were established. In this section, the operationalization for material
resources and organizational outcomes is presented.
Material Resources
From the various data collected regarding the material aspects of INGOs,
variables were formulated. First, I summed the total number of part-time
employees and the total number of full time employees to form a variable
“employees.” Similarly, the total number of people volunteering in each
organization was used as an additional human resource measure, called
“volunteers.” Then, summing the total number of grants, other donations, and
internal operating budget reported on GuideStar, a variable of organizational
wealth was created called “revenue.” Together, “employees,” “volunteers,” and
“revenue” provide measures of material capacity, revenue used as a measure of
organizational wealth, and the total number of employees and volunteers to
assess human capital. These three variables were constructed using information
from GuideStar’s annual report of non-profit organizations (2012). To create the
composite measure of “material resources” a weighted sum of the three variables
was computed.
Social Capital
A measure of social capital is utilized from the network analysis
completed in Chapter 4. Although many analyses were run, only centrality
measures will be used in the model to assess the organization’s social capital in
the present chapter. Other measures, such as density, while interesting and help
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communicate a clear picture regarding possible information flow, do not access
social capital. Eigenvector centrality was chosen as the measure of social capital
in these three models, due to its ability to assess an organization’s influence in a
network, considering paths that must pass through that node to reach another
node in the network (see Figure 4.1). Since I am interested in the connectivity of
INGOs in relation to their ability to leverage other material resources, I am
interested in a measure accounting for influence and power, as determined by
the location in the social structure. While degree centrality provides information
on connection, all links are treated equally, which limits the ability to examine
relational strength. Hence, Eigenvector centrality illustrates the central location
of each node as well as accounts for possible bridges. For example, World Vision
is working in multiple locations and so is Heifer International. These
organizations are connected to one another through a few direct links (which
would appear in their degree centrality measures). However, these two very
central actors are also working with some smaller INGOs, who are further on the
periphery of the network. These smaller organizations, like the Hunger Project,
have higher Eigenvector scores because they are connected to other powerful
actors such as World Vision. In turn, these connections enable the Hunger
Project to have a shared social connection with other organization that they may
not be working with directly. Here, Eigenvector centrality takes into account, in
this network, those actors who are connected to other powerful actors, and not
just the number of direct links. On average, the organizations had an Eigenvector
183!

score of .168, with all possible values falling between 0 and 1. The Eigenvector
scores are used in this analysis as the single-item measure of social capital, my
primary independent variable.
Although I argue that the relationships I examine in the field are only part
of the social capital available to INGOs, that is the relationships between only
other INGOs, there are a couple limitations to my design that deserve
examination. In this research, I am examining two “downstream” activities.
That is, I am looking at connections between INGOs in the field as well as an
outcome related to field location, which could potentially be argued to be
tapping the same phenomenon. I have argued that social capital and reach are
related, however, I argue that in my model, they are tapping different variance.
These two measures are correlated, as I expect, but not so highly related that
there is concern these measures are interchangeable or representing a biased
result (see correlation matrix for exact statistics, Chapter 4). The following
paragraphs will present evidence to support the argument that my independent
variable and dependent variable are indeed tapping divergent pieces of the
model, one as a service provider and one as a service beneficiary.
The operationalization of social capital of INGOs measures more than
simply the interconnected presence on the ground. Many interactions take place
between two or more INGOs who work in the same location. Surely, location
provides motivation for collaboration. However, once relationships develop,
sustaining these relationships happens across different levels of the organization.
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Communication, resource sharing and collaboration happen at headquarters,
between leadership teams and through advocacy channels. Therefore, the proxy
used to measure social capital, proximity in the field, is capturing more than
field-level coordination. It captures human resource sharing, reporting
collaboration, coordination with donors as well as the location specific
collaboration such as shared housing, or inter-organizational personnel. Moore,
Eng and Daniel (2003) also use centrality measures as independent variables in a
model assessing reach, suggesting there is a qualitative difference between proxy
related to co-location and the variable measuring reach.
Moreover, researchers are tempted to assume co-location is need driven,
data suggests this is not the case (InterAction Aid Map 2012; WFP Hunger Map
2012). This is an important distinction, as to avoid assuming higher need drive
INGO’s co-location. Some of the most food insecure areas are also those with
the fewest number of projects. What is the reason for this? Simply put, security
concerns discourage INGO actions. Many INGOs develop a high tolerance for
operating in extremely insecure environments, especially in those areas prone to
civil wars and violence. Others, however, do not attempt to operate under such
conditions. This results in an uneven aid distribution.
Currently, the lowest numbers of aid programs are operated in some of
the world’s most food insecure populations. In Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Tajikistan,
Angola, Afghanistan and Rwanda, chronic hunger affects 35% or more of the
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total population (WFP Hunger Map 2012). I would assume, if co-location were
need-driven, areas most affected would experience an abundance of support.
That is not the case. In Iraq, 6 programs exist, in Afghanistan 2 (InterAction Food
Aid Map). In Sudan, 3 programs interact, In Angola, only 1. Furthermore,
Yemen does not have a single program. When compared to areas experiencing
moderate need, such as China and Bangladesh, each with 5% or less of the
population chronically hungry, 29 and 88 projects currently operate, respectively.
It is evident, need is not the only factor driving co-location. Therefore, I argue
my social capital variable construction accounts for more than chance or need
driven project saturation. The coordination accounts for mainly downstream
activities, although not perfectly measured. The proxy for co-located projects
captures the coordination at divergent levels of the organization, not just those
employees bumping shoulders in the field.
Examining Organizational Outcomes
Chapter 2 presents an argument regarding the need to examine
organizational outcomes. In this model, I decided to focus on the people served
by INGO programs directly, as a measure of the INGO’s reach, as the main
outcome. When the number of people reached is high, I infer these are successful
programs. I argue a mix of social capital and material resources are necessary to
reach vulnerable populations and the right mix of resources can aid an
organization in better achieving their goals to stomp out hunger.
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An organization’s reach is a direct product of the programs they
implement. By reach, I mean the total number of people who are served by any
given project. The number of people reached serves as an indicator of the
breadth and depth of the INGO’s programming resources, illustrating how they
are distributed among communities. While examining the number of people
reached is not a perfect outcome measure, it is the only measure that is directly
related to the INGO and their programming and not confounded with other
extraneous elements that are outside the scope of this project. Examining an
organization’s reach gives us a quantitative and objective outcome. Reach can be
used to compare INGOs and examine patterns between INGOs because it is
calculated consistently across organizations. In this section, I will explain why I
choose reach, and evaluate the other options, explaining why they were not the
best choice for this research.
Although reach provides the only direct measure related to the INGO’s
programming, it is not a perfect measure. Reach does not account for program
complexity. Take for example a program where an INGO trains a small group of
local farmers to cultivate and re-plant seeds using a new irrigation technique. A
program such as this is complex and requires multiple layers of expertise in
botany, agriculture, engineering and technical training. The program, for the
sake of illustration, may reach 15 farmers directly. Alternatively, imagine a food
distribution program that is geared towards handing out nutrient dense cereal
bars to school-aged children every morning for the duration of a school year. In
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this school, let us say there are 150 children. The program is less complex than
the farmer training described above, takes less resources, say a program manager
and a few support personnel in charge of procuring and distributing the bars.
Although the food distribution program is less complex, the reach measured
directly is far greater than the complex farming program. Accounting for this
type of complexity when comparing programs with a common outcome is
difficult. I argue, however, that the farming program, with less direct
beneficiaries, will create far greater outcome based on the ability to create food
locally and develop knowledge at the village level. While I suspect information
regarding the differentiation of various projects does exist, the mechanisms for
recording this information vary by organization and would require a case study
approach to validate the use of a weighted measure. In my dataset, I have no
way of differentiating between an in-depth program and one that is less intense.
Therefore, a weighted scheme is unviable in these data. Regardless of its
shortcomings, measuring reach remains the best alternative to examining direct
benefits of INGO capacity building.
I considered many concepts that could account for the outcome of food
security programs when developing this conceptual model. However, alternate
objective measures are also troublesome for divergent reasons. The other
outcomes that could be measured to examine possible effects of the food security
programs are objective health outcomes, such as infant mortality rates, or global
indicators such as the Global Health Index (GHI). The reason why these types of
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outcomes are not a good fit for this conceptual model is simple and two-fold: 1).
They are measured at the nation-state level; 2) they are not direct effects of INGO
programming and confound other aspects such as quality of health care systems,
institutionalization within the country, prominence for local disease and so on.
Considering the need to examine INGO specific indicators, I also investigated
INGO data to see if the organizations measure location specific health indicators.
Unfortunately, the information available, is also reported at the state level.
Moreover, the INGO data collection and reporting mechanisms are drastically
different, making comparisons between organizations implausible. Given the
confounding nature of the other observable outcomes, as well as the mismatched
unit of analysis, moving from the village level indicator to the nation-state, the
best conceptual option available is to measure INGO reach directly.
In sum, the dependent variable of this study is an operationalization of
each organization’s outcome, measured by reach. “Reach” was operationalized
as the people organizations serve with the resources available. The variable used
to assess capacity is called “Total Reach.” To construct the “total reach” variable,
the total number of people served by each project was summed for each
organization. Similarly, I created a variable for “average reached,” by dividing
the “total reached” variable by the number of projects at each organization.
In Table 5.1, below, the variables used in these models are summarized
before introducing the empirical models.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Data and Source
Variable

Source

Operationalization

Purpose

Total Reach

InterAction’s Food
Aid Map

A continuous variable
was compiled that
examines the total
number of beneficiaries
reached by food security
projects.

Outcome variable of
the study

Revenue

GuideStar

The total of all grants and
other funds will be
calculated as a measure of
the organization’s wealth.

The first of three
variables used to
assess an INGO’s
material resources

Employees

GuideStar

The total number of FT
and PT volunteers will be
summed for each INGO,
illustrating human
capital.

The second of three
variables used to
assess an INGO’s
material resources

Volunteers

GuideStar

The total number of
volunteers providing time
to an organization

The third of three
variables used to
assess an INGO’s
material resources

Eigenvector
Centrality

InterAction’s Food
Aid Map

All INGOs will have a
link with one another
should they be involved
in a project in the same
city (or similar unit). The
connective measures will
be used to create a
variable for social capital.

To evaluate the effect
social connections
(social capital) have
on the population’s
ability to reach more
people suffering from
food insecurity. For a
more in-depth
overview, please see
Chapter 4.
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Methods
I have posited that both social capital and material resources are
important in reaching hungry people. In this section, I will lay out the
methodological choices chosen to assess my claims before presenting the results.
OLS Regression and Moderation
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression analysis is a method used to
examine predictive relationships between an outcome variable (dependent
variable) and at least one predictor variable (independent variable) (Nishishiba,
Jones and Kraner 2013). OLS regression models use correlation as a basis to
predict the value of one variable from the value of a second variable or the
combination of several variables. Linear regression analysis provides information
about the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable and
independent variable. In a moderated regression model, such as the one
presented here, the relationship between the independent variable and the
dependent variable is affected by a third variable, the moderator. In a moderated
regression model, the effect of the moderator is called an interaction effect. Here,
the moderator variable is the measure of organizational capacity—material
resources. The purpose for choosing a moderated regression model was driven
theoretically by Andrews (2010) in his work examining how resources and
organizational structure can interact with social resources to have an impact on
organizational output.
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I also use a measure of centrality, derived from my SNA. This type of
analysis, using a network output as a predictor in a regression model, has
precedent in political science and international relations (Baybeck and Huckfeldt
2002; Fowler 2006; Franzese and Hays 2006; Lazer 2005; Maoz et al. 2006; Maoz
2009; Schneider et al. 2003; Scholz and Wang 2006; Ward and Hoff 2007; Ahlquist
and Ward 2009). Some criticisms of this approach have emerged, suggesting that
network measures violate the independence assumption of OLS regression, and
thus alternatives should be investigated. However, scholars still use network
measures in regression analysis, as viable alternatives are limited, depending on
the structure of data and the temporal availability of longitudinal data. Although
I would have opted to use an ERGM to test my hypotheses, the specifications of
my data were not optimal for using an ERGM, specifically the need for specified
dyadic relationships. While other alternatives may have been appropriate, my
knowledge of such alternatives was limited. Moreover, I was planning to use
more than one relational measure in my final equation. However, upon
examination of my data, I found that all of my relational measures were highly
correlated, and thus tapping the same phenomenon, I abandoned that approach.
I chose the best alternative, using only one relational measure, Eigenvector
centrality. I opted to utilize a network measure as one of my independent
variables in these empirical models, alongside other continuous attribute
variables.
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It is also theorized here that material resources moderate social resources,
altering the effect on organizational outcomes (Andrews 2010). The best way to
model this interplay was with a moderated regression analysis to examine both
predictors and their interaction on the dependent variable. In the next section,
the empirical models are outlined.
Empirical Model Specification
One model is presented in this chapter, mirroring elements I was able to
operationalize based on my conceptual model in Chapter 2. The unit of analysis
will be the INGO (n=51) and the sector (or population) includes all food security
projects carried out by an INGO. A total of 1189 projects were utilized to
establish links, examined using SNA in Chapter 4. The network data was
constructed in Chapter 4, making descriptive analysis possible. However, this
chapter takes the analysis further. As illustrated in the literature, most of the
information presented in articles and white papers is predominately anecdotal
and there are few large-scale analyses. Studies of INGOs, particularly focusing
on actions of strategic actors, are limited. These results aim to offer new evidence
to support claims about social capital in organizations, considering also material
resources.
This model will test an empirical model that examines the interactive
effect of material resources and social capital on reach. The model suggests
material capacity moderates the relationship between social capital and reach.
Therefore, this research suggests that divergent effects can occur when
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examining social capital, which may be explained by the organization’s ability to
absorb challenges with the appropriate levels of staff and finances. To examine
this phenomenon, the model and equation (1) in Figure 5.1 will be utilized.

Figure 5.1: Empirical Model

Social(Capital:(
Eigenvector(Centrality((

Outcome:(
Organiza9onal(Reach((

Material(Resources:(
Revenue((
Employees(
Volunteers(

(1) Reach= b0 + b1Social Capital+ b2Material Resources+ b3 (Social Capital x
Material Resources) + E

This model, as defined is expected to have a high level of internal reliability,
meaning these measures are established and collected similarly for all INGOs.
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Therefore, each of the measures used in this study are consistent between cases.
Moreover, donors place stipulations on reporting requirements, and these data
are required for reporting purposes, further demonstrating the consistency in
measurement. In sum, measures of revenue, project beneficiaries and the like are
consistent across all units in the study. The measures chosen are also objective
measures, reported for legal purposes and not likely to be over-inflated by INGO
self-reporting. Also, as these measures are common across projects, comparisons
of INGOs based on these criteria are possible. There is empirical precedent for
using social connectivity of organizations as a form of social capital (Andrews
2010; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Powell 1990).
Moreover, considering the large sample size, external validity is not
expected to be a problem. I do not expect these results to be isolated within the
food security sector. These models are expected to remain robust, even when
tested in a divergent sector, as INGO programming is executed similarly across
sectors. Therefore, I would expect an analysis of health programs to yield similar
results, for example. In sum, the findings from this study are expected to be
generalizable to other sectors within the INGO community, such as human rights
programs, governance projects, and civil society enhancing programs.
Suggestions following this research will aid donors and INGOs alike, offering
possible explanations for organizational outcomes. It is possible, and often
probable, that donors and INGOs have different development goals and
expectations, as suggested in Chapter 2. Therefore, a study empirically testing
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the assertion that material and social resources both have an affect on outcomes
should prove useful. Furthermore, with the squeeze on resources, a study
examining capacities and their ability to enhance reach could guide INGO
decision-makers in their organizational planning and resource allocation agenda.
Analytic Results
This study examines the role social and financial resources play in aiding
INGOs in their missions to reach hungry people. These results represent the first
tests of social connectedness on reach, in a predictive model or as moderated by
an organization’s material resources. Through conversations with leaders in the
field, it became evident social connections, partnerships and coordination are at
the forefront of each organization’s agenda. Yet, quantifying the benefits or
usefulness of such resources is not well documented.
I posited that INGOs have resources at their disposal, both material, like
financing and staff, but also social, such as partnerships and alliances. Using a
measure of centrality, derived from SNA, in a regression analysis allows for
inference to be made of the potential importance and relationship both categories
of resources have on the overall outcome, or people reached.
Organizational Description
In this network, I examined the material resources by means of revenue,
employees and volunteers. The average revenue within this network was $245
million and the median value was $58 million. This illustrates that the
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organizations varied greatly in their internal funding resources. The number of
employees also varied greatly across organizations, with an average number of
full and part-time employees at 1766 and a median of 202 employees. When it
comes to volunteers, there is no exception—the median number of volunteers in
these 51 organizations is 23 volunteers25.
In order to test my hypotheses, a dependent variable was chosen that best
assessed the organization’s ability to serve the organization’s constituents,
organizational reach. The variable was constructed by summing the total
number of community members in food insecure environments who were served
by each project, for each organization. On average, each organization served 2.7
million people as of April 2012. Table 5.2 provides a summary of the descriptive
statistics for each variable used in these models.
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard Deviation

Revenue (in millions)

244.9

57.9

577.2

Employees

1766.43

202.00

5093.15

Volunteers

12373.63

23.00

83948.75

Total Reached (in millions)

2.72

.280

7.93

Eigenvector Centrality

.168

.185

.118

Countries

7.29

5.00

9.08

Donors

3.43

2.00

4.11

N= 51 International Nongovernmental Organizations

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25

The average number of volunteers in these organizations was 12,373. Here, the median is reported, as a few
outliers in the dataset (organizations such as the Red Cross, who rely heavily on volunteers, skew the data).
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Regression Analysis
In an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression it was found that these
measures of material and social capital are tapping distinct attributes of these
actors, with possibly different implications for the influence and efficacy in the
food security network. The original model proposed in the research design
included multiple measures of material capacity, using revenue, employees, and
volunteers as separate indicators. However, upon examination of the data, it
was found that the multi-collinearity among the three variables was quite high.
In fact, they were almost perfectly correlated, with values of r=. 8 and higher. To
address this problem and retain the integrity of the model, I created a composite
variable called “material resources” using the three independent variables. The
composite measure is used in the analysis26. Overall, there is a low correlation
between INGOs’ Eigenvector centrality and their revenue (r = -0.12), employees
(r = -0.09), and volunteers (r = −0.20).
Model Summary Results
In this section, results from the empirical model will be presented.
Considering the evidence and organizational context, I expected that while social
resources and material resources are essential to reaching vulnerable
populations, there is likely an interactive effect within this relationship. Social
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26

I conducted multiple preliminary analyses with different model specifications. I used all the independent
variables in one model, just one measure of each concept in another and a moderated regression with just
revenue and social capital. The results are consistent, regardless of the model specification. There are no
direction changes or conflicting results, so only the final model is presented, as it most closely matches the
theoretical arguments proposed in Chapter 2.
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resources come at a cost—time, money and human resources must be devoted to
the pursuit and maintenance of the social resources. Therefore, understanding
the full effects of social capital means examining the organization’s material
capacity to sustain partnerships, share information and devote staff member’s
time to fostering relationships.
Interviews with organizational leaders also suggested there is a cost to
building social capital. Moreover, some leaders suggest that pursuing
partnerships is not always beneficial. For example, some organizations do not
have the material capacity to embark on such endeavors. This was an interesting
concept, which I wanted to build on in my analysis. Based on the theoretical
components in my theory, I posit that outcomes vary based on different levels of
material and social capital.
To test this assumption, I conducted a moderated regression analysis
(Baron and Kenny 1986). I used a macro called “simple1” developed by Jason
Newsom at Portland State University. Using the macro, I calculated the
moderating effects and simple slopes for social capital (x), reach (y), and revenue
(z).
A multiple regression model was tested to examine whether the
relationship between social capital and reach was moderated by revenue. After
centering both social capital and revenue, and computing a social capitalrevenue interaction term (xz) the two predictors and the interaction term were
entered into a simultaneous regression analysis. The variance accounted for by
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adding in the interaction term is much higher than either Model 1 or Model 2
(R2=.752), providing the best fit of the three models. The overall model,
predicting 75.2% of the variance in reach was significant, F(3)=47.43, p<.001,
suggesting that there is a relationship between material resources and social
capital and their relation to predicting reach, however, this relationship is altered
for varying levels of revenue. In this model, both main effects as well as the
interaction effect were statistically significant. For each standard deviation
change in Eigenvector centrality, we can expect a .268 standard deviation change
in total reach (β=.268, t=3.618, p<.001). When considering material resources,
each standard deviation chance in revenue will result in a .951 standard
deviation change in reach (β=.951, t=10.104 p<.001). The interaction term with
Eigenvector Centrality and revenue was also significant and in the expected
direction (β=.924, t=9.687, p<.001). The interaction term has slightly less impact
on the dependent variable than revenue alone, and I suspect this is due to the
resources allocated to developing social capital. In addition, the measure of social
capital is imperfect. It is a proxy, which means it is not measuring relationships
directly. It is also only measuring relationships between one set of actors
(INGOs) and not the other theorized actors in the network. Therefore, the impact
of this variable may be compromised due to criterion deficiency. Table 5.3 below
provides the summary statistics and Table 5.4 presents the correlations between
the two independent variables in this model and the interaction term. Figure 5.2
displays the resulting model graphically.
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Figure 5.2: Results

Social(Capital:(
Eigenvector(Centrality((
R2=.752((

.268(
.924(

Material(Resources:(
Revenue((
Employees(
Volunteers(

Outcome:(
Organiza9onal(Reach((

.951(

Table 5.3: Moderated Regression Summary
Predicators
Constant

(B)

(Beta)

Standard
Error
3331963.94

574406.309

Eigenvector
Centrality (x)

18036878.968

4985566.531

Material
Resources (z)

.013

xz

.077

t

p- value
5.801

.000

.268 (SE=.074)

3.618

.001

.001

.951 (SE=.094)

10.104

.000

.008

.924 (SE=.095)

9.687

.000

201!

Table 5.4: Correlations
xz
Eigenvector (x)
Material
Resources (z)
Reach (y)

xz
1
-.162
.629

Eigenvector
1
-.011
.340*

Revenue

Reach

1
.332*

1

To investigate the nature of the interaction, simple slopes for the
association of social capital (x) on reach at low, mean and high values of revenue
(z) were computed. Low revenue is defined as one standard deviation below the
mean. Medium revenue is defined as at the mean level. High revenue is
measured at one standard deviation above the mean. All three simple slopes
were statistically significant (low β=-.39, p<.001; medium β=.27, p<.001; high
β=.93, p<.001). These results indicated that social capital was more strongly
associated with reach at high levels of revenue. Specific summary statistics
regarding the standardized simple slopes are reported in Table 5.5 below.

Table 5.5: Significance Test: Simple Slopes for Social Capital
Beta

t-value

p-value

Low revenue (z)

-.39

-3.62

.001

Mean revenue (z)

.27

3.62

.001

High Revenue (z)

.93

10.07

.000

These results suggest that there are in fact some organizations who would
benefit from developing social capital, and others, who would not. As predicted,
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these relationships are not linear. In fact, organizations that have low revenue,
who seek out social resources and negatively impact reach. There are two
possible explanations for this finding. First, it may be that smaller organizations
are getting crowded out in the field by larger organizations, and thus are not able
to reach as many needy people. Second, and perhaps most relevant, is the
explanation that an organization’s pursuit of social capital takes up resources,
which are then diverted from programs that reach hungry people to other
organizational activities, such as networking, attending conferences, and
building partnerships. These findings suggest that organizations at the mean
level of revenue or above can benefit needy populations by developing social
ties, greatly increasing their efforts. However, this is not always the case and
organizations should be aware that some attempts to build partnerships, if their
portfolios are weak, would diminish organizational returns. Figure 5.3 also
illustrates what happens to social capital’s effect on reach at different values of
revenue, visually.
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Figure 5.3: Simple Standardized Slopes for Social Capital

x= Eigenvector centrality, z= Material Resources, y= reach

To further investigate social capital’s impact on reach, I conducted a
simple slopes test for the association of material resources (x) on reach at low,
mean and high values of social capital (z).27 Low social capital is defined as one
standard deviation below the mean. Medium social capital is defined as at the
mean level. High social capital is measured at one standard deviation above the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Please note that variable specification have been changed between the two simple slopes test. In order to
test the nature of the interaction on both independent variables, two simple slopes tests were needed. The first
uses the moderator (z) as social capital. In the second simple slopes test, (z) was changed to material resources
to examine the nature of the interaction at different levels of material resources.
27
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mean. All three simple slopes is this analysis remained statistically significant,
although the nature of the interaction altered (low β=-.29, p<.001; medium β=.95,
p<.001; high β=1.61, p<.001). These results indicated that revenue was more
strongly associated with reach at high levels of social capital. Interestingly, when
we examine social capital as a leveraging mechanism, the impact revenue has on
reach is greater at all three levels of social capital. This suggests, that while
impact is still greatest at high levels of revenue and social capital, organizations
that use social relationships to stretch funding fare better than those
organizations using revenue to stretch social capital. Specific summary statistics
regarding the standardized simple slopes for revenue are reported in Table 5.6
below.

The significance test results for the three simple slopes reported here is

located in Table 5.6.
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Figure 5.4: Simple Standardized Slopes for Material Resources

x= revenue, z= Eigenvector centrality, y= reach

Table 5.6: Simple Slopes Significance Test for Material Resources
Beta

t-value

p-value

Low Social Capital (z)

.29

3.93

.000

Mean Social Capital (z)

.95

10.10

.000

High Social Capital (z)

1.61

10.97

.000

Conclusion: Making Sense of the Results
At the beginning of this chapter, three hypotheses were laid out,
predicting the effects of social capital when material capital measures were
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introduced. In this section, I will revisit each hypothesis, in relation to the results
presented in this chapter, further explaining my results.
Hypothesis 1:
H1: The social connectedness of an INGO is positively related to the outcomes
they achieve.
The results of the regression analysis confirm that social capital enables
organizations to reach more hungry people. As social capital increases (as
measured by Eigenvector centrality) so does the predicted number of
beneficiaries. This finding holds true with multiple material control variables.
When I include the use of material resources as a moderator in a moderated
regression analysis, the overall model fares better, but the impact of social capital
decreases. However, when I examine the actual nature of the interaction, as
indicated in the two simple slope tests in the previous section, when social
capital is used to leverage revenue, all variations of the model achieve greater
results. The moderator variable require more explanation, which will be
explained in the discussion for hypothesis 3, as the relationship between social
capital and reach in non-linear.
Hypothesis 2:
H2: Material resources enhance an INGO’s ability to achieve greater
organizational outcomes.
As expected, material resources impacted organizational reach in the expected
direction. The direct effect of material resources in reach was significant and
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positive, which suggests that as material resources increase, reach also increases.
I did not expect material resources to account for a larger variation in reach for
each unit change, however, I suspect this is due to the imperfect and incomplete
measure of social capital utilized in the model, as explained in the previous
section. This criterion deficiency leads me to believe that when I am able to
operationalize more of my concepts for measuring social capital, the impact of
social capital on organizational outcomes will become stronger, and perhaps
outweigh material resources.
Hypothesis 3:
H3: Material resources moderate the relationship social capital has on reaching
vulnerable populations.
It was examined that material resources indeed moderate the relationship
between social capital and reach. For some organizations, those at the mean
level of income of above, the promotion of social capital is beneficial. However,
organizations with little income do not receive the same benefits. This means,
the non-linear relationship between my predictor variables and my outcome
variable reach.
This finding makes sense, based on the theoretical arguments posited
earlier in Chapters 2 and 3. Social capital, while beneficial in the long run, can
have a time-lagged impact. That is, the initial development of relational
resources can be costly, both in regards to revenue and employee time devoted
to establishing and fostering relationships. This finding is contrary, however, to
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what I expected to observe. Although I expected a relationship between material
and social resources, I also expected that organizations short on material capital
would be able to reach more people through the promotion of social capital.
While this is the case for some organizations, those at a mean income level and
above, other small organizations do not operate in the same manner. I expected
to find universal benefits. When I examine the nature of the interaction further, I
find that when organizations use social capital as a leveraging tool, say to reach
more hungry people through partnerships, the outcome remains consistently
improved.
These results could also be partly attributable to the measurement of
social capital employed in this analysis. While I was able to empirically test all
the components of my material resources construct, I was only able to
empirically test one elements of social capital. That is, I was only able to examine
the relationships between INGOs, and not the other three elements of social
capital—the relationships between INGOs and donors, local partners and
businesses. I still argue, when additional measures of social capital are able to be
accounted for in the model, the impact of social capital will be enhanced. It may
be the case that smaller INGOs rely more heavily on local partners, accounting
for the downward slope at low levels of revenue. When all aspects of social
capital are considered, it is plausible that developing relational resources will
enhance performance for varying organizational sizes. Further discussion and
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the policy implications of these results are discussed in the final section of this
chapter.
Descriptive and inferential analysis results have been presented in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, but what does this mean in terms of organizational
reach and INGO policy decisions? There are several points here worth
pondering. First, researchers need to understand what it means to build social
capital. I conclude, from prior research and from the interviews conducted for
this project, social capital is in fact a resource, much like monetary resources or
human capital. It must be developed, cared for over time and can take time and
energy to sustain. In this analysis, it was also suggested social capital impacts
can be detrimental to some organization’s outcomes, as measured by reach in
this analysis. This is extremely important and new information INGOs as well as
scholars can use to advance studies of organizational capacity, taking into
account both organizational structure and external capabilities.
In this network, I deduced only organizations with a certain threshold of
revenue should pursue such ventures, and when they do, the gains are high.
However, other small revenue organizations do not secure the same fate. When
organizations with little monetary resources begin vying for social power in this
network, they begin to negatively effect their missions, trading in social
resources for the benefit of the populations who depend on them for food and
water, agricultural assistance and the like.
On the contrary, the leveraging power of finances can assist an
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organization in enhancing reach. International NGOs can adapt through the
development of long-term strategies, first build the organization’s material
capacity. The material capacity, once established can reach greater outcomes
through a leveraging of social relationships. Material capacity building can
include developing diverse revenue portfolios as well as developing a talented
pipeline of future leaders that can help combat the human resource deficit these
organizations face now and are certain to face in the future. When they reach a
desired threshold of material capacity to withstand the external environmental
challenges, they can begin building partnerships and expanding horizontally.
This notion is generally against the status quo of INGO studies, which suggest
that organizations spend time collaborating and playing off of their collective
comparative advantage. I have shown here that this endeavor is at times
advantageous, but not always the best course of action. In the next chapters, I
will expand on one organization’s story as well as present the limitations and the
direction for future research.
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Chapter 6: Mercy Corps Narrative
Introduction
In Chapter 5, the results of the empirical model were presented that
illustrate both social and material resources contain predictive properties
regarding an organization’s ability to reach hungry people. The model could
only test some aspects of the theory; however, there is much work that can be
completed in future research to expand on the ideas presented and tested in this
work. In this chapter, I aim to provide a more concrete and in-depth
understanding of my results, adding real life narrative, which explains how
social capital actually emerges, and how it interacts with material resources. I use
Mercy Corps as a case example, given my in-depth knowledge of the
organization and my site visits. The case will illustrate how one organization
works in the real world, demonstrating the elements of my model in a more
practical light.
My data suggests Mercy Corps has many partners, but it is not entirely
clear when and why they chose to partner. I wanted to investigate the
organizational motivation and decision-making process to better understand
how my model assists us in understanding the causal mechanisms associated in
advancing organizational capabilities. Collaborating is a large part of Mercy
Corps’ programs. Building and sustaining such relationships can be difficult to
manage. In most instances, relationships emerge organically, from either
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personal connection among employees from different organizations or through
location specific needs. Mercy Corps is currently working on many food security
proposals that, if funded, would not be possible without the collaborative efforts
of partners. Partnerships enable organizations to enhance the programs and in
some cases, get into an area they would not otherwise be welcome or respected. I
attempt to uncover the causal mechanisms at play, using examples. From the
empirical results presented within this work, I now understand there is
something embedded in the interaction of resources, but how and why this
relationship emerges is still underdeveloped. Through a case example, albeit
from one organization, we can get a deeper, richer understanding of this
phenomenon, building a launching point for future research.
Why look at Mercy Corps? There are several reasons to examine Mercy
Corps as a case example in food security programming. First, their commitment
to maintaining partnerships at all levels in my conceptual model is outstanding.
As you will see in this section, they have over 48 current thriving international
partnerships and even more partnerships with local collaborators in their field
locations (Interview December 2012). In addition, Mercy Corps is one of the
industry leaders in reaching vulnerable populations and make it their mission to
relieve pain and suffering. In my food security analysis, Mercy Corps ranks
among the top half of the organizations in all the areas investigated. They rank
thirteenth in social capital, eleventh in revenue, and sixth in reach, out of fiftyone organizations. Mercy Corps is currently serving 4.2 million food insecure
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people (InterAction 2012). They provide an outstanding example of how to build
partnerships while expanding reach. It is remarkable that although they are in
the top third of organizations for social capital and revenue, they are in the top
ten for reach, which means they are doing something right to exceed larger and
more connected organizations on getting the resources to their intended source,
the local communities. The following section provides a narrative focusing on
the empirical models presented in Chapter 5.
Mercy Corps Organizational Overview
Mercy Corps is a large INGO working on over 30 issue areas. They began
working in relief and development in 1979, and see their expertise as helping
transitional communities (Mercy Corps’ Annual Report 2012). Although Mercy
Corps operates in many program areas, they started with a food security project
in 1982 in Honduras. They developed a local partnership to teach soil
conservation and watershed management. In 1985, Mercy Corps began a food
security program in Sudan and in 1986 in Afghanistan, illustrating the
organization’s roots were established partially in food security.
Presently, Mercy Corps is serving 19 million people (Mercy Corps Website
2013). Since 1979, Mercy Corps has provided $2.2 billion in assistance to people
in 114 countries (Mercy Corps Website 2013). The agency consistently ranks as
one of America’s most effective and efficient charitable organizations, with a
commitment to get resources to the communities in need (GuideStar 2012). Over
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the last five years, more than 88 percent of resources were allocated directly to
programs that help families turn crisis into an opportunity to develop.
Mercy Corps and Social Capital
Mercy Corps favors a strategy to engage partners at multiple levels, from
international to communal. When describing partnership, they state:
Mercy Corps believes that partnership is critical to achieving deep impact,
sustainability, and amplifying reach. We collaborate with a diverse range
of partner agencies and institutions at all levels of the public, private and
civil society sectors to address the global challenges that drive our work
(Mercy Corps Website 2013).
This statement epitomizes the focus of my research, as the work Mercy Corps
executes around the globe with limited resources, illustrates that to reach more
people and get results, partnering is an essential ingredient. I review how Mercy
Corps’ builds and sustains partnerships with other INGOs, as well as other local
partners, to add qualitative richness to my empirical findings.
Mercy Corps Collaboration with Other INGOs
Mercy Corps collaborates with other large INGOs on almost every project.
They have a long-standing relationship with Save the Children, where they have
worked side-by-side for over a decade in Tajikistan. Catholic Relief Services
(CRS) is also a long-standing partner. Mercy Corps works with other INGOs in
development and delivery of programs, across sectors including food security.
How do these partnerships emerge, how are they sustained and to what extent
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are they fostered across the organization? These questions, unable to be
answered by my empirical model, are important in understanding the causal
mechanisms in this study.
First, these partnerships emerge, almost always, in the field. Often these
projects in infancy are not interconnected or well developed with the intent to
collaborate. Mercy Corps, like most other large INGOs, responds to calls for
proposals, while trying to identify a niche where they can offer services.
Therefore, one of the primary organizational imperatives is to write winning
proposals. Donors, such as USAID, send out these request for proposals (RFP).
Mercy Corps then employs an internal team to develop an evaluation of needs
on the ground. The field staff typically coordinates location specific information.
A program officer at the headquarters is the primary writer for the proposal. This
initial step requires little outside collaborative effort, as Mercy Corps relies on the
social capital built with donors, through sustained projects, to develop a case for
their project. Therefore, they are relying on relationships at the donor-INGO
level, but not the INGO-INGO level at the beginning of proposal development.
As the proposal is developed, there are pieces not easily implemented by
one organization, as these programs require many outputs with small budgets.
This in turn, motivates INGOs to look for areas of collaboration with other INGOs
seeking funding. The program officers working on the proposal at headquarters
find themselves in a strategic dilemma, one where they need to be cautious, so as
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to not give up information about the projects they are developing proposals for,
but also pragmatic, as they are unlikely to win the proposal if they cannot offer
solutions to the problems identified by the donors. Keep in mind, donors have a
bird’s eye view of the projects currently in operation, as a few donors and
government agencies fund the majority of these projects. Therefore, if Mercy
Corps proposes a project that either duplicates current work, or shows lack of
knowledge of the other programs already established, they appear
uncoordinated; an undesirable perception when competing for scarce funding.
Program officers often find themselves in a situation where they need to find a
partner to build a better proposal.
The idea of partnership begins to emerge, at the headquarters, during a
project’s infancy. However, coordination, although perhaps articulated at
headquarters, is established in the field. When the program officers reach the
conclusion that a partnership is needed to develop a winning proposal, they look
to their organizational leaders in the field for guidance. For example, assume
that Mercy Corps’ is building a program to reduce childhood malnutrition in
Somalia. The program officer, in Portland, Oregon, is not familiar enough with
the conditions on the ground, or with the other organizations willing to work in
a highly volatile and dangerous environment to offer advice on how to partner
nor which partners to choose. The program officer would then contact the
country specific staff, either a country director or program manager, for input on
how to proceed with the proposal. Continuing with the same example, Mercy
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Corps may have an established track record with school nutrition programs and
would like to propose an intervention focused on school meals. The project
criterion recommends an education program for families. The on the ground
country director in Somalia will then rely on the social capital he or she has
developed, suggest partners. He or she will argue that Mercy Corps should
partner with organization “A” because they are already working with parents in
the area, have an established rapport and are well connected with the civic
groups. The country director may also suggest not considering organization “B”
because their staff are having a hard time adjusting to the living conditions, and
are otherwise distracted because of fear for their safety.28 One example came
from Zimbabwe, where a partnership between two INGOs forged in the field
because the country directors found they worked well together and had similar
interests. In Niger last year, Mercy Corps had a partner that was creating a
reporting nightmare for the organization and they had to internalize the
reporting functions of the partner agency to avoid losing funding. In another
case, a partnership had less than desirable outcomes when it was discovered that
Mercy Corps had a much higher tolerance for working in insecure environments.
The other agency was not performing and feeling insecure in the DRC. The
Mercy Corps’ program officer, lacking geographic connection, or environmental
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Although this is an illustrative example, these events are based on real observations in fieldwork, where
some organizations are not prepared to work in the environments where projects are implemented. Thus, their
performance is crippled by anxiety and inability to cope, which is more common in emergency response
situations.

218!

knowledge, relies on the social connections and information gained from the
field staff operating on the ground to begin a discussion with possible partners.
Moreover, the motivation for partnership emergence is based on
experiences with the other INGOs. Different INGOs hire staff with different
specialties, and sometimes, divergent ideological preferences. When INGOs
interact on the ground, they get to know the other staff well, and begin to form
friendships, or a social support network in the field. These social interactions
turn into social capital when the organization is looking for new partners, or
need to build collaborative programs in a specific geographic location. At Mercy
Corps, the field staff that work in close proximity often forge friendships that, in
turn, develop into business partnerships. INGOs operate with high levels of
grant funding and the likelihood two organizations will need to collaborate in
the future is high, thus creating an incentive to foster lasting relationships. While
this is just an example illustrating how partnerships begin, I later cover how
these relationships add benefit to the organization.
I provided an example of how social capital emerges, both at headquarters
and in the field, primarily with an imperative to gain access to funding. Now, I
will turn attention to how these partnerships are sustained and why.
Partnerships, much like friendships, take time to establish. In INGOs, similar to
other organizational structures, trust is an important aspect in fostering
relationships. At an organization like Mercy Corps, whose livelihood depends
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on their reputation with donors, beneficiaries and private constituents, entering
into a partnership can be risky business. As such, Mercy Corps is slow to enter
into a partnership with another INGO, but once trust is established, effort is
directed at maintaining the relationship.
For example, Mercy Corps has a long-standing relationship with Save the
Children. The relationship emerged through field collaboration, as outlined
above, in Central Asia in the 1980s (Interview 2013). The two organizations
recognize their collective advantage, in serving different classes of beneficiaries,
communities in transition and children. After successfully completing a project
together, they developed personal and professional ties between organizations
and established contacts between program officers of the two organizations.
Now, when it comes time to develop a proposal, or share a resource in the field,
Mercy Corps has an established connection, and the upfront costs of developing
the relationship, are no longer a strain on the organization. It should be noted
that maintaining the relationship takes time and resources.
Once relationships are established at Mercy Corps, like the relationship
with Save the Children, they are maintained in several ways. First, they are
maintained through continued interaction and cooperative projects in the field.
Mercy Corps has a small set of partnerships with other INGOs that are well
developed. These organizations collaboratively develop projects, and share
resources, such as housing, food and other commodities in the field. This
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continued day-to-day interaction is part of the glue holding the organizations
together and keeping a trusted bond in place. Second, they are maintained
through connections with program staff. Once Mercy Corps partners with an
INGO, the program officers working at headquarters become connected and
regular emails and telephone messages are exchanged. This communication can
aid the organization in brainstorming collaborative solutions to complex
problems, help in finding a solution to a staffing issues, or simply checking in to
see how the person is doing, establishing an alternative mechanism for dealing
with stress through personal connections and friendship. Third, they are
maintained though policy and advocacy channels. INGOs are known for
collaborating on policy issues, for example, banning landmines, fighting for
human rights in Argentina, or demanding international action in Sudan to name
a few. INGOs who have an established track record of working together enter
into policy activism regularly. Mercy Corps with CARE, Save the Children, and
Oxfam fought against the war in Iraq and genocide in Sudan at a national policy
level. Through established trust and relational bonds, the organizations were
willing to stand-up for perceived problems, showing solidarity. Finally, these
relationships are sustained through leadership channels. Mercy Corps’ leaders
often have to make difficult decisions, whether that means the recent decision to
send staff to Syria, knowing there is a chance someone could not return home, or
decisions about programs that need to be cut when funding is tight. In these
tough decision-making dilemmas, solitary leaders, say the CEO of Mercy Corps,
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calls upon the opinion and advice of his respected colleagues in partner
organizations. In all four of these situations, in the field, at headquarters,
through advocacy or through leadership exchanges, Mercy Corps interacts with
other INGOs to develop solutions, discuss difficult problems, and act in
solidarity. The social capital that emerges out of these interactions may begin in
the field, but it is sustained at all levels of the organization, providing real and
perceived benefits to the organization.
Benefits of Collaborating with Other INGOs
I have reviewed the mechanisms allowing social capital to emerge at
Mercy Corps, and some of the reasons it is sustained, but this discussion is not
complete without a demonstration of the benefits associated with the social
capital generation and maintenance. Adler and Kwon outlined three benefits
derived from social capital, which I reviewed in Chapter 3 (Adler and Kwon
2002, 29-32). In this section, I will focus on these three benefits in relation to
coordination with other INGOs at Mercy Corps.
The first benefit is information. Mercy Corps greatly benefits from
information sharing with other INGOs. They are aware of new RFP calls before
they are released through enhanced information flows. They are also aware of
the challenges other organizations are facing in certain geographic areas, so they
can act proactively to avoid facing similar challenges. Mercy Corps shares data
and evaluation material with other INGOs that is used to build program
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objectives. They also share information about employees so they can build
solutions to the human resource shortages. Mercy Corps is also part of Learning
in International NGOs (LINGOS), which is an umbrella group that coordinates
opportunities for INGOs to share information and develop better solutions based
on best practices. LINGOS facilitates webinars, conferences, and mechanisms for
circulating information. In short, Mercy Corps is part of formal and informal
channels of communication with other INGOs.
Influence is another benefit Mercy Corps’ derives from their interactions
with other INGOs. Through building collaborative partnerships with other large
INGOs, like CRS, CARE, and Save the Children, Mercy Corps has an established
“club”29, or a group of organizations that are able to persuade other actors
through the power and control in numbers. Mercy Corps based on collaboration
with other INGOs has negotiated positions in Sudan, as well in Iraq, while other
organizations were forced out. In environments where conflict is currently
taking place, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, Mercy Corps has established
themselves as a leader. Here, the ability to form partnerships has enabled Mercy
Corps to influence the conversation in a coordinated manner, urging policymakers in Washington, DC to take humanitarian crises more seriously and
allocate funding to the problems.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Coleman (1998) developed this concept, where he examines that Senators can call upon favors from other
members, as they owe them for previous interactions. Coleman calls this the “Senate Club”.
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Influence, and the power derived from inter-collaboration is closely
related to the third benefit of social capital, solidarity. Solidarity assists in
establishing strong social norms, beliefs and compliance with local rules, in the
absence of any formal controls. INGO work, especially in global contexts,
benefits as a whole from solidarity. The INGOs working together, in the field or
in administrative roles, keep each other in check, and establish a strong
normative basis for their interactions with local communities. At Mercy Corps,
their reputation for working in the field in a non-paternalistic manner is echoed
by partners. Mercy Corps and other INGOs are held accountable to the larger
INGO community regarding expectations for behavior and upholding rules.
Mercy Corps benefits from solidarity in a sense that the costs for monitoring
program staff and field workers does not depend on developing a hierarchical
staffing arrangement with direct supervision. At Mercy Corps, the program staff
are held accountable for actions not only by their supervisors, but also by other
INGO staff working in close proximity. Much of the work program managers do
is independent of supervision, adding extra pressure to perform and uphold
empowerment norms in the industry comes from other co-located INGO project
staff. Additionally, working in close proximity to other INGOs allows Mercy
Corps to establish a high level of commitment for the project success for
programs inside and outside the Mercy Corps structure. Therefore, meeting
organizational outcomes is a performance measure for the INGO, but also, in the
case of Mercy Corps working with other INGOs, a reputational imperative.
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In summary, Mercy Corps gains access to information, influence and
industry solidarity from social capital. The three benefits Mercy Corps gains
from developing relationships with other INGOs is not divorced from the
concept of securing much needed material resources. In the next section, I will
begin to explore a few real life examples that demonstrate the interactive nature
of social and material resources.
Interaction Between Material and Social Resources
The development of social resources, as argued previously, does not
operate in a vacuum. The ability to develop social resources is dependent on
material resources, and vice versa. At Mercy Corps, the interaction between
material and social resources is evident in two main areas: 1) human resource
shortages; and 2) collaborative efforts to secure grant funding. Remember the
discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the difficulties facing INGOs when it comes to
recruiting, and more importantly, retaining high performing staff? Developing
social capital can assist with combating the human resources challenges in many
ways. When Mercy Corps posts a position on their webpage, it can remain open
for quite a while, sometimes up to a year. Moreover, when positions are filled,
especially in the field, the average tenure is about 9 months (Interview 2013).
There are many problems with this low recruitment and high turnover
rate, not the least of which is the lack of personnel needed to complete tasks.
This challenge of recruiting and retaining staff at Mercy Corps is a large cost to
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the organization, an organization attempting to run a lean headquarters
operation in order to divert more money to field operations. Over the last five
years, the Learning and Effectiveness division of Mercy Corps has grown
dramatically in an attempt to fill positions efficiently, and keep personnel once
they are hired. In addition, seven years ago, there was one full-time and one
half-time recruiter at Mercy Corps. Today, there is a recruitment director, four
full-time recruiters and temporary recruiters brought in during high volume
times. The role of finding, interviewing and hiring staff is creating a strain on the
organization.
However, this strain is also being combatted, aside from hiring more
professional recruiters, through a well-developed social network. This is the case
for two reasons. First, INGO personnel, through relational ties are better able to
recruit personnel through referrals and direct knowledge of an employee’s
intention to resign, enabling proactive action. Second, one of the main reasons
cited for resigning from field positions is the isolated and often stressful
environment in the field (exit interview data 2004). Developing relationships
with other co-located INGO professionals helps build an emotional support
system that may reduce turnover. This in turn, reduces the cost to hire and retrain a new employee. The social relationships forged in the field become an
asset to retaining employees who otherwise feel isolated. The relationships create
solidarity, which at the very least, provides an avenue for social support. At
best, this provides a relational resource from which future project collaboration
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emerges. At my site visit, I was told about an example of this collaboration in
Zimbabwe last year, where a partnership between two INGOs forged in the field
because the country directors found they worked well together and had similar
interests (Mercy Corps Site Visit, June 2013). In sum, the relational resources
between Mercy Corps and other INGOs is interacting with the material
resources, enabling them to hold onto staff longer.
Secondly, social resources interact with material resources when it comes
to applying for donor funding. As mentioned above, in the illustration regarding
how INGOs begin to form partnerships, it was argued that this partnership
almost always begins with a pragmatic decision, necessary to gain access to
funding. However, this relational element, that assists Mercy Corps in securing
funding from large donors like DFID, USAID, or the UN, is a function of the
relationships they develop in the field and at headquarters. Simply put, as
organizations like Mercy Corps, Save the Children, or CRS develop long-lasting
partnerships, the efficacy for which they can gain access to funding increases.
They have more ears to the ground, to learn about upcoming funding proposals.
They have program managers whom have a history of working together to
quickly develop the proposals and they have a network of employees with
different specialties and from across organizations to choose from. These
relationships assist in efficiencies and waste less material resources in the time an
employee needs to spend establishing the relationships. Here, building
relationships can lead to increased funding, and increased funding means that
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Mercy Corps and their partners have the resources necessary to maintain
relationships; representing the non-linear interaction of material and social
capital.
Finally, global emergencies accentuate the interaction between resources.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami hit on December 26, 2004. It was one of the largest
emergencies requiring humanitarian intervention this century. The natural
disaster claimed 260,000 lives, with even more injuries. One and a-half-million
people were displaced. It took over $14 billion dollars of aid to restore the
communities effected in Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Somalia, and other
surrounding areas. This event was the largest emergency Mercy Corps has
responded to in its history. An event this catastrophic requires coordination and
a speedy response. Every minute that passed created more imminent danger for
the affected population, including the risk of water related illnesses due to
compromised water tables.
I was working at Mercy Corps at the time, and had allowed my team to
take the week off for the holidays. I was called at 1:30 am, the day after
Christmas, and needed to respond immediately. Countless tasks were at hand,
not the least of which was recruiting volunteers and hiring staff to get on the
ground quickly. Also, we needed to coordinate logistics, supplies, water
purification materials, and develop a plan to house and feed hundreds of
thousands of people without homes. In order to accomplish this task, and save
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lives, our local team at Mercy Corps relied on our social capital to respond
quickly and adequately and stretch our material power.
We connected with our team members in Banda Aceh, Indonesia the
closest geographic location affected by the disaster. We spent the first hours after
the emergency planning and developing a list of materials needed and social
connections we could call on to get immediate solutions on the ground. One of
the primary tasks was to reach out to every partner we knew. Who else had staff
in the field nearby? What business partners did we have in the area that can help
with gathering supplies? What connection do we have with other INGOs that
could stretch our material power? We had conference calls with responding
teams at all the major INGOs. With the help of partners, we deployed resources
quickly. Mercy Corps had a strong connection to Engineers without Borders.
CARE had a connection to the Red Cross. Medical Teams International showed
up at Mercy Corps headquarters with medical supplies and helped pack boxes
for shipment. We relied on other INGOs to help with logistics, purchasing
airline tickets, etc. Instead of deploying many logistics coordinators, we
streamlined the teams across organizations, with cross-organizational teams
deployed to all effected areas that included: logistics personnel, water and
sanitation engineers, program managers, refugee camp coordinators, food
distribution personnel, medical doctors, and counselors. Where Mercy Corps
alone did not have the material capability financing or staff with all the needed
expertise to respond, through the social connections established across the INGO
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community, we were able to build complete teams, share personnel, streamline
administrative tasks, and coordinate planning efforts.
While there were mistakes made and panic was not eliminated through
coordination, the ability to respond was enhanced through social connections.
The relational resources between INGOs enabled pooled material resources to
reach further. Moreover, the staff needed to coordinate the projects were
streamlined, sharing responsibility across regions and technical areas. INGOs
have since used the response to the 2004 Tsunami as a learning opportunity
where they together debriefed and wrote after action reviews that helped the
organizations plan for better responses to the next emergency. One outcome, the
development of a centralized emergency response team, has since been
established in the major INGOs as a way to quickly and efficiently coordinate
these emergency efforts. This is just one example, for which I have personal
experience, which demonstrates how the connections established within INGOs
can greatly aid the ability to react when the need is immediate and resources are
slim.
While I attempted to model the relationships between INGOs in my
empirical models, there are other sources of social capital I was unable to
operationalize and test, which in fact form an essential part of Mercy Corps, and
other organizations’, abilities to reach more people. These relationships are
between INGOs and local partners and INGOs and business partners. In the
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following sections, I will review each, respectively, based on the information I
was able to gather from organizational sources and from my own professional
experience.
The Elephant in the Room: Local Partnerships
I argue in my theoretical motivation for this project, that social capital
only emerges in part out of the relationships with other INGOs. Other
relationships also account for social capital exchanges, including relationships
with local partners. I was unable to test this aspect of my model, but still
contend it is an important element in modeling an INGO’s social capital. The
following section provides a review of what I learned about partnering choices in
the food security sector while conducting a site visit at the Mercy Corps World
Headquarters on June 20, 2013. As I do not have the information available to
assess the organization’s local partnerships systematically, a couple of specific
examples from current proposals will be used to demonstrate the use of local
partners and the important role they play in reaching populations. These
proposals are currently under review by funding agencies to enhance
partnerships and food security programs at Mercy Corps: Afghanistan Poppy
Production; Coffee Kids Collaboration; and Coffeelands Initiative.
Afghanistan Poppy Production
Opium crops are big business in Afghanistan agriculture. Currently,
although many other fruits and vegetables can grow optimally in areas where
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poppies are cultivated, the financial benefits of food production do not match the
narcotic prices. In an attempt to strengthen food availability and grow a variety
of crops in Afghanistan, Mercy Corps is working on a proposal that is not strictly
food security, but aims at diversifying poppy production in areas that are ideal
for other food production. The first goal of the program was to reduce poppy
cultivation, with a secondary goal to increase the value of food crops. Finally the
program aims to create a variety of foods available in the market. In many areas
of the country, communities can only get vegetables a couple months a year. By
increasing nutritional diversity in the optimal growing environments, they can
triple the time that fruits and vegetables are available to Afghans. In addition,
the program has an aim to increase capacity of the anti-narcotics arm of the
government. Mercy Corps has worked in Kandahar since 1986. Because the
communities appreciate the work accomplished by the organization, Mercy
Corps has a solid reputation within the communities. In order to retain that
privileged relationship, Mercy Corps needed to separate their objectives from the
government. To achieve the funding requirements, Mercy Corps found a partner
within the community that has connections with the counter-narcotics ministry,
which in turn is linked to the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore, Mercy Corps
can continue to work with the communities, where they have the most impact,
and their partner agency can work with the government agencies, meeting all the
donor requirements. In turn, they can achieve all the aims, without jeopardizing
their trust and commitment to the community, whom generally distrust the
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government ministries. In this instance, Mercy Corps would not be able to
achieve the program objectives without partnership. The local partner they
chose was identified through on-going field interactions between the local
agency and Mercy Corps’ Afghanistan team.
Partnerships, as I have argued, are difficult to start and sustain, however.
Mercy Corps’ partnership with the new local NGO struggled in the middle of the
proposal. The organization was not performing and failing to deliver the
research necessary to complete the proposal submission on time. This in turn,
led to Mercy Corps dedicating more material capacity to the development of the
proposal and nurturing the relationship at the same time. Before the proposal,
Mercy Corps and this organization had only previous social relationships, but no
established working relationship. In order to get up and going, Mercy Corps
representatives reported that it can take a lot of energy and resources at the
onset. When there are immediate interests for an opportunity present,
sometimes one organization has to be willing to take on more of the work to
build the partnership, before it can be sustained.
Coffee and the Hope of Collaboration
Coffee cultivation and coffee corporations offer a rich source of
collaboration. The coffee industry is unique. Businesses that roast and sell the
coffee report feeling a sense of responsibility to help coffee farmers (Mercy Corps
Website 2013). The companies report that they see their role as helping farmers
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to climb out of poverty. In April 2013, Mercy Corps began a new partnership in
Boston with a specialty coffee associate. They are beginning a new movement in
food security for coffee producers. A small NGO named Coffee Kids is well
respected, with a funding history of over 25 years. Coffee Kids works with local
organizations in coffee producing areas, primarily in Latin America. They focus
on building capacity to take on institutional funding within local NGOs in the
coffee producing regions. Coffee Kids’ connections and local respect within
Latin America countries make them a perfect partner organization for Mercy
Corps. In addition, Coffee Kids is looking at a way to grow without losing their
specialty. Partnerships with larger NGOs allow them to remain specialized and
still grow as an organization.
The current coffee crisis is also responsible for spawning an increased
interest in collaboration among INGOs, NGOs and the coffee producers and
cultivators. We are about to experience a major problem in the coffee industry
with an outbreak of the Coffee Leaf Rust. Coffee Leaf Rust is a fungus that
grows in Latin America and it is attacking coffee crops. As of June 2013, 77% of
farmers in the area are in trouble because a portion of their crops were damaged
(Interview May 2013). Coffee production in threatened. Once the trees are
damaged, producers could lose their main cash crop for the next 5 to 7 years,
which is the time it takes for a new tree to mature. This crisis is somewhat
unique in agriculture due the prolonged damage destruction in a coffee crop
ensues.
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Conversations about the damage to the crops and the developing
partnerships got USAID interested. USAID flew out to Portland because they to
hear about the plan partners were beginning to establish with specialties from
CRS, Heifer International, and Coffee Kids, forming a new consortium. This
consortium is comprised of both local NGOs and INGOs. Coffee Kids is in more
countries in Latin America than the other NGOs, which allows the larger INGOs,
such as Mercy Corps to get closer to communities without the initial start-up
energy. Mercy Corps’ field offices, including Guatemala are currently looking at
coffee proposals that incorporate the use of smaller NGOs, such as Coffee Kids.
Coffee Kids has local networks and can form new relationships faster within
their established framework. The new partnership allows INGOs to save on
valuable time in an emergency response and allows Coffee Kids the opportunity
to align with larger NGOs so they can expand without losing their specialized
advantage.
Coffeelands Initiative
As discussed, coffee has proven to be a great area for food security
programs to embrace collaboration across sectors. Mercy Corps’ new program
invites business and industry leaders into the conversation with local growers,
harvesters, NGOs, and donors. After the industry was reprimanded for
unsustainable fair trade practices in 2012, they launched a large study of food
insecurity in the agricultural areas designated as the “coffeelands.” They found
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fair trade had not improved the situation of local farmers, which was a huge
disappointment for business leaders whom prided themselves on better
implementing fair trade practices than multi-national corporations (Mercy Corps
Website 2013; Interview 2012). Mercy Corps is finding coffee farmers are still
food insecure for seven to eight months each year (Interview 2013) .
Through research and consultation on the area of coffee industry
collaboration, the reviews are mixed. The INGOs and other partners coordinate
sometimes and sometimes they do not. The end results are good at the
community level, but not shaping up on a global scale. When asked if the
programs collaborative efforts are working, a Mercy Corps representative
responded, “Are we moving a needle in a larger population sense? The answer is
no. Collaboration is good, but it’s hard to get things done in a meaningful
manner” (Interview June 2013). Mercy Corps, along with the other partners in
the Coffeelands consortium are arguing for the creation of a shared measuring
system. They are calling the structure a “backbone organization.”
The backbone organization’s role is to drive coordination and establish a
community of practice. Coordination takes time, energy, and resources. Many
of the partners have little to spare. At this stage, Mercy Corps has engaged a
consultant to begin a scoping exercise, examining what it will take to make a
backbone organization fruitful for the partners, while enhancing collaboration
and reducing transaction costs. The final report is due out at the end of 2013 to
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examine how a coordinating board would help promote collective action. First
and foremost, the organizations working in a common industry need to establish
common and agreed upon goals and measurement standards. Many are
interested in the coffee issue right now, but funding for the research side to get
the initiative going is waning. However, the partners are arguing that if they can
get the program going to alleviate some of the coordinating pressures, this
program, “could really expand reach.”
Business Partnerships
Emphasis at Mercy Corps is placed on partnerships with other
development agencies, but the pursuit of building social capital does not stop
there. Mercy Corps has many partners in business and industry, as well as many
foundations that support their work. Programs range from employee giving
programs to relief packages. In 2012, Mercy Corps had forty-eight such partners,
which are listed below in Table 6.1 (Mercy Corps Website 2012). Each of these
partners donated more than $50 thousand to assist in the program of their choice
and some donated $500 thousand or more.
Table 6.1: Mercy Corps Business and Foundation Partners in 2012
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
Chevron Corporation
Margaret A. Cargill Foundation
NVIDIA Corporation
Omidyar Network
Reach Out To Asia
Silicon Valley Community Foundation
Source of Hope Foundation
The Rockefeller Foundation
Xylem

Nike, Inc.
Shell
Starbucks Foundation
The Gerald and Henrietta Rauenhorst Foundation
The Vibrant Village Foundation
Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
W.K. Kellogg Foundation
Western Union Foundation
Boston Foundation
Beijing Shunya International Investment Co. Ltd.
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Boeing
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation
ELMA Relief Foundation
Global Impact
Google
Greater Good
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc.
Intel Foundation
JELD-WEN Foundation
Kind Hearts for Charitable Humanitarian
Development
MasterCard Worldwide
Middle East Children's Institute

Combined Jewish Philanthropies
CREDO
Global Giving
James E. and Lila G. Miller Charitable Trust
Linked Foundation
Microsoft
Ploughshares Fund
T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc.
The Ford Foundation
The W. O'Neil Foundation
United Way of the Columbia Willamette

Nike Foundation

Wish for Haiti

Vista Hermosa Foundation
Waggener Edstrom Worldwide

Mercy Corps choses to partner with businesses and foundations to
enhance monetary capital. The organizations listed in Table 6.1 help build a
funding base that carries less stipulations than donors. Moreover, there is less
competition for some of these partnerships between and among INGOs based on
proximity. For illustration, Nike supports a great deal of programs at Mercy
Corps. Part of the reason for this collaborative relationship is related to the
location of both organization’s headquarters in Portland, Oregon. While Nike
supports other philanthropic endeavors, the partnerships with Mercy Corps is
strengthened due to their ability to remain personally connected. At Mercy
Corps, an entire division is dedicated to seeking these partnerships and
sustaining them, in the hopes of gaining financial support. Although not tested
in my model, the relationships Mercy Corps builds with businesses interacts
with their ability to secure donations from these partners, further illustrating the
chemistry between social connections and financial capabilities.
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Summary and Conclusion
Interviews, site visits and personal experience with food security
professionals have confirmed that partnerships are a great asset for Mercy Corps’
programs; however, these partnerships come at a cost to the organization. Mercy
Corps favors a diverse portfolio with multiple partnerships. Food security
partnerships appear to be locally based at the city or regional level. The
evolution of partnerships and collaboration is very contextual and generally
emerges in the field. In some cases, the connection is personal. In other cases, the
partnership is spawned due to necessity, like the Afghanistan opium reduction
program, where Mercy Corps needed to remain apolitical. Some partnerships
create a strain on the organization. It is evident that the location of the
partnerships matters. In another country, this same partner is working
beautifully with the same program, illustrating the country context for choosing
partners. Other partnerships are sustained by prolonged interactions. Mercy
Corps and Save the Children have partnered for years in Tajikistan. The
partnership has flourished overtime and now runs smoothly with little
cultivation.
In summary, relationships that emerge from downstream activities,
meaning those activities located in the field, are also connected to other activities
at different levels of the organization. Figure 6.1 below illustrates a coordination
map, where a few partnerships with other INGOs transcend field level
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coordination. Partnerships in the field are linked both at the location and at
headquarters. In addition, advocacy offices tend to coordinate, depending on the
issue. The collaboration map below, using just a few of the many partners, helps
illustrate how complex these relationships become.
Figure 6.1: Sample Mercy Corps Collaboration Map
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Overall, there are four lessons to be learned from this narrative regarding
the Mercy Corps case example:
•

Partnerships are fruitful and they take time and resources to
sustain;
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•
•
•

Some programs cannot be accomplished without strategic
partnerships;
Organizations and their employees have social resources they draw
on to get work done; and
Developing and sustaining relationships with partner agencies is
driven from the field and is best done in the contextual
environment in which these organizations work.

The case examples help highlight how my empirical models play out in real life
scenarios. In addition, the information obtained through interviews and site
visits made possible future research initiatives more clear, which will be
discussed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 7: Implications, Limitations and Future Research
Introduction
I posited both social capital and material resources are essential in
reaching hungry populations. The theoretic basis of INGO interaction was
developed. The subsequent empirical model was tested to examine the
relationship between divergent resources and organizational reach, as the main
outcome variable of this study. It was evident that the relationship between
social capital and reach is not linear. In fact, for some organizations with little
financial assets, the pursuit of additional social capital can be detrimental to their
missions of reaching and serving the one-billion hungry people in the world.
Here, it was found that those with revenue at the mean level or above had an
organizational advantage in collaborating and using some material resources to
pursue and maintain relationships with other INGOs. The premise and findings
represent a first attempt to quantify food security programs to examine the use of
relational and material resources in meeting outcomes. The remainder of this
chapter will present the implications of these findings as well as the limitations
and suggested direction of future research.
Implications of Findings
Social capital benefits are gaining prominence in the social science
literature, especially at the individual level, including the use of social media.
This study looked at a different unit of analysis—the organization. It was
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hypothesized that organizations pursue and maintain relationships as a source of
capital. In turn, this capital enables the organizations to create and sustain
programs, aiding their outputs. As suspected, organizational resources, such as
social capital, can be beneficial to achieving the INGOs mission, but there are
some critical findings that warrant discussion regarding both resource allocation
and public policy decisions.
INGO Resource Allocation Implications
International NGOs struggle with the proper mix of resources needed to
get the job done right. This study proves no exception, as some organizations
choose divergent methods of obtaining and using resources to reach hungry
populations. However, we need to understand what these findings mean in a
practical manner in order to aid INGOs in their resource allocation decisions.
The findings here suggest INGOs view social relationships as a source of
capital, much like revenue or human resources. However, organizations should
develop a long-term strategic plan before choosing to pursue a more rigorous
social portfolio. These findings suggest some attention should be given to
organizational capacity building, whether in terms of fundraising campaigns,
staff development training, or the securing of a diverse grant portfolio. I suggest
before embarking on a partnership with other large INGOs, these organizations
work on building a financial stream that can sustain the organization. This is
interesting, as much of the literature suggests that promoting partnerships is a
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preferred way to grow the organization. However, when it comes to reaching
the hungry populations, organizations must realize that pursuing social
relationships may, at first, diminish their ability to reach the people they are
pledged to serve. These findings, do not suggest that social capital is not helpful
or should not be pursued. For some organizations, social capital can greatly
increase their ability to reach vulnerable populations. The key take-away
message is that a stable financial portfolio is a precursor to building and
sustaining social resources.
Policy Implications
What do these findings mean for public policy and the development
sector? First, it suggests donors may want to reconsider placing limitations on
funding based on partnerships. This practice may harm smaller organizations;
sometimes those focused on one or two issue areas, which often incorporate
nutrition and health. To enable grassroots organizations to grow, government
agencies need to re-evaluate the growth curve and consider funding smaller
agencies, with perhaps seed money, to allow them to flourish and develop the
social connections needed at the next phase of their development. This in turn,
could help diversify the types of organizations seeking partnership and enrich
programs by providing more of a variety of professions and backgrounds in the
field.
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In addition, INGOs should be aware of the implications and costs to
sustain social relations overtime. They can develop internal strategic plans that
organize social connectivity as part of a long-term strategy and be prepared with
human and financial capital to begin building social wealth when the
organization is ready. Moreover, the organizations may want to begin using the
social connections in more advocacy roles to build awareness of the power local
social connections can establish. This may require bringing on new champions
for change within the organization to help alleviate the pressure on the
organization to expand horizontally.
Civil society organizations are also an important part of the policy plan.
These organizations have a natural place in the community and may be best
suited for connecting INGOs and local organizations. Building stronger
connections to civil society organizations as an intermediary decision, before
branching out to business and other international partners may have a better
return on investment for the organizations in terms of using resources and still
reaching local populations, although I was not able to model this expectation.
In sum, the international environment makes building and sustaining
partnerships even more challenging than domestic social relations due to
location and access. As this research illustrates, regardless of the difficulty of
developing such relations, they can prove invaluable when pursued at the right
time. This section has offered a few suggestions about the future policy
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direction, with hopes that organizations will continue to see the value in building
relationships and partnering for global change.
Limitations
As with any research, there are limitations to these findings and
suggestions for improving future research projects. The four limitations
discussed here are: the use of archival data, the ability to model the international
and not local partnerships, the limitation of one sector analysis and the
availability of outcome variables. The reasons for choosing archival data were
outlined in chapter 4, citing the difficulty of obtaining primary data when
sampling is not an option. In review, to execute a complete and accurate SNA,
all actors must be accounted for, making global analyses and data collection
difficult. In this analysis, through consultation with INGOs, the connections
between organizations, using archival data, were used based on a shared location
at the village level. Although this is likely a fairly close proxy to actual
partnerships, given the nature of the work, it would be better to develop a link
given actual partnerships, with an ability to measure strength of the relationship
added to the analysis. In order to compete a project of that nature, one would
need to conduct either a survey with 100% participation rate or conduct a series
of case studies at the country level that can eventually be linked back to a global
analysis. Neither of these approaches is desirable given the fluidity of the sector,
but modeling exact connections would be desired to a proxy approach.
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Second, I focus on partnerships between and among INGOs. While this is
a valuable project, there is also value in expanding to include other partners
outlined in the conceptual model in Chapter 2. Information regarding local
partnerships and business partnerships would likely aid in understanding the
full model of participation and elucidate more on the value of connectivity and
social capital in development issues. Regardless of this limitation, the first
attempt at modeling connections between INGOs proved to be useful and gives
researchers reason to dig deeper into the phenomena of inter-organization
collaboration to effect organizational outcomes.
Third, this analysis focused on the food security sector. Given the large
variety of sectors represented by INGO work, I would like to see this model
applied to other sectors including, human rights or gender-based violence to
further test external validity. It would be desirable to replicate this study with
another sector to see if the model withstands variation and can be used as a
model for all sectors in the INGO collaboration framework. The nature of the
work, including the locations, isolation and insecure environment does not
change depending on the sector, so there is reason to believe this is a robust
model, but until it is tested across sectors, it remains limited in generalizability.
Finally, another limitation to this study is the use of the outcome variable
as measured by the organization’s reach. Ideally, the outcome variable would be
an objective measure of development, either indicators on the global health index
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or other local health and nutrition related outcomes, including disease
prevalence. This would enable us to make inference that the organizations are
not only reaching those in need, as well as evaluate the effectiveness of those
activities. It would prove interesting to use this model to test effectiveness and
evaluate the use of social capital on sustained health and nutrition changes,
modeled longitudinally. Given the limitations in available data, as well as the
ability to collect village level data for all communities in the world, the analysis
presented here was limited to an objective, but fairly crude outcome of an
organization’s effectiveness.
In conclusion, there are some limitations of this study and areas for
improvement in future research. Although this study was also evaluated at a
process level with representatives of the INGOs themselves, it still seems
plausible to expand and test the model’s robustness across time, other sectors,
levels of partnerships, and alternate outcomes.
Direction of Future Research
As mentioned, this study is the first in an attempt to begin building a
comprehensive network structure of INGOs and their coordination efforts.
There are countless activities and areas for expansion both looking at other areas
in the network, as suggested in the limitations of this project, and in the ability to
build the concept of both social capital and material capacity for this sector that
often works in very insecure, dangerous environments, and often in isolation. As
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discussed, the INGO sector faces other human resource challenges, in addition to
having the capacity to build social connections. Looking at a few of these
organizations more in-depth, like I have done here with Mercy Corps, may help
to build a robust theory. There are a few specific ideas that are worth
mentioning on the topic of future research ideas: a case study approach, an
internal perspective, and an alternative sector model.
Case Study: African Regions
Food security, like many other development issues, hits Africa much
harder than other regions of the world. Drought, lack of access to markets, and
limited crop varieties make Africa the target of many food insecurity issues. In
order to test some of the limitations mentioned above, particularly the actual
connections with local partners and businesses, a comprehensive case study of
the African regions would be very useful. This project would take much time
and resources, and would require external funding. However, a project
examining actual links to address poverty issues in one of the hardest hit regions
of the world would be a viable research agenda worth pursuing. The case
studies would include interviews of local aid workers, attending and observing
project meetings, and meeting local partners. A case study project, especially
with its limited number of participants, would also make collecting an additional
outcome variable more likely.

249!

The leadership pipeline & organizational stressors
INGO leaders, as well as other aid workers operate in environments that
are highly stressful. They are at risk for burnout and feelings of disconnect from
the organization due to their work in isolation. INGOs across the spectrum have
cited problems in human resource shortages and the lack of leaders in the
pipeline. In order to better understand these issues and help address the lack of
material resources available to address development issues such as food security,
we need to investigate some of the internal processes and environments effecting
employee’s ability to stay engaged, move to positions of leadership and develop
the ability to sustain the relationships.
A project examining material capacity issues and well-being of
international aid workers would be valuable and is currently not receiving much
attention in the academic literature. This project would need a pilot to enable the
research questions and process to be better focused and tailored to create
changes for the population. However, I see this project as developing an
intervention that connects aid works and builds a community structure that
assists the isolated staff members in building networks of support, expanding the
social capital of the organization to include the social capital of the individual
workers that make-up the organization. This in turn, may be the link that assists
in better making a case for connections between social capital and organizational
outcomes, which may be mediated by internal human resource demands.
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Test Hypotheses in Another Sector
As mentioned, I focused on the food security sector, one of over 40 sectors
gaining attention in INGO work. While I included all areas with a food security
component, including agricultural and health promotion programs, there are
other areas in which to expand. However, selection criteria involved food
security, which is not the only activity in development. There are many
programs in the INGO field that are focused on divergent activities, not related
to food security. For example, there are governance programs, conflict
initiatives, and women and gender programs. These each represent an
alternative sector of INGO work, outside the scope of food security. To further
test this model, and make inference about INGO work more globally, it would be
important to test these hypotheses and model descriptions looking at other
sectors.
Conclusion
This research accomplished much in the quantification of food security
resources and the application of social capital to the organizational level. There
are, however, still projects that could be completed to further advance this
research agenda, including building the social and material capability constructs
to include alternate variables and looking for an outcome variable assessing both
reach and effectiveness. Nonetheless, I conclude material resources are an
important factor in determining an INGO’s reach in the food security sector. I
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must also concede not all organizations receive the same reward for the
promotion of cooperation and partnership. However, social capital does aid
organizations in reaching more people, and I still contend, that once alternative
relationships are modeled between INGOs and donors, businesses, and local
partners, the impact of social capital will increase in the model.
In sum, I advanced the scholarship of INGO work in international
relations and organizational literature and provided some new measurement
constructs that can be tested across sectors in future research. In conclusion,
organizations are in fact social beings and their connections can, under the
correct environment, aid in achieving organizational outcomes. I demonstrated
how one such organization, Mercy Corps, is using these tools to build
collaborative work environments. Future studies are encouraged to model social
relations and outcomes related to the interactions of organizations globally.
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regulations covering the protection of human subjects. The committee is satisfied that
your provisions for protecting the rights and welfare of all subjects participating in the
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Please note the following requirements:
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before they have been reviewed and approved by the Committee.
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the investigator’s responsibility to ensure that a Continuing Review Report (available in
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before the expiration date, and that approval of the study is kept current.
Adverse Reactions: If any adverse reactions occur as a result of this study, you are
required to notify the Chair of the HSRRC immediately. If the problem is serious,
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Appendix B: Interview Consent Form
Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Dr. David Kinsella and his
doctoral student Mariah Kraner, ABD at Portland State University. They are
studying the social and financial resources international non-governmental
organizations (INGO) use to conduct food security programs. Food security and
technical support managers in the area of food security working at INGOs are
invited to participate in the study.
If you decide to participate, we ask that you complete a one hour interview with
the researcher to answer questions about your organization’s network and food
security programs. The interview will take place at your place of work and
during your scheduled work hours, either in person or over the phone, which
ever is more convenient for you. With your permission, the interview will be
recorded. The audio files will be password protected and stored for 5 years to
protect the fidelity of the interview transcripts.
Frequently Asked Questions
How will my privacy be protected?
We will protect your privacy in the following ways:
1. Your name or other protected information will not be used in any published
documents.
2. Only research personnel associated with the study will be able to access your
information and these individuals will keep your information confidential.
3. The code key, linking your name to your participant code and study data will
be stored in a locked and password-protected computer file, with access limited
only to investigators.
What are the risks and discomforts?
There may be personal discomfort when answering questions about your
organization. You may refuse to answer any of the questions or stop the
interview at anytime. There is also a potential risk of embarrassment for
organizations from a participant’s comments. Participants also have a minimal
risk that their personal viewpoints about an organization may be subject to
employment repercussions. You can choose to keep your identity confidential as
a potential safeguard against this risk.
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There are limited numbers of participants in this study. Therefore, top leaders
and employers may potentially identify the sources of statements/information,
particularly when participants provide anecdotes or specific examples. You
should keep this risk in mind when agreeing to participate in this study. Every
effort will be made on the part of the researchers to protect the identity of
interviewees. As a potential safeguard, organizational names and employee
names will not be included in any reports for this research project. In addition,
you will be sent a copy of the interview questions ahead of time so that you can
judge your comfort with the interview material and think about what
information you feel comfortable sharing, giving the potential risks stated above.
What are the benefits?
You may or may not personally benefit from being in this study. However, by
serving as a subject, you may help us learn how to benefit others in the future.
What are my alternatives?
You may choose not to be in this study. You can choose not to answer interview
questions or ask to have information withheld from the transcript.
Confidentiality and privacy of your protected health information:
We will not use your name or your identity for publication or publicity purposes.
If you sign this form, you are agreeing that PSU may use and publish the deidentified information collected and created in this research study.
You have the right to revoke this authorization and can withdraw your
permission for us to use your information for this research by sending a written
request to the Investigator listed at the bottom of the research consent form. If
you do send a letter to the Principal Investigator, the use and disclosure of your
information will stop as of the date he receives your request. However, the
Principal Investigator is allowed to use and disclose information collected before
the date of the letter or collected in good faith before your letter arrives.
The information about you that is used or disclosed in this study may be redisclosed and no longer protected under federal law.
Costs:
There will be no direct cost to you for participating in the study.
Liability:
If you have concerns or questions about your participation in this study or your
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review
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Committee, Research + Strategic Partnerships (RSP), PO Box 751, Portland, OR
97207, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400, or via email at HSRRC (hsrrc@pdx.edu).
If you have questions about the study itself, please contact Mariah Kraner at
(503) 550-0983, mariahk@pdx.edu.
Participation:
You do not have to join this or any research study. If you do join, and later
change your mind, you may quit at any time. If you refuse to join or withdraw
early from the study, there will be no penalty or loss of any benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled.
You may refuse to sign this consent and authorization form.
You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records.
Your responses are completely confidential and will not be linked to you in any
way. No information on any individual or organization will be provided to
management.
Signatures:
Your signature below indicates that you have read this entire form and that you
agree to be in this study.
(Participant' s name
(Participant's signature)
(Date)
(Name of person obtaining consent)

(Signature of person obtaining consent)
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Appendix C: List of Interview Questions
Interview Questions
Overview: This semi-structured interview script is designed for a 45 minute to 1hour interview with senior food security or strategic planning staff at large
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). These questions will
be asked after a cursory social network analysis has been completed, aiding the
discussion to understand the theoretic foundations of organizational
cooperation, given the social and material structure.
Questions:
1. Understanding that your organization has to make tradeoffs when
focusing resources to expand reach, would you say that more effort is
directed to building relationships with partners in the field or on
enhancing internal capacity and fundraising?
2. Here is a global overview of the actual connections INGOs have related to
food security. What reasons would you give for this social structure and
resource allocation?
3. Why do social relationships have more of an impact on your
organization’s reach? What about material resources ?
4. When you choose to partner with other organizations, what are the
reasons to make such a decision? Are there criteria your organization
establishes when choosing to work with another organization in the field?
5. When it comes to choosing food security programs, would you say that
your organization has the resources and liberty to develop programs that
are based on beneficiary need? Why or why not?
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Appendix D: Invitation to Interview
Invitation to Participate in Interview
Greetings ________________,
You are receiving this message because of your work in the food security
programs at (insert organization). I am a doctoral student at Portland State
University in the Public Affairs and Policy program. Dr. David Kinsella and I are
studying the global reach of food security programs at International NonGovernmental Organizations (INGOs). We are looking at how both social and
financial resources assist organizations in achieving their missions related to
food security. In order to better understand the nature of the work and our
preliminary results, I would like to schedule a one-hour interview with you. We
can conduct it in person or over the phone, which ever is more convenient for
you. If you decide to participate, I will send you a consent form, the interview
questions and a copy of my dissertation overview to better orient you to the
project. If you’d like to participate, please send me an email at mariahk@pdx.edu
and I’ll schedule a time that is convenient for you.
Thank you in advance for taking the time to consider assisting in this research
project and for helping me complete my dissertation project.
Kind regards,

Mariah Kraner, MA, ABD
Research Associate/Project Manager
Oregon Healthy Workforce Center
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Appendix E: IRB Application

Kraner IRB Application
November 2012

&

Friends or Foes?:
Examining Social Capital of International NGOs and Food Security Programs

1. Considering both internal and external organizational resources and pressures,
what factors best predict an international non-governmental organization's
reach in the food security network?
2. To what extent does an organization's social capital predict its humanitarian
reach?

1
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Appendix F: Rank Order- Centrality
INGO
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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Heifer International
World Vision US, Inc.
Catholic Relief Services
The Hunger Project
World Concern
Action Against Hunger
Life for Relief and Development
Lutheran World Relief
Episcopal Relief & Development
Food for the Hungry
Concern Worldwide
Counterpart International
Mercy Corps
Church World Service
Helen Keller International
ACDI/VOCA
Adventist Development and Relief
Agency
CARE
Christian Reformed World Relief
Committee
Save the Children
International Medical Corps
Plant With Purpose
Africare
World Hope International
Pact
United Methodist Committee on Relief
World Neighbors
World Relief
Women for Women International
American Jewish World Service
Trickle Up
Freedom from Hunger
Operation Blessing International
International Rescue Committee
African Medical and Research
Foundation
PATH
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Eigenvector
0.37
0.362
0.355
0.315
0.314
0.31
0.303
0.303
0.277
0.277
0.267
0.267
0.264
0.261
0.236
0.235
0.235
0.23
0.222
0.222
0.221
0.216
0.215
0.212
0.191
0.185
0.184
0.184
0.183
0.181
0.174
0.17
0.162
0.105
0.076
0.073

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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Planet Aid
Mercy-USA for Aid and Development
Relief International
Winrock International
American Red Cross
Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
Baptist World Alliance / Baptist World
Aid
CHF
Food for the Poor
International Relief & Development
Islamic Relief USA
MAP International
Meds & Food for Kids
OXFAM America
Stop Hunger Now
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0.07
0.05
0.046
0.035
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Appendix G: Rank Order- Reach
INGO
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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World Vision US, Inc.
Helen Keller International
Catholic Relief Services
Pact
Save the Children
Mercy Corps
Freedom from Hunger
Action Against Hunger
The Hunger Project
Counterpart International
American Red Cross
African Medical and Research
Foundation
Baptist World Alliance / Baptist
World Aid
Meds & Food for Kids
Africare
Food for the Hungry
CARE
Winrock International
International Medical Corps
Food for the Poor
ACDI/VOCA
Islamic Relief USA
World Concern
Lutheran World Relief
Mercy-USA for Aid and Development
Church World Service
Episcopal Relief & Development
United Methodist Committee on
Relief
PATH
Concern Worldwide
Relief International
Christian Reformed World Relief
Committee
Adventist Development and Relief
Agency
International Rescue Committee
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tot_reached
48090762
24448304
22191797
5001402
4693692
4258849
3281665
3094032
2816006
2697663
2265000
1852001
1799305
1707588
1601209
1311288
1114973
921510
670388
542039
524000
452000
386542
344726
338457
280544
279127
279119
265000
239640
174931
144468
142892
135509

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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World Hope International
Heifer International
World Neighbors
CHF
International Relief & Development
American Jewish World Service
OXFAM America
Life for Relief and Development
MAP International
Stop Hunger Now
World Relief
Trickle Up
Women for Women International
Planet Aid
Plant With Purpose
Operation Blessing International
Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
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124800
124231
88594
70000
50000
47580
33350
33025
29100
26959
15250
12910
12000
6000
5800
4500
2700

Appendix H: Rank Order- Revenue
INGO
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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American Red Cross
Food for the Poor
World Vision US, Inc.
Catholic Relief Services
CARE
Operation Blessing International
Save the Children
International Rescue Committee
Relief International
PATH
Mercy Corps
MAP International
Pact
Islamic Relief USA
CHF
ACDI/VOCA
International Medical Corps
Heifer International
Helen Keller International
Food for the Hungry
Counterpart International
OXFAM America
Church World Service
Adventist Development and Relief
Agency
Winrock International
American Jewish World Service
World Relief
International Relief & Development
Action Against Hunger
Lutheran World Relief
Planet Aid
Concern Worldwide
World Concern
Women for Women International
Life for Relief and Development
Christian Reformed World Relief
Committee
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Revenue
3587775430
1514086411
1508088782
918950000
611013453
473062348
445564956
397873717
338439221
264120854
244942281
209454380
190764968
147310283
139076747
138356769
131132443
118297299
94627525
87417777
87171456
84865882
82412807
74728346
58766249
57979919
56683191
56661360
50300597
41988503
36360283
32009344
32009344
31197464
29630156
16238289

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Episcopal Relief & Development
World Hope International
The Hunger Project
United Methodist Committee on
Relief
Freedom from Hunger
African Medical and Research
Foundation
Stop Hunger Now
Africare
Mercy-USA for Aid and Development
Baptist World Alliance / Baptist
World Aid
World Neighbors
Trickle Up
Meds & Food for Kids
Plant With Purpose
Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
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16134462
14236514
11804326
10925358
7436071
7094000
6804737
6168946
6156289
5503587
5107695
3997360
2464359
703127
360928

